What do you think?
Rate this book
Kant and the Philosophy of History
The description for this book, Kant and the Philosophy of History, will be forthcoming.
- GenresHistory
354 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1980
1 person is currently reading
27 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
March 19, 2025
This book certainly belongs on the Mount Rushmore of contemporary Kant books. Yovel does a fantastic job of highlighting that Kantian philosophy is not ahistorical in a sense often derided by post-Kantians (and commended by many Kantians themselves). Rather, his philosophy is self-consciously born out of its historical situation and its goal---its ultimate end---is a historical one: the realization of the highest good in the world. Kant is no "abstract philosophizer" but perhaps the most concrete of all philosophers heretofore, understanding himself and his philosophy to emerge from his historical standpoint, and to culminate in a further historical standpoint, one in which Good has defeated Evil and the Kingdom of God has been brought down to earth.
April 27, 2022
So I did write a 10,000 word review of this book, deciding I wanted to review it for Goodreads so badly I just went ahead and wrote my dissertation on it. I'm not going to lie the Hegelian yearnings in Yovel make this book not the best text for an orthodox exegesis of his work, but its development and argument are commendable. I just think that,
In his explication of what he sees as the ‘historical antimony’ inherent in Kant’s system, Yovel claims Kant lacks a unifying ground that mediates between rational and empirical history. This leads him on the topic of the intellectus archetypus to pronounce that ‘Since no intrinsic ground can be found within the system, Kant must resort (…) to a transcendental postulate, “God”; but this postulate does not explain the [rational and empirical] correspondence. It only asserts and (…) presupposes it’ . It is however Kant’s point that we can no more than presuppose or hope for a correspondence between our rational actions and the development to an empirical equivalent of the ‘kingdom of ends’. To have the capacity to cognize the ground that unifies these two domains would on Kants’ account distinguish the distinction between actuality and possibility upon which our freedom is presupposed. Kant also recognizes the consequences of this for the possibility of the systematization of his philosophy, if he was to in a Spinozistic or Fichtean fashion cognize the unifying ground of the practical and theoretical domains, he would fashion himself as an intellectus archetypus and thereby rise above the discursive cognition he ascribed as the natural constitution of every rational being. Yovel’s criticisms of Kants philosophy of history thus demand for a resolution of an antimony which is constitutive of Kant’s system itself.
This more radical approach present in the work of Yovel’s 'Kant and the Philosophy of History' (1989) sees the tension between the demands of rationality and the cunning of nature in history as symptomatic of the dualisms pervasive in Kant’s system. He points here to the internal difficulties in Kant's architectonic that disallow the possibility of a mediation between man’s empirical and rational history, a mediation that is necessary for a coherent philosophy of history. In simultaneously demonstrating the necessity and untenability of such a mediation for Kant, Yovel claims this leads to a ‘historical antimony’ within his system that cannot be resolved, and thus proves fatal.
Ultimately, I really think:
Kant develops in his pragmatic anthropology the methodology for an ongoing self-critique into our own moral and natural constitution which recognizes the discursive nature of human cognition. By integrating both practical and theoretical perspectives and being guided by reasons demand of a ‘rational faith’ in the possibility of a wholly moralized human condition, the pragmatic anthropology provides a critical foundation for Kant’s philosophy of history. This is achieved in two respects, both theoretical and practical. Theoretical by elucidating its systematic place in Kant’s philosophical architectonic, and practical in providing an empirically grounded moral map for enlightened individuals subsisting in history. The first is done by its demonstration of the practical reality of reason bridging the domains of freedom and nature in history, or otherwise integration of Kant’s Critical philosophy with his pragmatic empirical investigations. Yovel’s criticism that this unified moral teleology demands man’s elevation to the cognitive status of an intellectus archetypus is demonstrated as unfounded due to the merely regulative capacity of our Idea of the highest good. This is conceptually reflected in the open-ended but simultaneously transcendentally necessitated endeavour of answering the unifying question ‘what is man?’. The second practical respect is achieved by demonstrating the continuity between our conception of a doctrine of right and morality proper, with Kant providing pragmatic advice on how to realise a ‘kingdom of ends’. Fackenheim’s criticism that Kant’s philosophy of history should be seen as extraneous to his Critical system due to its impracticality is thus also shown as unfounded. Kant’s enlightenment project to inspire awe and make man reflect on the starry heavens above and the moral law within thus ultimately proves to be a constitutive part of his philosophy itself.
Please comment below what you think of this book.
In his explication of what he sees as the ‘historical antimony’ inherent in Kant’s system, Yovel claims Kant lacks a unifying ground that mediates between rational and empirical history. This leads him on the topic of the intellectus archetypus to pronounce that ‘Since no intrinsic ground can be found within the system, Kant must resort (…) to a transcendental postulate, “God”; but this postulate does not explain the [rational and empirical] correspondence. It only asserts and (…) presupposes it’ . It is however Kant’s point that we can no more than presuppose or hope for a correspondence between our rational actions and the development to an empirical equivalent of the ‘kingdom of ends’. To have the capacity to cognize the ground that unifies these two domains would on Kants’ account distinguish the distinction between actuality and possibility upon which our freedom is presupposed. Kant also recognizes the consequences of this for the possibility of the systematization of his philosophy, if he was to in a Spinozistic or Fichtean fashion cognize the unifying ground of the practical and theoretical domains, he would fashion himself as an intellectus archetypus and thereby rise above the discursive cognition he ascribed as the natural constitution of every rational being. Yovel’s criticisms of Kants philosophy of history thus demand for a resolution of an antimony which is constitutive of Kant’s system itself.
This more radical approach present in the work of Yovel’s 'Kant and the Philosophy of History' (1989) sees the tension between the demands of rationality and the cunning of nature in history as symptomatic of the dualisms pervasive in Kant’s system. He points here to the internal difficulties in Kant's architectonic that disallow the possibility of a mediation between man’s empirical and rational history, a mediation that is necessary for a coherent philosophy of history. In simultaneously demonstrating the necessity and untenability of such a mediation for Kant, Yovel claims this leads to a ‘historical antimony’ within his system that cannot be resolved, and thus proves fatal.
Ultimately, I really think:
Kant develops in his pragmatic anthropology the methodology for an ongoing self-critique into our own moral and natural constitution which recognizes the discursive nature of human cognition. By integrating both practical and theoretical perspectives and being guided by reasons demand of a ‘rational faith’ in the possibility of a wholly moralized human condition, the pragmatic anthropology provides a critical foundation for Kant’s philosophy of history. This is achieved in two respects, both theoretical and practical. Theoretical by elucidating its systematic place in Kant’s philosophical architectonic, and practical in providing an empirically grounded moral map for enlightened individuals subsisting in history. The first is done by its demonstration of the practical reality of reason bridging the domains of freedom and nature in history, or otherwise integration of Kant’s Critical philosophy with his pragmatic empirical investigations. Yovel’s criticism that this unified moral teleology demands man’s elevation to the cognitive status of an intellectus archetypus is demonstrated as unfounded due to the merely regulative capacity of our Idea of the highest good. This is conceptually reflected in the open-ended but simultaneously transcendentally necessitated endeavour of answering the unifying question ‘what is man?’. The second practical respect is achieved by demonstrating the continuity between our conception of a doctrine of right and morality proper, with Kant providing pragmatic advice on how to realise a ‘kingdom of ends’. Fackenheim’s criticism that Kant’s philosophy of history should be seen as extraneous to his Critical system due to its impracticality is thus also shown as unfounded. Kant’s enlightenment project to inspire awe and make man reflect on the starry heavens above and the moral law within thus ultimately proves to be a constitutive part of his philosophy itself.
Please comment below what you think of this book.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews