David Baldwin cleverly addresses the issue of determining whether economic statecraft is working in his book Economic Statecraft. His chapter on ‘National Power and Economic Statecraft’ suggests a more nuanced and sophisticated metric for judging whether economic statecraft works. Instead of examining only whether the target acquiesced to the demands of the coercer, Baldwin suggests that the costs of the chosen policy should also play a role in deciding on a course of action. In effect, Baldwin argues that leaders, when considering imposing sanctions, should weigh their own utility as opposed to the objective effectiveness of the economic statecraft (Baldwin, p.119). For example, as Baldwin notes, it might be the case that military force is more effective in coercing a target than economic sanctions but that the costs are also prohibitively high. In such a circumstance, the utility of imposing sanctions is higher than the alternative (Baldwin, p.121-3). Indeed, such a comparison is crucial because every policy adopted (or not adopted) by a decision maker has opportunity costs and the policy maker aims to maximize his utility. This metric for judgment is quite different from the one considered by Pape and Elliot, which only looks at whether target states acquiesce to coercers. This new conceptualization of how to judge the efficacy of economic statecraft does add value to prescribing how policymakers should act when considering its use, however, it is problematic in a variety of ways.
First, Baldwin takes his argument too far when arguing that the effects of economic statecraft can be gradual and hard to discern. He is certainly correct when he claims that, ‘The “low politics” of economic exchange may not be very noticeable on any given day; but over the long haul, it is one of the most important influence mechanisms in the world,’ (Baldwin, p.118). However, he takes this difficulty in discernment into the territory of non-falsifiability when discussing the effects of economic statecraft on target states. He claims that, ‘Increased costs are political effects. Not all influence is manifest in terms of changes in policy; changes in the costs of noncompliance also constitute influence,’ (Baldwin, p.133). First, by asserting that economic statecraft is having an effect even when one cannot see the effects makes it impossible to disprove and therefore poor social science. Second, even if it were the case that the costs were having political effects and one could not see them, it does not follow that these costs are important in evaluating how a target state will respond to economic coercion. For example, say that the United States decides to embargo almond imports from North Korea in order to coerce the North Koreans to give up their nuclear program. Though Baldwin might be right that there are some costs to the North Koreans, because almond production is so trivial in North Korea, discussing it in terms of tangible costs that might play any role in coercing the North seems immaterial. Rather, when discussing whether or not economic coercion has political effects, it is necessary to actually see those political effects occurring. Anything short of that is either non-falsifiable, unimportant, or both.
The second critique is that Baldwin’s conceptualization refocuses the debate away from arguably the most crucial issue at hand – determining the circumstances under which states will respond to coercive economic statecraft. When estimating the utility of a sanctioning action, one needs to know whether the targeted state is likely to acquiesce or not. For example, if one is deciding on how to stop the Iranians from acquiring nuclear weapons, it is necessary to estimate whether a particular action has any chance of causing them to stop the development. It is possible that an action has low cost but no chance of success whereas another action has a moderate chance of success while a very high cost. In such a situation, the policymaker’s highest utility would be the second option. However, Baldwin’s discussion does not help us in determining when the target country would be more or less likely to acquiesce and therefore cannot get us very far in terms of prescription.