What do you think?
Rate this book
The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume 2 1893–1913
Book by Peirce, Charles S., Houser, Nathan, Kloesel, Christian J. W.
584 pages, Hardcover
First published December 31, 1992
About the author
Charles Sanders Peirce
204 books193 followersCharles Sanders Peirce (/ˈpɜrs/, like "purse", September 10, 1839 – April 19, 1914) was an American philosopher, logician, mathematician, and scientist, sometimes known as "the father of pragmatism". He was educated as a chemist and employed as a scientist for 30 years. Today he is appreciated largely for his contributions to logic, mathematics, philosophy, scientific methodology, and semiotics, and for his founding of pragmatism.
In 1934, the philosopher Paul Weiss called Peirce "the most original and versatile of American philosophers and America's greatest logician". Webster's Biographical Dictionary said in 1943 that Peirce was "now regarded as the most original thinker and greatest logician of his time."
An innovator in mathematics, statistics, philosophy, research methodology, and various sciences, Peirce considered himself, first and foremost, a logician. He made major contributions to logic, but logic for him encompassed much of that which is now called epistemology and philosophy of science. He saw logic as the formal branch of semiotics, of which he is a founder. As early as 1886 he saw that logical operations could be carried out by electrical switching circuits; the same idea was used decades later to produce digital computers.
Bertrand Russell (1959) wrote, "Beyond doubt [...] he was one of the most original minds of the later nineteenth century, and certainly the greatest American thinker ever." Alfred North Whitehead, while reading some of Peirce's unpublished manuscripts soon after arriving at Harvard in 1924, was struck by how Peirce had anticipated his own "process" thinking. Karl Popper viewed Peirce as "one of the greatest philosophers of all times". Yet Peirce's achievements were not immediately recognized. His imposing contemporaries William James and Josiah Royce admired him, and Cassius Jackson Keyser at Columbia and C. K. Ogden wrote about Peirce with respect, but to no immediate effect.
The first scholar to give Peirce his considered professional attention was Royce's student Morris Raphael Cohen, the editor of an anthology of Peirce's writings titled Chance, Love, and Logic (1923) and the author of the first bibliography of Peirce's scattered writings. John Dewey studied under Peirce at Johns Hopkins and, from 1916 onwards, Dewey's writings repeatedly mention Peirce with deference. His 1938 Logic: The Theory of Inquiry is much influenced by Peirce. The publication of the first six volumes of the Collected Papers (1931–35), the most important event to date in Peirce studies and one that Cohen made possible by raising the needed funds, did not prompt an outpouring of secondary studies. The editors of those volumes, Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, did not become Peirce specialists. Early landmarks of the secondary literature include the monographs by Buchler (1939), Feibleman (1946), and Goudge (1950), the 1941 Ph.D. thesis by Arthur W. Burks (who went on to edit volumes 7 and 8), and the studies edited by Wiener and Young (1952). The Charles S. Peirce Society was founded in 1946. Its Transactions, an academic quarterly specializing in Peirce, pragmatism, and American philosophy, has appeared since 1965.
Peirce has gained a significant international following, marked by university research centers devoted to Peirce studies and pragmatism in Brazil (CeneP/CIEP), Finland (HPRC, including Commens), Germany (Wirth's group, Hoffman's and Otte's group, and Deuser's and Härle's group), France (L'I.R.S.C.E.), Spain (GEP), and Italy (CSP). His writings have been translated into several languages, including German, French, Finnish, Spanish, and Swedish. Since 1950, there have been French, Italian, Spanish, British, and Brazilian Peirceans of note.
In 1934, the philosopher Paul Weiss called Peirce "the most original and versatile of American philosophers and America's greatest logician". Webster's Biographical Dictionary said in 1943 that Peirce was "now regarded as the most original thinker and greatest logician of his time."
An innovator in mathematics, statistics, philosophy, research methodology, and various sciences, Peirce considered himself, first and foremost, a logician. He made major contributions to logic, but logic for him encompassed much of that which is now called epistemology and philosophy of science. He saw logic as the formal branch of semiotics, of which he is a founder. As early as 1886 he saw that logical operations could be carried out by electrical switching circuits; the same idea was used decades later to produce digital computers.
