Art as a Social System

by Niklas Luhmann, Eva Knodt (Translation)

This is the definitive analysis of art as a social and perceptual system by Germany's leading social theorist of the late twentieth century. It not only represents an important intellectual step in discussions of art―in its rigor and in its having refreshingly set itself the task of creating a set of distinctions for determining what counts as art that could be valid for those creating as well as those receiving art works―but it also represents an important advance in systems theory. Returning to the eighteenth-century notion of aesthetics as pertaining to the "knowledge of the senses," Luhmann begins with the idea that all art, including literature, is rooted in perception. He insists on the radical incommensurability between psychic systems (perception) and social systems (communication). Art is a special kind of communication that uses perceptions instead of language. It operates at the boundary between the social system and consciousness in ways that profoundly irritate communication while remaining strictly internal to the social. In seven densely argued chapters, Luhmann develops this basic premise in great historical and empirical detail. Framed by the general problem of art's status as a social system, each chapter elaborates, in both its synchronic and diachronic dimensions, a particular aspect of this problem. The consideration of art within the context of a theory of second-order observation leads to a reconceptualization of aesthetic form. The remaining chapters explore the question of the system's code, its function, and its evolution, concluding with an analysis of "self-description." Art as a Social System draws on a vast body of scholarship, combining the results of three decades of research in the social sciences, phenomenology, evolutionary biology, cybernetics, and information theory with an intimate knowledge of art history, literature, aesthetics, and contemporary literary theory. The book also engages virtually every major theorist of art and aesthetics from Baumgarten to Derrida.

Genres: Art, Sociology, Philosophy, Nonfiction

424 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 1995

About the author

Niklas Luhmann was a German sociologist, and a prominent thinker in systems theory, who is increasingly recognized as one of the most important social theorists of the 20th century.

Luhmann wrote prolifically, with more than 70 books and nearly 400 scholarly articles published on a variety of subjects, including law, economy, politics, art, religion, ecology, mass media, and love. While his theories have yet to make a major mark in American sociology, his theory is currently well known and popular in German sociology and has also been rather intensively received in Japan and Eastern Europe, including Russia. His relatively low profile elsewhere is partly due to the fact that translating his work is a difficult task, since his writing presents a challenge even to readers of German, including many sociologists. (p. xxvii Social System 1995)

Much of Luhmann's work directly deals with the operations of the legal system and his autopoietic theory of law is regarded as one of the more influential contributions to the sociology of law and socio-legal studies.

Luhmann is probably best known to North Americans for his debate with the critical theorist Jürgen Habermas over the potential of social systems theory. Like his one-time mentor Talcott Parsons, Luhmann is an advocate of "grand theory," although neither in the sense of philosophical foundationalism nor in the sense of "meta-narrative" as often invoked in the critical works of post-modernist writers. Rather, Luhmann's work tracks closer to complexity theory broadly speaking, in that it aims to address any aspect of social life within a universal theoretical framework - of which the diversity of subjects he wrote about is an indication. Luhmann's theory is sometimes dismissed as highly abstract and complex, particularly within the Anglophone world, whereas his work has had a more lasting influence on scholars from German-speaking countries, Scandinavia and Italy.

Luhmann himself described his theory as "labyrinth-like" or "non-linear" and claimed he was deliberately keeping his prose enigmatic to prevent it from being understood "too quickly", which would only produce simplistic misunderstandings.

Reviews

[Alexander Carmele · Rating 1 out of 5]

Kunstbegrifflicher Totalausfall – oder leerlaufender Systemzwang ohne kategoriellen Mehrwert.

Nach seiner Emeritierung 1993 arbeitete Niklas Luhmann konzentriert an der Vervollständigung seines neben Soziale Systeme soziologischen Hauptwerkes Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft (1997) und verstarb ein Jahr später. Teil dieses architektonischen Theorieentwurfes sind die funktionalen Teilsysteme der Gesellschaft: u.a. die Wissenschaft, das Recht, die Wirtschaft, die Kunst, die Politik, die Religion, das Erziehungssystem. Mit Die Kunst der Gesellschaft jedoch überzieht er den Rahmen seines Begriffs, wohlwissentlich:

Das Verständnis des damit gemeinten Sachverhalts [der fehlenden Selbstbeschreibung des Kunstsystems] ist vor allem durch den Begriff der »Kultur« verhindert worden - einen der schlimmsten Begriffe, die je gebildet worden sind. Man konnte dann zwar zwischen objektiver und subjektiver Kultur unterscheiden, hatte aber in beiden Fällen einen (artifiziellen) Sachverhalt vor Augen, der durch Zurechnung auf Individuen oder Gruppen nur relativiert wurde.

Statt nun die Konsequenz aus dieser Beobachtung zu ziehen, nämlich das Schisma zwischen subjektiver und objektiver Kultur zu akzeptieren und insofern die Selbstbeschreibung von Kunst als Diskurs im psychischen System zu verorten, also in einem Ich, das sich produktiv-ästhetisch der Welt durch Ausdruck exponiert, versucht Luhmann dennoch „Kunst“ als System zu beschreiben und erzeugt, insbesondere für seine Verhältnisse, großes Begriffs-Wirrwarr.

Der Beobachter ist erschienen und setzt sich der Beobachtung aus. Und damit wird man die Frage nicht mehr los, mit welchen Unterscheidungen beobachtet wird und warum so und nicht anders. Damit ist der alte Versuch der Philosophie, die Kunst als Konkurrentin zu degradieren, ans Ende gelangt. Minerva läßt mehr als nur eine Eule fliegen, und jeder Beobachter läßt sich beobachten als Konstrukteur einer Welt, die nur ihm so erscheint, als ob sie das sei, als was sie erscheint.

Nun zum Problem: durch die Präsenz der Beobachtung zweiten Grades wird insbesondere die Unangemessenheit eines Systembegriffs für die Kunst deutlich, denn: Was ist die Kunst, was nicht? Schwertkunst, Überredungskunst, Bildende Kunst? Kunst bedeutet viel. Hätte Luhmann wenigstens den Kunstmarkt als Feld gewählt, oder wenigstens die Museen- und Galeriengeschichte. Aber nein, er wählt das System „Kunst“ mit einem symbolisch generalisierten Medium namens „schöner Schein“:

Das Konzept eines Sondermediums für Kunst verbirgt sich hinter dem Begriff des »schönen Scheins«.

Worin zeichnet sich aber ein Medium in der Systemtheorie aus? Dass es einen verlässlichen Code besitzt, anhand dessen die Elemente des Systems in ihrer Komplexität reduziert werden können: schuldig/nicht schuldig im Rechtssystem; wahr/nicht wahr im Wissenschaftssystem; durchsetzbar/nicht durchsetzbar in der Politik und, neben weiteren, gezahlt/nicht gezahlt in der Wirtschaft. Der jeweilige Code basiert, der Reihenfolge nach: auf Gesetzesbücher, auf Zitierfähigkeit, auf Wählerstimmen und dem Preis.

Diese Struktur, die die genannten Systeme besitzen, um verlässlich und reproduzierbar ihren Code zu bestätigen und zu stabilisieren, besitzt die Kunst nicht. Was „schön“ ist, bleibt unklar. Die Kunst besitzt kein symbolisch generalisierbares Medium, um Komplexität zu reduzieren. Sie erweist sich als Kommunikation des Inkommunikablen, also als Teil des kommunikativen Systems, nur mit selbstreferenziellen Mitteln, wie Luhmann feststellt. Hier jedoch hört die Soziologie auf, und Philosophie beginnt.

Luhmann hat sich mit Die Kunst der Gesellschaft eindeutig ein Eigentor geschossen und der Kritik Tür und Tor geöffnet, er überstrapaziere andauernd kybernetische und systemtheoretische Begriffe und verwende sie in unzutreffenden Sachverhalten. In dem Fall stimmt’s. Das Buch führt in die Systemtheorie ein, mehr oder weniger, aber enthält nichts Weiterführendes über Kunst und ästhetische Operationalisierungsstrategien.

Wenn Theorie auch nur irgendetwas mit konsistenter Begriffsbildung zu tun haben will (womit sonst?), ist Die Kunst der Gesellschaft ein Totalausfall.

[Schedex]

"Indem das Kunstsystem diese sich reflektierende Form von Selbstreferenz inszeniert und laufend re-inszeniert, kann es auf die Unterscheidung zwischen affirmativen und kritischen Einstellungen zur Außenwelt verzichten. Es verzichtet damit auch auf eine "politische" Funktion, die es ohnehin niemals mit Aussichten auf Erfolg und niemals "demokratisch" hatte usurpieren können. Statt dessen symbolisiert es Zustände, die auf der Ebene der Gesellschaft und ihrer Funktionssysteme als Folgen funktionaler Differenzierung sich eingestellt haben und die offen lassen, wie man sich dazu einstellt, weil es darauf nicht mehr ankommt. Ein Beispiel unter vielen wäre die Resorption der Themen sozialer Bewegungen durch das Funktionssystem der Massenmedien. Das Kunstsystem vollzieht Gesellschaft an sich selbst als exemplarischem Fall. Es zeigt, wie es ist. Es zeigt, auf was die Gesellschaft sich eingelassen hatte, als sie Funktionssysteme ausdifferenzierte und sie damit einer autonomen Selbstregulierung überließ. Es zeigt an sich selbst, daß die Zukunft durch die Vergangenheit nicht mehr garantiert ist, sondern unvorhersehbar geworden ist. Operative Schließung, Emanzipation von Kontingenz, Selbstorganisation, Polykontexturalität, Hyperkomplexität der Selbstbeschreibungen oder einfacher und unverständlicher formuliert: Pluralismus, Relativismus, Historismus, all das sind nur verschiedene Anschnitte dieses Strukturschicksals der Moderne. Die Kunst zeigt in der Form des Leidens an sich selbst, daß es so ist, wie es ist. Wer dies wahrnehmen kann, sieht in der modernen Kunst das Paradigma der modernen Gesellschaft. Aber daß dies geschieht, führt nur auf die Frage, ob es einen Unterschied macht, wenn es geschieht."

[Steven Peck · Rating 4 out of 5]

Read as part of a project working on cybernetics. This is a standardly referenced work. Powerful, rich, and difficult. Filled with ideas that are worth mining further. My largest complaint is that with a few more examples and illustrations of what he was talking about, this would have been more accessible to non-specialists who might find these ideas rewarding. I'm a biologist, and many of his insights about evolution and ecology were important and worth reading the book for, but the level of jargon in here is though the roof. Still this is an important book and well worth the slog for the gems I found.

[Bill Weaver · Rating 5 out of 5]

The scope and breadth of Luhmann’s undertaking and analysis is truly astounding, and based on this “astonishment” alone, one might be tempted to call his writings in totality a work of art. “[T]o borrow a phrase from antiquity, the work of art is created for the sake of astonishment.” (p. 40) Luhmann would no doubt have objected to such a description, blurring as it does the boundaries of differentiated subsystems which are operatively closed, according to the theory, a condition which “might be described as autonomy[,]” meaning that “within its boundaries, autopoiesis functions unconditionally, the only alternative being that the system ceases to exist.” (p. 157) In this context, “an autopoietic system” is merely a “self-determining process” of communication. (p. 11) Luhmann goes on to note that a “system that partially relies on external elements or structures because it cannot operate without them—a computer, for example—is not an autopoietic system.” (p. 157)

This appears to be one of the more problematic aspects of Luhmann’s theory, when he states in his conclusion that the “art system . . . remains dependent on its social environment, and such dependencies (of an economic nature, for example) may increase.” Luhmann attempts to mitigate (or ignore) this difficulty through the concept of “structural coupling[]” such as “between the nervous system and consciousness[.]” (p. 8) Such connections “between system and environment are presupposed.” (p. 50; citing Humberto R. Maturana and Francisco Varela, The Tree of Knowledge: The Biological Roots of Human Understanding (Boston, 1992), pp. 75ff, 181ff) Indeed, “artistic communication realizes specific forms of structural coupling between consciousness and society.” (p. 52) Here we see Luhmann’s assumption that communication is fundamentally separate from perception. “To be sure, communication can indicate perceptions, but what it indicates remains as operatively inaccessible to communication as does the entire physical world.” (p. 10)

Luhmann touches on recent evidence that “the external world is the brain’s own construction, treated by consciousness as if it were a reality ‘out there.’” (p. 6) For Luhmann, in a kind of second act for the mind / body distinction, the “world . . . remains undetermined.” (p. 36) So far as sociology is concerned, the system remains largely undetermined as well. “An external (in this case sociological) description of the art system . . . says nothing about how the art system handles self-generated uncertainties and difficulties.” (p. 315) Then what exactly, does a sociological description of an art system do? The function of the sociological system appears to be a third party observation, that can see both sides of the distinction drawn by the subsystem. “Sociological interest in the notion of function . . . aims at the ‘other side’ of the distinction that art introduces into the world. The question might be rephrased as follows: How does reality appear when there is art?” (p.143)

It may depend to some degree on differentiation, which seems to define “modern society.” (p. 133) Luhmann ponders along the lines that “if differentiation in its specifically modern form turns out to be not as beneficial as was previously assumed, then one needs to revise one’s judgment of modern society.” (p. 133) We are firmly in the grips of a neo-modernist here, as Luhmann wastes little time with the “ill-fated title ‘postmodernism[,]’” a topic for which he finds the “relevant literature . . . grown out of proportion[, and] reason enough for a communication system to end the discussion.” (p. 298; footnote 218)

