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Strategy and History
The German 1918 Offensives: A Case Study in The Operational Level of War
This is the first study of the Ludendorff Offensives of 1918 based extensively on key German records presumed to be lost forever after Potsdam was bombed in 1944. In 1997, David T. Zabecki discovered translated copies of these files in a collection of old instructional material at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He presents his findings here for the first time, with a thorough review of the surviving original operational plans and orders, to offer a wealth of fresh insights to the German Offensives of 1918. David T. Zabecki clearly demonstrates how the German failure to exploit the vulnerabilities in the BEF’s rail system led to the failure of the first two offensives, and how inadequacies in the German rail system determined the outcome of the last three offensives. This is a window into the mind of the German General Staff of World War I, with thorough analysis of the German planning and decision making processes during the execution of battles. This is also the first study in English or in German to analyze the specifics of the aborted Operation HAGEN plan. This is also the first study of the 1918 Offensives to focus on the ‘operational level of war’ and on the body of military activity known as ‘the operational art’, rather than on the conventional tactical or strategic levels. This book will be of great interest to all students of World War I, the German Army and of strategic studies and military theory in general.
436 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2006
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
December 28, 2018
This may be one of the best case studies I have ever read. Well researched, clearly written and highly informative. Does not get bogged down in the minutiae of the ludendorff offensives but remains fixed on its whole purpose: the operational level. Highly recommended for any student of military history.
May 14, 2016
During the spring of 1918, the Germans shattered the static nature of combat that had characterised the Western Front for the previous three years. Over a period of four months, the German Army inflicted a series of hammer blows against the British and French, driving them back dozens of miles and inflicting enormous casualties. It was not unknown for advances to seize in a single day as much territory as had taken the Entente Powers months to gain during the battles of 1916 and 1917. Yet the end result of these battles was that the German Army became utterly exhausted and was unable to resist the pressure along the whole length of the line that was exerted by the refreshed French, British and American forces from July onwards, leading to the war ending in military defeat on the battlefield - a conclusion almost totally unpredictable at the start of the year.
Yet, despite this being the turning point of the war, the period has been barely touched by historians, and the German side of the trenches virtually ignored. So David Zabecki's book, based on his PhD thesis, fills a gaping hole in the literature.
Based on extensive examination of the original German records, many of which seems to have survived almost by a miracle through a little-known arrangement for the copying of archives between the German and American authorities in the 1920s and 1930s, Zabecki has produced the first academic study of the whole series of offensives. Moreover, he has sought to explain why they proved ultimately futile - even self-defeating.
Zabecki's conclusion is stark - the offensives failed because the Germans, and especially Ludendorff, failed to understand the operational level of warfare. While often tactically outstanding, each of the offensives lacked any clear purpose, beyond the attrition of enemy forces. He points out that Ludendorff never understood the vital importance of the rail connection at Amiens, for example, whose loss could have caused the entire logistic system of the BEF to collapse, leading to a potential Dunkirk-style withdrawal. Zabecki also demonstrates that Lundendorff's opportunistic approach, so effective in tactical situations, led him to interfere incessantly in the operations of subordinate formations, bypassing both their commanders (going always via the chief of staff route) and the army group headquarters, and pouring in additional forces with no clear purpose.
This powerful study represents an important counterbalance to the sometimes excessively hagiographic approach to the German Army.
The only real criticism to make of the work is that Zabecki's reliance on the current US Army understanding of operational art is sometimes too complete. Although that understanding provides a powerful lens through which to analyse the German actions, Zabecki appears a little too ready to accept the current US Army doctrine as representing the last word on the subject - this reader was left with a sense that the doctrine may be slipping into dogma. This would be unfortunate on two main grounds. First, the reality must be that the understanding of operational art must grow and develop over time. What seems self-evident now may seem less so, or even plain wrong, in a few years time. If the US Army is unable to recognise that doctrine is only valid for the period that it is valid, and that that period will be finite, then this raises concerns regarding the future combat effectiveness of that army. Second, as a consequence, this might cause Zabecki's analysis of the events of 1918 to become unnecessarily dated, which would be a real loss. To an extent, this is precisely the fate that has befallen his excellent study of Bruchmuller, which was closely tied to the artillery regulations employed by the US Army in the early 1990s, but since superceded.
But the above should not take away from the fact that Zabecki has written an important book that any serious student of the First World War, or of operational art more generally, would benefit from reading.
Yet, despite this being the turning point of the war, the period has been barely touched by historians, and the German side of the trenches virtually ignored. So David Zabecki's book, based on his PhD thesis, fills a gaping hole in the literature.
Based on extensive examination of the original German records, many of which seems to have survived almost by a miracle through a little-known arrangement for the copying of archives between the German and American authorities in the 1920s and 1930s, Zabecki has produced the first academic study of the whole series of offensives. Moreover, he has sought to explain why they proved ultimately futile - even self-defeating.
Zabecki's conclusion is stark - the offensives failed because the Germans, and especially Ludendorff, failed to understand the operational level of warfare. While often tactically outstanding, each of the offensives lacked any clear purpose, beyond the attrition of enemy forces. He points out that Ludendorff never understood the vital importance of the rail connection at Amiens, for example, whose loss could have caused the entire logistic system of the BEF to collapse, leading to a potential Dunkirk-style withdrawal. Zabecki also demonstrates that Lundendorff's opportunistic approach, so effective in tactical situations, led him to interfere incessantly in the operations of subordinate formations, bypassing both their commanders (going always via the chief of staff route) and the army group headquarters, and pouring in additional forces with no clear purpose.
This powerful study represents an important counterbalance to the sometimes excessively hagiographic approach to the German Army.
The only real criticism to make of the work is that Zabecki's reliance on the current US Army understanding of operational art is sometimes too complete. Although that understanding provides a powerful lens through which to analyse the German actions, Zabecki appears a little too ready to accept the current US Army doctrine as representing the last word on the subject - this reader was left with a sense that the doctrine may be slipping into dogma. This would be unfortunate on two main grounds. First, the reality must be that the understanding of operational art must grow and develop over time. What seems self-evident now may seem less so, or even plain wrong, in a few years time. If the US Army is unable to recognise that doctrine is only valid for the period that it is valid, and that that period will be finite, then this raises concerns regarding the future combat effectiveness of that army. Second, as a consequence, this might cause Zabecki's analysis of the events of 1918 to become unnecessarily dated, which would be a real loss. To an extent, this is precisely the fate that has befallen his excellent study of Bruchmuller, which was closely tied to the artillery regulations employed by the US Army in the early 1990s, but since superceded.
But the above should not take away from the fact that Zabecki has written an important book that any serious student of the First World War, or of operational art more generally, would benefit from reading.
November 6, 2016
An excellent, though at times over-detailed, account of the failures of the German 1918 offensives. In a way, Zabecki is a victim of his own success - he argues so coherently and convincingly in the introduction and early parts of the book that the 1918 offensives had no real operational goal and little operational or strategic logic behind them, that much of the meat of the book is somewhat anticlimactic. His accounts of the German planning and tactical brilliance are excellent - including techniques for maintaining operational security, dramatically improving artillery support techniques while maintaining surprise, and the use of the new stormtroop units and tactics.
But while Zabecki argues that the British had two extremely vulnerable elements of their center of gravity (the railheads at Amiens and Hazebrouck) that the German offensives could have sought to target and possibly capture, therefore disjointing the entire BEF, splitting it from the French, and possibly forcing it back on the ports at Calais and Dunkirk, it really doesn't seem possible that the Germans had the logistical and mechanical resources to achieve that kind of operational and strategic mobility. All in all, Zabecki is most effective in pointing out, quite simply, that the Germans would have been better off husbanding reserves until a negotiated peace could be achieved.
But while Zabecki argues that the British had two extremely vulnerable elements of their center of gravity (the railheads at Amiens and Hazebrouck) that the German offensives could have sought to target and possibly capture, therefore disjointing the entire BEF, splitting it from the French, and possibly forcing it back on the ports at Calais and Dunkirk, it really doesn't seem possible that the Germans had the logistical and mechanical resources to achieve that kind of operational and strategic mobility. All in all, Zabecki is most effective in pointing out, quite simply, that the Germans would have been better off husbanding reserves until a negotiated peace could be achieved.
April 5, 2013
This is a superb book for those interested in understanding military operations in WWI as well as understanding the operational level of war. General Zabecki has risen above the WWI-related dogma that insightful military thinking disappeared between 1914 and 1918 and provides insight into mostly the German thought but also the thinking of the Allies. His description of the operational art in theory and practice is clear and enlightening. My only complaint is that his description of actual operations quickly drags down to a listing of dates and place names one had to labor through to get to the his truly interesting analysis.
June 16, 2014
Any military professional unfamiliar with David Zabecki's work is seriously lacking. His work, especially on the First World War and the use of artillery is beyond excellent and worthy of a read by any student of military science, history, or the First World War. Zabecki has consistently broke new ground in evaluating the First World War, especially in its final year, fully elevating Georg Bruchmuller to his rightful place in military history. This should be read along with Zabecki's earlier work, Steel Wind, upon which he draws on and expands in this volume.
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September 27, 2015admirably focused but without sacrificing breadth.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews