The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning for Global War, 1934-1940

by Henry G. Gole

Startled by the bombing of Pearl Harbor, goes the mythology, Uncle Sam laid down spanner and spade and rolled up sleeves to defeat Japan and Germany. In fact says Gole, a retired US Army colonel turned historian, the US was not totally unprepared for global war. He reconstructs the thinking and plans from course material that was used at the US Army War College and lost until recently. Annotation (c) Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)

Genres: Military Fiction, History

256 pages, Hardcover

First published November 1, 2002

Reviews

[Terry · Rating 4 out of 5]

Quirky little book about some of the planning done, mostly by the US Army before World War 2. It's a bit dry and repetitive, but does provide a lot of useful detail about early planning. Sort of wish the author had added more about planning in World War 2, but this is an interesting read in itself.

[Terry Tucker · Rating 5 out of 5]

There are two reviews here. This first one is 11/26/23 and my Initial one from 2003.
Lost in this history is the great contributions of General Stillwell, Military Attaché 1935-1937 and as a student/advisor 1925-1927. Other history that should be included in one’s study is the Green Book Series:
• Stillwell’s Mission to China,
• Stillwell’s Command problems
• Time Runs out in CBI (China-Burma-India)
• Barbara W. Tuchman’s biography, Stillwell and the American Experience in China

Americans – as result of what historians have either written or omitted – have generally accepted the interpretation that military planning for war only began in 1939 when US security appeared to be threatened. Drawing on material found at the US Army War College, and then later, at the National Archives, after the Green Book Series was published, the material demonstrates that the US Army began planning for Coalition Warfare as early as 1934.

The very first scenario that the USAWC Class of 1934 studied was “Participation with Allies.” The chairman appointed by the AWC to the committee to conduct the study was LTC U.S. Grant III. In his dual role as army chief of staff and president of the joint board, he had the task of preparing a memorandum of instruction for the Blue representative to the Inter-Allied War Council covering the following points; the conduct and objectives of the war, the extent of US military preparation and the extent of allied participation. It was apparent from the start that students were to work at the highest level of national security policymaking. The backdrop for this study was the high-profile debate in the journal Foreign Affairs, by British, American and Japanese top admirals between 1931 and 1935. Col Jonathan M. Wainwright led the group that worked out the American concept of the operation. Capt. William F. Halsey was asked to do an estimate of the allied situation, determine logistics and transportation requirements, determine the allied military and naval forces available and present consolidated allied plans to the committee.
Halsey was not a novice to “Plan Orange.” He had played that scenario as a student at the Naval War College before graduating in 1933 and was aware of current views regarding war with Japan, among those views was the expectation that the Japanese would attack without a declaration of war – like they had in 1904 against Russia. Another major assumption was that the Philippines would be lost early in the war.

War Planning scenarios were well conceived and based on the actual international situation in 1933 – 1934. Plan Orange would be replayed by AWC students in the class of 1939 and 1940.

The planning for Orange and actual events that led to Pearl harbor reflect a Roosevelt Administration that was primarily concerned about containing Japan and had little appetite for encouraging active support for China. By 1940. Plan Orange solutions included establishing a shell trading company and tourist bureau in Rangoon to handle supplies that would provide support and organization to Chinese regular and irregular forces and enhance Chinese economic and military effectiveness in such a way as to harm Japan. Other schemes included organizing scientific expeditions that would really be US miliary missions. The idea to do something to hurt the enemy before the US could be mobilized and deployed produced some creative thinking in what would later be called dirty tricks (reminiscent of the Cold war tactics)

__________________________________________________________
2003

I read this book in 2003 while working on my MA in History. I just reread it again.
This book is based on the material discovered in 25 footlockers that were discovered in the basement of and attic of the Army War College. Twenty three of these lockers contained curriculum material for the period 1919-1941. Of course, this material was uncovered after the publication of the infamous "Green Book" Series and so this book contradicts what was published. Had the authors of the series had access to this material, the Green Books would have been significantly different in content and history.
Never-the-less, the summary of this book is that, following WW I, there was a nucleus of trained professionals that had been studying strategy and foreign affairs and where exceptionally knowledgeable of geopolitical events. The "Color Plans" and ultimately, the Rainbow Plans reflect this understanding. The blue prints for a massive mobilization and global conflict had already been studied in the early 30's. That, by 1935-36, The US Military had already wrestled with the prospects of a two front war and had anticipated the problems of fighting with a "Coalition of Allies."
This book is rich in detail and is very readable history. The chapters are coherent and flow well and the appendix's, notes and bibliography will aid you in further detailed study.

[William J. · Rating 5 out of 5]

For those individuals interested in strategy and war planning, this is an excellent book. As a 1996 graduate of the US Army War College (AWC) I can attest to the continued emphasis in the AWC on broadening inter-service, inter-agency understanding and in understanding working with allies. Ends, ways and means are the crux components of strategy. What is to be accomplished, how is it going to be accomplished and what is needed to insure it is accomplished, remain important questions for the strategist. Since, as Clausewitz states, war is a continuation of politics by other means, military war planning is shaped by US national interests in the international environment. This book clearly demonstrates how important the military education system is to the security of our nation. Colonel Gole, PhD, the author, says: "Planning for war is more than preparing formal documents for approval by duly constituted authority and filing them in a secure container ...Synchronizing means, ways, and ends is what strategists do for the nations they serve"(Gole, pp.152-153). Those officers and civilian leaders who participated in US war planning from 1934-1940 served our nation well. There are many lessons that this book passes on to those who plan as the AWC Motto states, "Not To Promote War But To Preserve Peace."