In Luhmann’s description of modern society “the orientation toward specific functions (or problems) of the social system catalyzes the formation of subsystems that dominate the face of society.” (pp. 133-34) For Luhmann, “society . . . manifests itself in the comparability of its subsystems.” (p. 134) By comparing different subsystems along general and abstract lines “such as system formation and system boundaries, function, medium and forms, operative closure, autopoiesis, first- and second-order observation, and coding and programming . . . a theory of society emerges that does not depend on discovering a unified meaning behind society—for example, by deriving societies from the nature of man, from a founding contract, or from an ultimate moral consensus.” (p. 134) Luhmann’s larger project “may be treated . . . as different forms of self-description available to the system of society.” (p. 134) “The self-description of a system is a paradoxical undertaking from its very beginning.” (p. 302) Indeed, paradox is central to Luhmann’s distinctions, and descriptions of all the subsystems of society: “art . . . law, science, politics, and so on[.]” (p. 134)

For Luhmann then, sociology is a method by which society engages in “self-description.” (p. 134) He is, in a sense, attempting to describe a system of society which encompasses, as environment, all other subsystems. “[F]rom a sociological perspective[.]” systems must adapt to “the results of social evolution” in order to preserve “autopoietic” or self-generating “autonomy.” (p. 302)

Thus, Luhmann would seem to attempt an examination of “the problematic relationship between art and society[,]” a problem that “remains unresolved[.]” (p. 302) Joseph Beuys called it something like “the fatal distance between the artistic will and social reality.” (please forgive, but the external citation escapes me at the present time) It is a problem exemplified by such as Duchamp and the readymade, and a problem which “did not present itself until the twentieth century” according to Luhmann. (p. 314) Prior to this, art developed such that eventually “[p]rofit motives became worthy of literature, and peasants became suitable for portraits.” (p. 145) Here, as in many places, Luhmann appears highly skilled at describing the evolution of the art system, yet he fails to offer a convincingly articulated point at which operative closure and autopoiesis begins, which seems perhaps a fatal flaw for a theory describing such processes as “unconditional[.]” (p. 157)

Luhmann states that his description “remains external and has no control over . . . the art system[.]” Luhmann’s investigations lead him to “one question—a question that cannot be answered by sociology or by any other academic discipline, but only by art. . . . [the question] of how the distinction between art and nonart is to be controlled; how, in other words, the paradoxical unity of art and nonart can be dissolved within the art system itself.” (p. 314)

For Luhmann, art has moved in a difficult direction for any system, a direction in which each communication becomes an attempt to thwart the system’s boundaries. “Art approaches a boundary where artistic information ceases to be information and becomes solely utterance [Mitteilung], or more accurately, where information is reduced to conveying to the audience that art wants to be nothing more than utterance.” (p. 298) Such efforts at self-negation, according to Luhmann, have led to a situation where art becomes nothing but utterance, or conveys solely information to that effect, such as a scream for the sake of screaming one might phrase it. (p. 298) This presents difficulties for any system of communication, when communication is defined by Luhmann as “the difference between information and utterance,” pp. 39 - 40 (emphasis in original)

Hanging over the entire discussion of course, are those pesky “psychic systems,” or “humans” as you and I would refer to them. Luhmann does actually break down and discuss “psychic systems” quite a bit within the text currently under discussion, yet tellingly, the phrase itself is left out of the index. Luhmann (and most of his disciples it seems) would like to ignore such problematic areas of analysis, by moving the frame to the abstract level of “communication systems” or “social systems[.]” (p. 9) In discussing the perception of psychic systems, however, Luhmann notes that a “distinction must be presupposed when dealing with the psychic system’s participation in the communicative process—when, in other words, one of the conditions of possibility of society is at stake.” (p. 16; Luhmann cites himself here, notably)

“Art cannot overcome the separation between psychic and social systems.” (p. 48) Yet the “irritation” remains; if a social system falls in the woods without any psychic system with which to structurally couple, does it utter any information? I must confess at the time I first wrote this, I may have misunderstood Luhmann's theory - elsewhere in his book Introduction to Systems Theory for example he does indicate that for a system to function there must be at least one living observer - so for example, someone or anyone in an art museum alone might be sufficient to allow for the operations of the art system. Nonetheless, you can perhaps observe the difficulty with the functioning of Luhmann's own theory, that purports to explain "human" systems without humanity. One might call Luhmann's theory the neutron bomb of sociology, if it weren't such a vulgar comparison.

Many more learned scholars in the area of sociology might find such concerns a “trivial distinction,” similar to dismissals by internal observers of other system-specific paradoxes which Luhmann describes. Nonetheless to the non-sociologist (or non-systems theorist!), such concerns may appear valid. Certainly as Luhmann defines it, communication exists almost entirely independent of such individuals or “psychic systems.” But is this just an impressive parlor trick, designed to fool us into submission while the modernists continue to operate the machinery of civilization from behind a curtain of ever increasing complexity?

[evangelos]

Didn't read all chapters, only parts of it for research purposes.

[S. Efraim Lindbo · Rating 4 out of 5]

A hard read but very much worth it.

[Phillip]

would like to try again on this one.