The Fateful Alliance: France, Russia and the Coming of the First World War

by George F. Kennan

Chronicles the collapse of a confident, forward-looking Europe into World War I

Genres: History, Russia, European History, France, Russian History, World War I, Politics

Hardcover

First published January 1, 1984

About the author

From Wikipedia:

George Frost Kennan (February 16, 1904 – March 17, 2005) was an American advisor, diplomat, political scientist, and historian, best known as "the father of containment" and as a key figure in the emergence of the Cold War. He later wrote standard histories of the relations between Russia and the Western powers.

In the late 1940s, his writings inspired the Truman Doctrine and the U.S. foreign policy of "containing" the Soviet Union, thrusting him into a lifelong role as a leading authority on the Cold War. His "Long Telegram" from Moscow in 1946, and the subsequent 1947 article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" argued that the Soviet regime was inherently expansionist and that its influence had to be "contained" in areas of vital strategic importance to the United States. These texts quickly emerged as foundational texts of the Cold War, expressing the Truman administration's new anti-Soviet Union policy. Kennan also played a leading role in the development of definitive Cold War programs and institutions, most notably the Marshall Plan.

Shortly after the diploma had been enshrined as official U.S. policy, Kennan began to criticize the policies that he had seemingly helped launch. By mid-1948, he was convinced that the situation in Western Europe had improved to the point where negotiations could be initiated with Moscow. The suggestion did not resonate within the Truman administration, and Kennan's influence was increasingly marginalized—particularly after Dean Acheson was appointed Secretary of State in 1949. As U.S. Cold War strategy assumed a more aggressive and militaristic tone, Kennan bemoaned what he called a misinterpretation of his thinking.

In 1950, Kennan left the Department of State, except for two brief ambassadorial stints in Moscow and Yugoslavia, and became a leading realist critic of U.S. foreign policy. He continued to be a leading thinker in international affairs as a faculty member of the Institute for Advanced Study from 1956 until his death at age 101 in March 2005.

Reviews

[Mshelton50 · Rating 4 out of 5]

The late George F. Kennan, a very distinguished American foreign service officer and writer, offers a detailed look at the formation of the 1894 Franco-Russian alliance that played such a fateful role in the events of 1914. The France of the Third Republic was anxious to end 20+ years of diplomatic isolation following the disastrous Franco-Prussian war, and find a counterweight to Imperial Germany. Russia, in the form of Tsar Alexander III and many highly placed military and civilian personnel, was desirous of establishing a new foreign axis, given that Germany had refused to renew Bismarck's Reinsurance Treaty.

Kennan follows the various diplomatic and military conversations involved, as well as the bureaucratic and political jostling that took place behind the scenes in Paris and St. Petersburg. The treaty, such as it was, took nearly three years to finalize, and constituted a commitment by both powers to undertake a general mobilization in case either was threatened by Germany.

What astonishes Kennan is that neither party sought to define the political aims of any war that would result. Yes, the French expressed their desire for the return of Alsace-Lorraine, and Russian military personnel their aim to annex Galician Poland from Austria-Hungary, but beyond that, nothing was much discussed. Tsar Alexander, incredibly enough, believed that a defeat of Germany would mean the end of the German Empire, and a return to the cluster of smaller states that had existed prior to 1866. As General de Boisdeffre told his Russian counterpart, "Let's defeat them first, the rest will be easy." Interestingly enough, the whole project went into high speed over the quite mistaken belief that the United Kingdom had agreed to accede to the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy. Moreover, in the following 20 years, i.e., down to the eve of World War I, very few people in either government were privy to the actual terms of the agreement as finalized. Secondly, the military personnel (Generals de Miribel and de Boisdeffre for the French, and Obruchev for the Russians) were certain that war was "inevitable," without being able to point to any objective facts that would justify such a conclusion.

The cautionary tale that the alliance offers to us is twofold, Kennan believes. First, if military professionals are allowed to operate on the assumption that war is inevitable, they will plan accordingly, with the result that such plans will lock in the parties and eliminate the room for diplomacy. As General Obruchev wrote, mobilization means war. Second, for all the horrors of World War I, Europe and the rest of the world were able to rebuild and revive afterwards. But in the age of intercontinental nuclear weapons, there is no such hope.

[Andreas · Rating 4 out of 5]

The book deals with the coming together of France and Russia which were politically isolated for different reasons at the time; France due to Bismarck politics to keep it isolated, and Russia due to Germany letting the Reinsurance Treaty lapse. It shows that France from the outset guided Russia in concentrating the Russian forces against Germany rather than the actual enemy. The Russian tsar Alexander III was dreaming at the same time about a Germany broken up into a series of weak small states and hence unable to support Austria-Hungary, or pose any serious threat to Russia. While the Triple Alliance was truly defensive in nature the Franco-Russian alliance was clearly motivated by offensive goals to destroy Germany according to the author. A good book worth reading providing a solid basis on the topic.

[emilio squillante · Rating 4 out of 5]

Turgid for me, a scientist, but insightful and instructive to the lay person. BTW, why is it always the banks getting us in trouble?

[David Carniglia · Rating 3 out of 5]

A good description of a very intricate set of negotiations for the historic Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894. I had no idea that, due primarily to the rivalry and clash of personalities involved, this aptly termed "fateful" alliance had such a difficult genesis.

The Tsar, in particular, seemed to vacillate between trusting France and going it alone against the perceived threat from the Triple Alliance. Both he and the Kaiser apparently put personal enmity ahead of the well-being of their countries. The French leadership, for their part, had as much interest in advancing their careers as they did in looking out for the best interests of France.

The author captures these twists, turns, and anomalies quite well. His style, however, gives a somewhat aloof impression, as though he's depicting a documentary rather than a drama. Also, some of his phrasing is a bit formal, explaining and introducing his transitions and points ("making mention of..." and "turning to") too often.

I found myself skipping over these remarks to dwell on the pithy quotes and informed analysis. While I enjoyed the book and recommend it as a reliable resource on the topic, it might've been even more interesting with a tighter narrative.

While I understand and appreciate that the narrow focus (just from 1890-1894) will necessarily concentrate on the fascinating details of the diplomatic process, more shadings of the larger picture might've been included.

What if the Dual Alliance doesn't come about? Why have an alliance during peacetime anyway? The author does allude to the fact that Bismarck's purpose in setting up the Triple Alliance was defensive. Were more alliancesnecessary or desirable? We tend to get boxed in by certainty of hindsight; but the Franco-Russian Alliance is just the one outcome that did occur.

[Jim Bogue · Rating 5 out of 5]

Mr. Kennan spent most of his long and distinguished career focused on the history and diplomacy of Russia, the Soviet Union, and then Russia again (he was born 13 years before the birth of the USSR and outlived it by 14 years). He writes with insight and wit. He is thus the perfect man to explore the circumstances of the negotiations for the Franco-Russian military alliance from 1890-1894.
Since Russia was by far the most reactionary great power in Europe at this time, and France the most liberal, there were grave drawbacks to such an agreement; they were overshadowed by both powers’ suspicion and fear of Germany (and in Alexander III’s case his strong dislike of the Kaiser). With Bismarck’s removal from power Germany seemed far less predictable than before. For Russia this was magnified when Germany declined to renew its treaty with Russia.
Kennan focuses on the secrecy with which the negotiations were carried out. In Russia, all decisions were in the hands of the Czar - only he, his Foreign and War Ministers (both of whom opposed the treaty), a few generals (strongly in favor) and his family knew what was happening. France was a Republic, but nonetheless only a few officials were privy. This naturally, in a time of slow communications, kept things moving at a glacial pace.
This is a fascinating study, based on extensive research. A fine introduction to the buildup to WWI.

[David Hill · Rating 3 out of 5]

I think George Kennan was one of the most perceptive figures in the history of US-Russia relations and of the Cold War. I've been working my way through his books for quite some time and in the end, expect to read them all.

In this book, Kennan analyzes the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894. Perhaps to a greater extent than many other historians, he makes it a point to understand the personalities involved in the negotiations, to fully understand the motives, the hidden agendas, and the strengths and weaknesses of the people behind historically important events.

As the title suggests, this alliance was key to the events that led up to the First World War. I didn't know much about it before reading the book, and I'll admit that for most students of history, Kennan may be taking us deep into the weeds on this one; might be giving us more detail than we really need.

I have been reading Kennan in a somewhat random order. I didn't realize that this is the second book of a trilogy, the first being Decline of Bismarck's European Order. I haven't bothered to find out if the third was ever written. (Kennan has done this before: promised a trilogy but only delivered the first two. No matter.)

[Allan · Rating 4 out of 5]

The author was the American diplomat in Moscow for a short time and had written and advised about the Soviet Union. His perspectives on Russia, one would expect, were different than those typically trained historians.

There were a few things I took away from the book. General Nikolai Obruchev's 1891 comment about mobilization no longer being a peaceful act, but rather an act of war (when was mobilizing an army ever considered peaceful?). The French insistence on a simultaneous mobilization - both France and Russia mobilizing in case of war with Germany. And Russian foreign minister Giers' level headedness when it came to looking out for the best interests his country and his Tsar. Giers wanted to give his Tsar other options while not being boxed in by treaty in case circumstances warranted. The tragedy is that Giers passed away shortly after Alexander III and the Russians failed to learn from Giers' hard work. Keenan said he tried to find Giers' grave but could not as the church had been converted to an off-limits government building. I too looked for it on the internet given that it's been almost two decades since the collapse of the Soviet empire. No luck.

This is what you get when a former engineering manager reviews a book. Engineers are notorious for writing their life's history on the back of a book of matches or on a single napkin - with room to spare.

[Joe · Rating 3 out of 5]

A very interesting and scholarly review of the negotiations involved in formalizing the French / Russian Alliance in the 1890's. It is not an easy read by any definition; but it was a very worthwhile book to read. Keenan argues that the terms of this Alliance set the scene for the next 60 years of war in Europe.

The characters on all sides are made real showing their strengths and faults. Alexander III, the Kaiser and Carnot are well-known to history. But Kennan brings to life the supporting characters who, for the most part, made the Alliance possible. The interactions and intrigue are fascinating.

I enjoyed the book and would recommend it to anyone who enjoys reading history.

[Mark Singer · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a detailed account of the how the alliance between Russia and France came to be in the early 1890s. The treaty between the unlikely partners of Tsarist Russia and republican France was pursued by each for differing objectives, but both felt isolated in international affairs, and threatened by the partnership of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The terms of the treaty dictated that Russia and France were committed to come to the aid of the other in event of an attack by fully mobilizing their armies, and Kennan describes the long-term consequences of this agreement.

[David Nichols · Rating 2 out of 5]

The author's central thesis - that the Franco-Russian alliance was the product of a predominant European theory of total war and total victory - is a useful one, but his narrative is, regrettably, a dull and turgid one.