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Radical Nature: The Soul of Matter
An exploration of consciousness in all matter--from quantum to cosmos
• Outlines theories of consciousness in ancient and modern philosophy from before Plato to Alfred North Whitehead
• Reveals the importance of understanding mind-in-matter for our relationships with the environment, with other people, even with ourselves
Are rocks conscious? Do animals or plants have souls? Can trees feel pleasure or pain? Where in the great unfolding of life did consciousness first appear? How we answer such questions can dramatically affect the way we live our lives, how we treat the world of nature, and even how we relate to our own bodies.
In this new edition of the award-winning Radical Nature, Christian de Quincey explores the “hard problem” of philosophy--how mind and matter are related--and proposes a radical and surprising answer: that matter itself tingles with consciousness at the deepest level. It’s there in the cells of every living creature, even in molecules and atoms. Tracing the lineage of this idea through Western philosophy and science, he shows that it has a very noble history--from before Plato to Alfred North Whitehead. He reveals that the way to God is through nature and that understanding how body and soul fit together has surprising consequences for our relationships with our environment, with other people, and even with ourselves.
• Outlines theories of consciousness in ancient and modern philosophy from before Plato to Alfred North Whitehead
• Reveals the importance of understanding mind-in-matter for our relationships with the environment, with other people, even with ourselves
Are rocks conscious? Do animals or plants have souls? Can trees feel pleasure or pain? Where in the great unfolding of life did consciousness first appear? How we answer such questions can dramatically affect the way we live our lives, how we treat the world of nature, and even how we relate to our own bodies.
In this new edition of the award-winning Radical Nature, Christian de Quincey explores the “hard problem” of philosophy--how mind and matter are related--and proposes a radical and surprising answer: that matter itself tingles with consciousness at the deepest level. It’s there in the cells of every living creature, even in molecules and atoms. Tracing the lineage of this idea through Western philosophy and science, he shows that it has a very noble history--from before Plato to Alfred North Whitehead. He reveals that the way to God is through nature and that understanding how body and soul fit together has surprising consequences for our relationships with our environment, with other people, and even with ourselves.
336 pages, Paperback
First published April 1, 2002
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136 people want to read
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
April 5, 2012
One of the best and most thought provoking books I've ever read.
March 14, 2026
Christian de Quincey, Managing Editor of the IONS (Institute of Noetic Sciences) Review and advocate for a unified view of consciousness, cosmology, and spirituality, should be well-known to those who engage in consciousness studies. He has placed his endorsement of experientialism — the view that physical nature experiences — in opposition to the perspectives of Colin McGinn (1994), Nick Humphrey (2000a), and Ken Wilber (2000b). Panexperientialism is a bracing notion, one in which human consciousness arises from the natural life of the universe without the explanatory gap of traditional materialism or the need for any sort of supernatural miracle.
For me, it is ʻa consummation devoutly to be wishedʼ. Scientists, too, should feel a great sense of relief that they no longer have to suffer the frustration of seeking the cause of subjective experience amidst objective reality because subjective experience has been here all the time! De Quincey states forthrightly that his purpose is less to argue than ʻto tell a new cosmology story aimed at healing the split between mind and body, between consciousness and the physical worldʼ (p. xii). So what we are dealing with here is not traditional philosophy at all, but therapy. Since the case for panexperientialism cannot be revealed experimentally or logically, de Quinceyʼs therapywill proceed by going beyond such and appealing directly to the ʻparadox of experienceʼ itself.
This all sounds agreeable to me, so I gird my loins for this adventure into raw experience (even though de Quincey has proven himself so excellent at intellection that his restatement of Humphreyʼs A History of the Mind was recommended by Humphrey himself (2000) as the best summary available). But here all de Quincey tells me is that when intellect faces paradox, ʻwe must bow in silence before the mystery — and participate with it on its own ineffable termsʼ (p. 22).
Unfortunately, de Quincey postpones such ʻbowingʼ and does the usual thing with relativity, quantum physics, and chaos theory, the three twentieth-century sciences that have undermined mechanism. We next get a summary of the philosophical mind-body problem (even though we know heʼs already solved it) and the history of panpsychist thinking. I was still awaiting my direct revelation when I found there were two meanings to ʻconsciousnessʼ: one ʻpsychologicalʼ that distinguishes between conscious and unconscious (or preconscious) experience, the other ʻphilosophicalʼ that equates consciousness with experience ʻall the way downʼ. Ignoring the fact that many psychologists and philosophers would disagree with this prescription, it seemed to me de Quincey might be folding his tents and preparing to leave the panexperientialist encampment.
The important point about panexperientialism is that it recognizes that conscious experience is a particular quality or mode of universal experiencing in which the mindful apprehension of both world and of physical experience is present. To fall back on the archaic term panpsychism is to open the door to the Mind of — or beyond — Nature, which is top-down, shamelessly religious faith, not the sort of pantheistic panexperientialism I had come to expect from de Quincey. In this way, de Quincey differentiates his views from the panexperientialism of his colleague David Ray Griffin, who apparently coined the term (in Cobb & Griffin, 1977).
This panpsychist-panexperientialist question left me in a panic. Who am I to believe now? Will my direct experience of ʻradical natureʼ be conscious or unconscious? It is a good thing that Radical Nature is only the first volume in a proposed trilogy that will be followed by Radical Knowing and Radical Science [They never were–GN]. I eagerly anticipate the next two, as surely they will cure my pandemic confusion.
References
Cobb, J.B., Jr. & Griffin, D.R., eds. (1977). Mind in Nature: Essays on the Interface of Science and Philosophy (Washington, DC: University Press of America).
de Quincey , C. (1994), ʻConsciousness all the way down? — An analysis of McGinnʼs critique of panexperientialismʼ, Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (2), pp. 217-29.
de Quincey, C. (2000a), ʻConceiving the inconceivable: Fishing for consciousness with a net of miraclesʼ, Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4), pp. 67-81.
de Quincey, C. (2000b), ʻThe promise of integralism: A Critical appreciation of Ken Wilberʼs Integral Psychologyʼ, Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (11-12), pp. 177-208.
Humphrey, N. (2000), ʻIn reply,ʼ Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4), pp. 98-112.
For me, it is ʻa consummation devoutly to be wishedʼ. Scientists, too, should feel a great sense of relief that they no longer have to suffer the frustration of seeking the cause of subjective experience amidst objective reality because subjective experience has been here all the time! De Quincey states forthrightly that his purpose is less to argue than ʻto tell a new cosmology story aimed at healing the split between mind and body, between consciousness and the physical worldʼ (p. xii). So what we are dealing with here is not traditional philosophy at all, but therapy. Since the case for panexperientialism cannot be revealed experimentally or logically, de Quinceyʼs therapywill proceed by going beyond such and appealing directly to the ʻparadox of experienceʼ itself.
This all sounds agreeable to me, so I gird my loins for this adventure into raw experience (even though de Quincey has proven himself so excellent at intellection that his restatement of Humphreyʼs A History of the Mind was recommended by Humphrey himself (2000) as the best summary available). But here all de Quincey tells me is that when intellect faces paradox, ʻwe must bow in silence before the mystery — and participate with it on its own ineffable termsʼ (p. 22).
Unfortunately, de Quincey postpones such ʻbowingʼ and does the usual thing with relativity, quantum physics, and chaos theory, the three twentieth-century sciences that have undermined mechanism. We next get a summary of the philosophical mind-body problem (even though we know heʼs already solved it) and the history of panpsychist thinking. I was still awaiting my direct revelation when I found there were two meanings to ʻconsciousnessʼ: one ʻpsychologicalʼ that distinguishes between conscious and unconscious (or preconscious) experience, the other ʻphilosophicalʼ that equates consciousness with experience ʻall the way downʼ. Ignoring the fact that many psychologists and philosophers would disagree with this prescription, it seemed to me de Quincey might be folding his tents and preparing to leave the panexperientialist encampment.
The important point about panexperientialism is that it recognizes that conscious experience is a particular quality or mode of universal experiencing in which the mindful apprehension of both world and of physical experience is present. To fall back on the archaic term panpsychism is to open the door to the Mind of — or beyond — Nature, which is top-down, shamelessly religious faith, not the sort of pantheistic panexperientialism I had come to expect from de Quincey. In this way, de Quincey differentiates his views from the panexperientialism of his colleague David Ray Griffin, who apparently coined the term (in Cobb & Griffin, 1977).
This panpsychist-panexperientialist question left me in a panic. Who am I to believe now? Will my direct experience of ʻradical natureʼ be conscious or unconscious? It is a good thing that Radical Nature is only the first volume in a proposed trilogy that will be followed by Radical Knowing and Radical Science [They never were–GN]. I eagerly anticipate the next two, as surely they will cure my pandemic confusion.
References
Cobb, J.B., Jr. & Griffin, D.R., eds. (1977). Mind in Nature: Essays on the Interface of Science and Philosophy (Washington, DC: University Press of America).
de Quincey , C. (1994), ʻConsciousness all the way down? — An analysis of McGinnʼs critique of panexperientialismʼ, Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (2), pp. 217-29.
de Quincey, C. (2000a), ʻConceiving the inconceivable: Fishing for consciousness with a net of miraclesʼ, Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4), pp. 67-81.
de Quincey, C. (2000b), ʻThe promise of integralism: A Critical appreciation of Ken Wilberʼs Integral Psychologyʼ, Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (11-12), pp. 177-208.
Humphrey, N. (2000), ʻIn reply,ʼ Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4), pp. 98-112.
December 31, 2018
Consciousness, one phenomena we are so intimately connected with, yet so abstracted from us. Of the many questions about consciousness that we can't answer is regarding its origin. Where does it come from? Why did it come? Is there even a reason for it to come at all? Did it even "come"? De Quincey believes not.
DeQuincey believes there are three rational possibilities for the question of origin: Mind/Body dualism, Emergence Theory, and Panpsychism. Of the first option, deQuincey has some strong objections. Dualism, in its heart, is the Cartesian split of Mind/Body, which describes the mind as separate from the body, independent. This is a split of the material body from the immaterial mind (and/or soul). This line of thinking gives rise to many issues, ontological to epistemological. The greatest of the latter asks "If the Mind is immaterial, how does it obtain knowledge of the material Body? What is the relation between the two?" Examining the arsenal of issues, DeQuincey abandons Dualism. He then dismisses Emergence Theory, which states that consciousness emerges with complex enough matter (like brains), on the grounds of it lacking explanation power. What determines what is "complex-enough"? Besides, it would not explain what caused it to arise. DeQuincey rather hastily, in my opinion, jumps to panpsychism. He describes it as: “Everything is alive—aggregates as well as individuals—with spirit or experience. All matter (including trees, rocks, oceans, winds) is conscious to some degree or in some respect.” In other words, consciousness does not “arise,” but is an intrinsic feature of an object, a particle, like spin/charge.
In support of his theory, he invokes “Cosmoecology,” citing Einstein’s Relativity as it says that if matter is the same as energy, that ultimately disproves substance dualism, and hence supporting his stance. To support that all objects contain consciousness, he discusses “Quantum Choice” whereby a
In this argument, DeQuincy demonstrates an alarmingly superficial understanding of Quantum Theory, which he then uses to his advantage. He builds the argument on the basis that randomness implies choice, and since particles' choice are random, it implies they are "self-driven" and exhibit choice. Granting this absurd claim, choice still does not necessarily imply agency/consciousness.
He does make some other arguments that I do not have a strong counter-argument for, but it does raise an eyebrow (or two). Particularly how he favours panpsychism for the sake of purpose. He believes the universe should have some telos, and he finds the greatest way to unite teleology-blind science with purpose is through the panpsychist model. He still does not make it clear why it's necessary for the universe to have a purpose, and for that I find his teleology-driven philosophy unconvincing. If you happen to agree that the universe should have a purpose, he will provide quite a good party conversation starter.
Regardless, I find that his other arguments are quite convincing. He does make it clear that panpsychism is not necessarily the ultimate model describing consciousness, but it does give a wholesome understanding, and hence why it should be favoured.
This book is written for the layman, and is accessible for any reader. An interesting read, regardless of the above!
DeQuincey believes there are three rational possibilities for the question of origin: Mind/Body dualism, Emergence Theory, and Panpsychism. Of the first option, deQuincey has some strong objections. Dualism, in its heart, is the Cartesian split of Mind/Body, which describes the mind as separate from the body, independent. This is a split of the material body from the immaterial mind (and/or soul). This line of thinking gives rise to many issues, ontological to epistemological. The greatest of the latter asks "If the Mind is immaterial, how does it obtain knowledge of the material Body? What is the relation between the two?" Examining the arsenal of issues, DeQuincey abandons Dualism. He then dismisses Emergence Theory, which states that consciousness emerges with complex enough matter (like brains), on the grounds of it lacking explanation power. What determines what is "complex-enough"? Besides, it would not explain what caused it to arise. DeQuincey rather hastily, in my opinion, jumps to panpsychism. He describes it as: “Everything is alive—aggregates as well as individuals—with spirit or experience. All matter (including trees, rocks, oceans, winds) is conscious to some degree or in some respect.” In other words, consciousness does not “arise,” but is an intrinsic feature of an object, a particle, like spin/charge.
In support of his theory, he invokes “Cosmoecology,” citing Einstein’s Relativity as it says that if matter is the same as energy, that ultimately disproves substance dualism, and hence supporting his stance. To support that all objects contain consciousness, he discusses “Quantum Choice” whereby a
“[a quantum event’s] behavior will appear utterly random, uncaused. That’s exactly what is observed in the behavior of quantum particles. The observer will not be able to detect any difference between choice-driven action and purely random behavior. But to the quantum entity making the choice, there would be a world of difference. The quantum event would be self-caused, not uncaused. It is uncaused only in the sense that no causes external to itself influence its behavior.”
In this argument, DeQuincy demonstrates an alarmingly superficial understanding of Quantum Theory, which he then uses to his advantage. He builds the argument on the basis that randomness implies choice, and since particles' choice are random, it implies they are "self-driven" and exhibit choice. Granting this absurd claim, choice still does not necessarily imply agency/consciousness.
He does make some other arguments that I do not have a strong counter-argument for, but it does raise an eyebrow (or two). Particularly how he favours panpsychism for the sake of purpose. He believes the universe should have some telos, and he finds the greatest way to unite teleology-blind science with purpose is through the panpsychist model. He still does not make it clear why it's necessary for the universe to have a purpose, and for that I find his teleology-driven philosophy unconvincing. If you happen to agree that the universe should have a purpose, he will provide quite a good party conversation starter.
Regardless, I find that his other arguments are quite convincing. He does make it clear that panpsychism is not necessarily the ultimate model describing consciousness, but it does give a wholesome understanding, and hence why it should be favoured.
This book is written for the layman, and is accessible for any reader. An interesting read, regardless of the above!
July 22, 2014
Christian DeQuincy's is the most thorough discussion I have encountered of the case for why we should consider the world as conscious "all the way down." He critiques the traditional reductionist and materialist arguments that it cannot be, covers several alternative perspectives, and provides the clearest exposition I have ever read - and I have read several - of process philosophy's case that it is. In doing so he builds on Charles Hartshorne's work.
When I brought the book to the attention of a professor friend who teaches process philosophy at a major university he liked it so much he will make it required reading in one of his classes. Well written and accessible, I recommend him highly for inquisitive lay people interested in this issue.
When I brought the book to the attention of a professor friend who teaches process philosophy at a major university he liked it so much he will make it required reading in one of his classes. Well written and accessible, I recommend him highly for inquisitive lay people interested in this issue.
May 9, 2025
Me parece muy interesante el tema del libro (pampsiquismo y panexperiencialismo). Se explica muy a detalle las diferentes teorías acerca del pampsiquismo y también explica el autor porqué termina sumándose a una de estas corrientes, la cual nota como más lógica. A veces siento que el autor es muy redundante en varios temas y eso, en lo personal, se me hacía demasiado tedioso, no por nada tardé casi un año en leerlo (lo dejaba por temporadas y luego regresaba a él), aunque en general creo que logra su propósito de informar acerca de esta teoría dentro de la filosofía de la mente que intenta explicar el difícil problema de la consciencia
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews