This is my second reading of a Robin Waterfield’s translation. While I cannot fully critique the accuracy of his translation, I find some his bias that manifest in his additional comments to be tiresome. His continual dig at conservatism, as if it is inherently anti-intellectual borders on a pathology. I agave to chuckle at is selective application of the term “snobbery” in his comments. Clearly an opinion in the eye of the beholder.
What follows are my comments for each of these four dialogues.
Charmides
I found this work to be unfulfilling. I know that is partly the point of this and all of Plato’s early dialogues. The objective of Socrates is to show people that they don’t really know what they think they know. Still I was hoping this work on the virtue of self-control (temperance) should have provided a foundation for my interesting in studying the virtues. Sadly the dialogue was diverted into a discussion of knowledge of knowledge. From what I understand, I believe Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is a better place to start.
For me the most significant aspect is that Socrates’ two interlocutors, Critias and Charmides became two of the hated Thirty Tyrants who briefly ruled over Athens following the Peloponesian War. To see Socrates take them down a notch, despite the familiarity and friendly relationships they had at the time is interesting considering Plato is writing this work at least a few years after the overthrow of the Thirty Tyrants.
Laches
I found Laches a much easier dialogue to follow than Charmides. It begins with the question of educating sons - specifically if they should train to be the heavy infantry of Greek military - the hoplites. It follows with interesting perspectives around training - all the more so as this book was written during the era of hoplite warfare. I was struck that such training was NOT a given considering Laches was a military general.
Knowing these dialogues always end I aporía - stuck without a conclusion - what I am finding the most interesting is how the characters react to this process. Laches is taken down by Socrates and openly admits defeat. He then proceeds to side with Socrates to ensure Nicias is also taken down, even if it means the conversation fails to define courage. Socrates of course succeeds in this effort.
Yet the argumentation is not as strong here. I believe the definition could have easily be come by if they considered not simply knowledge of threatening things, but how one acts with such knowledge. However, that is not the aim of Socrates. He is focused on the transcendent source of that which we call courage. The source cannot be contained by a definition of courage and thus a final definition remains elusive. These early works seem to be a prelude to Plato’s Theory of Forms that manifests in the middle and late dialogues.
Lysis
Lysis seems to be the opening of a trilogy of dialogues on love (Symposium and Phaedra’s being the other two). This work is focused on friendship (philia) or more accurately “attraction”. I found this work to be the most convincing evidence of Socrates corrupting the young.
The premise here is Socrates engaging in a debate around the nature of friendship to prepare Lysis, who is 12, to receive the affections of Hippothales. Now I know this was part of the ancient Athenian culture, but even considering this, it cheapens the whole dialogue. This is exacerbated by weak argumentation and word play resulting in a forced aporia.
One notion I salvaged out of this work is that the presence of the bad drives that which is neither good nor bad to the good. The opposite of this (something Socrates always likes to examine) is that without the bad there is no drive to the good. It is an interesting premise. If there was nothing bad in the world, would we need or even want friends?
Meno
Of the nine works of Plato I have read this far, Meno is my favorite. I admit this may be due in part that most of my previous readings have been Plato’s early dialogues which are notorious for ending in a state called aporia or ‘stuckness’. The dialogue ends in a dead end whereby no one knows what the right definition but do know at least a few wrong definitions.
What follows are some thoughts that came to me as I was reading:
Seeing Socrates give a geometry lesson to an uneducated slave was fascinating to read. It really drove the value of the Socratic Method - the elenchus. I think I need to put this into practice myself when tutoring my kids or leading a Bible study group. I clearly see the merits.
Is virtue (or excellence as described in Meno) teachable? In his comments the translator, Waterfield, implies that they are when considering the students aptitude and exposure to an “inherited conglomerate”. This comment made me smile as it is made firmly through the lens of a progressive college professor. In my own experience, I do believe moral virtue cannot truly be taught and that his arguments about fathers and sons ring true. The failure of sons to achieve the same moral standing as their fathers is so common as to practically be a law of nature. Plato describes Pericles and Thucydides. I would add King David from the Torah as another obvious example. In fact this is a proverb that I live by - do not heed the children of great men or women. Just as Socrates implies at 93e, virtue is not genetic.
The conclusion of Meno was a mind blowing moment for me. Whereas Waterfield was resistant to this argument - to the point of suggesting it almost destroys the entire work. For me, as a Christian, it articulated a passage of Scripture (Rom 13:1-5) that I have always struggled with. How do the authorities know how to govern? They clearly do it in a flawed manner. It is not a “science” of formulas with expected results. Rather it is an activity conducted in the conditions of the inspired working of God.