Bertrand Russell (1959) wrote, "Beyond doubt [...] he was one of the most original minds of the later nineteenth century, and certainly the greatest American thinker ever." Alfred North Whitehead, while reading some of Peirce's unpublished manuscripts soon after arriving at Harvard in 1924, was struck by how Peirce had anticipated his own "process" thinking. Karl Popper viewed Peirce as "one of the greatest philosophers of all times". Yet Peirce's achievements were not immediately recognized. His imposing contemporaries William James and Josiah Royce admired him, and Cassius Jackson Keyser at Columbia and C. K. Ogden wrote about Peirce with respect, but to no immediate effect.
The first scholar to give Peirce his considered professional attention was Royce's student Morris Raphael Cohen, the editor of an anthology of Peirce's writings titled Chance, Love, and Logic (1923) and the author of the first bibliography of Peirce's scattered writings. John Dewey studied under Peirce at Johns Hopkins and, from 1916 onwards, Dewey's writings repeatedly mention Peirce with deference. His 1938 Logic: The Theory of Inquiry is much influenced by Peirce. The publication of the first six volumes of the Collected Papers (1931–35), the most important event to date in Peirce studies and one that Cohen made possible by raising the needed funds, did not prompt an outpouring of secondary studies. The editors of those volumes, Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, did not become Peirce specialists. Early landmarks of the secondary literature include the monographs by Buchler (1939), Feibleman (1946), and Goudge (1950), the 1941 Ph.D. thesis by Arthur W. Burks (who went on to edit volumes 7 and 8), and the studies edited by Wiener and Young (1952). The Charles S. Peirce Society was founded in 1946. Its Transactions, an academic quarterly specializing in Peirce, pragmatism, and American philosophy, has appeared since 1965.
Peirce has gained a significant international following, marked by university research centers devoted to Peirce studies and pragmatism in Brazil (CeneP/CIEP), Finland (HPRC, including Commens), Germany (Wirth's group, Hoffman's and Otte's group, and Deuser's and Härle's group), France (L'I.R.S.C.E.), Spain (GEP), and Italy (CSP). His writings have been translated into several languages, including German, French, Finnish, Spanish, and Swedish. Since 1950, there have been French, Italian, Spanish, British, and Brazilian Peirceans of note.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
Read
April 8, 2026What an odd little man
Read
April 14, 2026ENGLISH
This is a long book with selected writings from philosopher and founder of the American School of Pragmatism Charles Sanders Peirce. I only read the famous Harvard Lecture VII, “Pragmatism as the Logic of Abduction”, in which the author develops the idea of “abduction” as a type of logical inference, due to its importance to the study of methodology of science.
This book is a good supplement to his “Illustrations of the Logic of Science”, in which Peirce goes through the other logical inferences “induction”, “deduction”, and “hypothesis” (my review here: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...).
Peirce’s lecture on pragmatism as the logic of abduction offers a dense yet ambitious account of how thought originates and develops. His three “cotary propositions” anchor the discussion, linking perception and reasoning in a continuous process. Particularly notable is his claim that perceptual judgments already contain general elements, which challenges the common assumption that abstraction only arises at later, more reflective stages of cognition.
Abduction, for Peirce, is the process by which we generate explanatory hypotheses in response to surprising facts. It follows a distinctive pattern: when an unexpected phenomenon is observed, we propose a possible explanation that would render it unsurprising. Unlike deduction, which presents a certainty, or induction, which deals with repetition, abduction introduces plausible ideas for later testing. Here is how Peirce lays it out:
“The surprising fact, C, is observed;
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course.
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true”.
Crucially, Peirce argues that this process is not separate from perception; rather, perceptual judgments themselves are extreme, uncontrollable cases of abductive inference.
One of the lecture’s strengths lies in how it integrates this notion of abduction with the pragmatist maxim, according to which the meaning of a concept lies in its conceivable practical effects. Peirce shows that this maxim effectively governs which hypotheses are admissible, while still allowing imaginative speculation so long as it ultimately connects to possible experience. However, the lecture can be difficult to follow, as its extended examples and frequent digressions sometimes obscure the central argumentative line.
In sum, the text presents a challenging but original vision of reasoning as rooted in perception and oriented toward action. Peirce’s account of abduction as the creative yet logically structured source of ideas is especially compelling, even if not always clearly expressed. Despite its complexity, the lecture is a significant contribution, offering a unified framework that connects how we perceive, hypothesize, and ultimately make sense of the world.
PORTUGUÊS
Este é um livro extenso com escritos selecionados do filósofo e fundador da Escola Americana de Pragmatismo, Charles Sanders Peirce. Li apenas a famosa Aula VII de Harvard, “O Pragmatismo como a Lógica da Abdução”, na qual o autor desenvolve a ideia de “abdução” como um tipo de inferência lógica, dada a sua importância para o estudo de metodologia científica.
Este livro é um bom suplemento a “Ilustrações da Lógica da Ciência”, no qual Pierce discorre sobre as outras inferências lógicas “indução”, “dedução” e “hipótese” (minha resenha aqui: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...).
A exposição de Peirce sobre o pragmatismo como a lógica da abdução oferece uma análise densa, porém ambiciosa, de como o pensamento se origina e se desenvolve. Suas três “proposições cotárias” (cotary propositions) ancoram a discussão, conectando percepção e raciocínio em um processo contínuo. Particularmente notável é sua afirmação de que os juízos perceptivos já contêm elementos gerais, o que desafia a suposição comum de que a abstração surge apenas em estágios posteriores e mais reflexivos da cognição.
Para Peirce, a abdução é o processo pelo qual geramos hipóteses explicativas em resposta a fatos surpreendentes. Ela segue um padrão peculiar: quando um fenômeno inesperado é observado, propomos uma possível explicação que o tornaria compreensível. Ao contrário da dedução, que apresenta uma certeza, ou diferentemente da indução, que lida com repetição, a abdução introduz ideias plausíveis para posterior teste. Peirce apresenta o conceito da seguinte forma:
“O fato surpreendente, C, é observado;
Mas se A fosse verdade, C seria algo óbvio.
Portanto, há motivos para suspeitar que A seja verdade”.
Fundamentalmente, Peirce argumenta que esse processo não é separado da percepção; pelo contrário, os próprios juízos perceptivos são casos extremos e incontroláveis de inferência abdutiva.
Um dos pontos fortes da palestra reside na forma como integra essa noção de abdução com a máxima pragmatista, segundo a qual o significado de um conceito reside em seus possíveis efeitos práticos. Peirce demonstra que essa máxima governa efetivamente quais hipóteses são admissíveis, permitindo ainda a especulação imaginativa, desde que esta se conecte, em última instância, à experiência possível. Contudo, a palestra pode ser difícil de acompanhar, visto que seus exemplos extensos e digressões frequentes por vezes obscurecem a linha argumentativa central.
Em suma, o texto apresenta uma visão desafiadora, porém original, do raciocínio como enraizado na percepção e orientado para a ação. A descrição de Peirce sobre a abdução como fonte criativa, mas logicamente estruturada, de ideias, é especialmente convincente, ainda que nem sempre expressa com clareza. Apesar de sua complexidade, a palestra é uma contribuição significativa, oferecendo uma estrutura unificada que conecta como percebemos, formulamos hipóteses e, em última instância, damos sentido ao mundo.
This is a long book with selected writings from philosopher and founder of the American School of Pragmatism Charles Sanders Peirce. I only read the famous Harvard Lecture VII, “Pragmatism as the Logic of Abduction”, in which the author develops the idea of “abduction” as a type of logical inference, due to its importance to the study of methodology of science.
This book is a good supplement to his “Illustrations of the Logic of Science”, in which Peirce goes through the other logical inferences “induction”, “deduction”, and “hypothesis” (my review here: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...).
Peirce’s lecture on pragmatism as the logic of abduction offers a dense yet ambitious account of how thought originates and develops. His three “cotary propositions” anchor the discussion, linking perception and reasoning in a continuous process. Particularly notable is his claim that perceptual judgments already contain general elements, which challenges the common assumption that abstraction only arises at later, more reflective stages of cognition.
Abduction, for Peirce, is the process by which we generate explanatory hypotheses in response to surprising facts. It follows a distinctive pattern: when an unexpected phenomenon is observed, we propose a possible explanation that would render it unsurprising. Unlike deduction, which presents a certainty, or induction, which deals with repetition, abduction introduces plausible ideas for later testing. Here is how Peirce lays it out:
“The surprising fact, C, is observed;
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course.
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true”.
Crucially, Peirce argues that this process is not separate from perception; rather, perceptual judgments themselves are extreme, uncontrollable cases of abductive inference.
One of the lecture’s strengths lies in how it integrates this notion of abduction with the pragmatist maxim, according to which the meaning of a concept lies in its conceivable practical effects. Peirce shows that this maxim effectively governs which hypotheses are admissible, while still allowing imaginative speculation so long as it ultimately connects to possible experience. However, the lecture can be difficult to follow, as its extended examples and frequent digressions sometimes obscure the central argumentative line.
In sum, the text presents a challenging but original vision of reasoning as rooted in perception and oriented toward action. Peirce’s account of abduction as the creative yet logically structured source of ideas is especially compelling, even if not always clearly expressed. Despite its complexity, the lecture is a significant contribution, offering a unified framework that connects how we perceive, hypothesize, and ultimately make sense of the world.
PORTUGUÊS
Este é um livro extenso com escritos selecionados do filósofo e fundador da Escola Americana de Pragmatismo, Charles Sanders Peirce. Li apenas a famosa Aula VII de Harvard, “O Pragmatismo como a Lógica da Abdução”, na qual o autor desenvolve a ideia de “abdução” como um tipo de inferência lógica, dada a sua importância para o estudo de metodologia científica.
Este livro é um bom suplemento a “Ilustrações da Lógica da Ciência”, no qual Pierce discorre sobre as outras inferências lógicas “indução”, “dedução” e “hipótese” (minha resenha aqui: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...).
A exposição de Peirce sobre o pragmatismo como a lógica da abdução oferece uma análise densa, porém ambiciosa, de como o pensamento se origina e se desenvolve. Suas três “proposições cotárias” (cotary propositions) ancoram a discussão, conectando percepção e raciocínio em um processo contínuo. Particularmente notável é sua afirmação de que os juízos perceptivos já contêm elementos gerais, o que desafia a suposição comum de que a abstração surge apenas em estágios posteriores e mais reflexivos da cognição.
Para Peirce, a abdução é o processo pelo qual geramos hipóteses explicativas em resposta a fatos surpreendentes. Ela segue um padrão peculiar: quando um fenômeno inesperado é observado, propomos uma possível explicação que o tornaria compreensível. Ao contrário da dedução, que apresenta uma certeza, ou diferentemente da indução, que lida com repetição, a abdução introduz ideias plausíveis para posterior teste. Peirce apresenta o conceito da seguinte forma:
“O fato surpreendente, C, é observado;
Mas se A fosse verdade, C seria algo óbvio.
Portanto, há motivos para suspeitar que A seja verdade”.
Fundamentalmente, Peirce argumenta que esse processo não é separado da percepção; pelo contrário, os próprios juízos perceptivos são casos extremos e incontroláveis de inferência abdutiva.
Um dos pontos fortes da palestra reside na forma como integra essa noção de abdução com a máxima pragmatista, segundo a qual o significado de um conceito reside em seus possíveis efeitos práticos. Peirce demonstra que essa máxima governa efetivamente quais hipóteses são admissíveis, permitindo ainda a especulação imaginativa, desde que esta se conecte, em última instância, à experiência possível. Contudo, a palestra pode ser difícil de acompanhar, visto que seus exemplos extensos e digressões frequentes por vezes obscurecem a linha argumentativa central.
Em suma, o texto apresenta uma visão desafiadora, porém original, do raciocínio como enraizado na percepção e orientado para a ação. A descrição de Peirce sobre a abdução como fonte criativa, mas logicamente estruturada, de ideias, é especialmente convincente, ainda que nem sempre expressa com clareza. Apesar de sua complexidade, a palestra é uma contribuição significativa, oferecendo uma estrutura unificada que conecta como percebemos, formulamos hipóteses e, em última instância, damos sentido ao mundo.
Read
March 20, 2016In this volume, specifically in some of the later papers like "What Pragmatism Is," Peirce emphasizes that pragmatism (or, rather, "pragmaticism," "a name ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers"), his theory of meaning, is a theory of the meaning of signs. Still, the categories, Peirce's One, Two, Three give the way we understand objects, experience, and meaning a structural role.
December 8, 2008
Peirce creates the uniquely American philosophical school, Pragmatism.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews