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American Diplomacy in the Great Depression: Hoover-Stimson Foreign Policy, 1929-1933
From the autumn of 1930 on, the Great Depression was the foremost fact in the calculations of statesmen everywhere in the world. In this book, Robert H. Ferrell examines the course of American foreign relations during the critical years from 1929 to 1933, in the context of the international catastrophe of the Great Depression.
Vividly and perceptively, Mr. Ferrell sketches the characters of Herbert Hoover, Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, and other key figures. he discusses the testing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact in Manchuria, the disarmament conferences, the formulation of the Stimson Doctrine, the problem of war debts, and significant changes to Latin American relations. He then analyzes the underlying assumptions of United States policy-making: how they derived form an earlier tradition and from the experience of World War I, why they were inadequate to the new circumstances, and why the American diplomatists were so reluctant to give them up.
American Diplomacy in the Great Depression is a definitive study of four crucial years in the interwar period, when cataclysmic political and economic changes impelled the United States to make a major re-evaluation of its procedures and goals in the conduct of foreign affairs.
Vividly and perceptively, Mr. Ferrell sketches the characters of Herbert Hoover, Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, and other key figures. he discusses the testing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact in Manchuria, the disarmament conferences, the formulation of the Stimson Doctrine, the problem of war debts, and significant changes to Latin American relations. He then analyzes the underlying assumptions of United States policy-making: how they derived form an earlier tradition and from the experience of World War I, why they were inadequate to the new circumstances, and why the American diplomatists were so reluctant to give them up.
American Diplomacy in the Great Depression is a definitive study of four crucial years in the interwar period, when cataclysmic political and economic changes impelled the United States to make a major re-evaluation of its procedures and goals in the conduct of foreign affairs.
319 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1957
About the author
Robert H. Ferrell
76 books9 followersRobert Hugh Ferrell was an American historian and author of several books on Harry S. Truman and the diplomatic history of the United States. He served in the U.S. Army Air Forces during the Second World War and was an intelligence analyst in the U.S. Air Force during the Korean War. He received a B.S. in Education from Bowling Green State University in 1946 and a PhD from Yale University in 1951, where he worked under the direction of Samuel Flagg Bemis and his dissertation won the John Addison Porter Prize. He went on to win the 1952 Beer Prize for his first book, Peace In Their Time, a study of the making of the Kellogg-Briand Pact.
He taught for many years at Indiana University in Bloomington, starting as an Assistant Professor in 1953 and rising to Distinguished Professor of History in 1974. He has held several notable visiting professorships, including Yale University in 1955 and the Naval War College in 1974.
He taught for many years at Indiana University in Bloomington, starting as an Assistant Professor in 1953 and rising to Distinguished Professor of History in 1974. He has held several notable visiting professorships, including Yale University in 1955 and the Naval War College in 1974.
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July 25, 2026
When Herbert Hoover was inaugurated as America’s 31st president in 1929, he inherited the most auspicious international climate in many years. The Great War was over a decade in the past, and the political situation in Europe appeared to have stabilized after the disruptive years that immediately followed it. The interrelated issues of war debts and reparations were on a more manageable footing. And ongoing efforts at disarmament promised to build on the recent signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and its outlawing of war as an instrument of national policy. All of this made the future look promising indeed.
By the time Hoover left office four years later, the Great Depression had made a mockery of such hopes. The ongoing global economic catastrophe had exposed the fragility of the postwar economic recovery, plunging millions in the industrialized world into destitution. As governments throughout the world prioritized their immediate needs over long-term collaboration, the drift towards disarmament and peace were reversed, with Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931 heralding the dawn of a new, more violent era in global affairs. Though Hoover and his secretary of state, Henry Stimson, sought to respond to the crises as best they could, Robert Ferrell finds that their efforts were burdened by assumptions and policies that were increasingly discredited by ongoing events. This he demonstrates through a careful accounting of the administration’s response to international developments, showing how in nearly every instance their good intentions fell short of providing an effective response.
These failings did not come from a lack of capability. As Ferrell details, the administration was staffed by capable individuals with considerable experience in foreign affairs, and none more so than the president himself. A mining engineer and business executive, Hoover spent several years living abroad and enjoyed a global reputation thanks to his extensive humanitarian work. While Stimson’s background in this regard fell short of the president’s, he brought with him to the office successful service both as war secretary during the Taft Administration and as governor-general of the Philippines. What separated the two men more in Ferrell’s view was their respective attitudes, as Hoover did not share Stimson’s admiration for military men and disdained the older man’s “slackness” in his work ethic.
Initially these differences mattered little, as the two were of like mind when it came to their commitment to continuing the policies of their Republican predecessors. Eager to cut the budget, Hoover supported efforts to reduce military costs, and Stimson spent much of his first year in office preparing for an arms conference in London intended to limit the size of the world’s navies. The London Naval Conference did indeed result in an agreement that forestalled a naval arms race between the major powers, yet it also exposed the increasing strains of such efforts. The acceptance of a ratio of large cruisers that was below parity with Great Britain and the United States triggered a political crisis in Japan that stimulated the militarist elements in their system.
Moreover, this diplomatic success was almost immediately overshadowed by the growing economic calamity of the Great Depression. The crisis threatened the carefully-constructed debt settlement agreements of the 1920s, which fueled a serious disagreement between Hoover and Stimson. While the latter was willing to write off the wartime debts owed by European nations to the United States, Hoover recognized the political impossibility of any such effort. The best he could do was to agree to a moratorium on repayments, which forestalled a likely repudiation of those debts by Germany and France but did nothing to address the much larger problem they posed to global economic health.
As the depression worsened, the major powers explored more radical options for relief. Foremost among these was Japan, who in September 1931 launched a seizure of Manchuria from a weakened China. This overt repudiation of the Versailles settlement and the Kellogg-Briand Pact demanded a vigorous response, yet in the end the most the administration did was announce their refusal to recognize the legality of Japan’s aggression. The Stimson Doctrine as it came to be called (despite Hoover’s subsequent attempts to name it after himself in an effort to pad out his thin record of achievement as president) embodies in Ferrell’s view all of the flaws in the United States’ interwar reliance on legalism and moral suasion, as it achieved nothing beyond demonstrating the hollowness of the postwar order.
The impact of the Great Depression made it unlikely that any other realistically possible response would have succeeded. As a portrait of policymakers swept up by forces beyond their reckoning Ferrell’s book is highly persuasive, and his account has largely stood the test of time. Despite its age and the considerable amount of documentary evidence that has become available since the book’s original publication, it has yet to be bettered as a study of America’s foreign policy during the early 1930s. Within the events described in it can be seen the seeds of another world war, one that they probably could not have prevented even if they knew that it was coming. It is that tragedy which makes Ferrell’s study not just worthwhile reading but a poignant one as well.
By the time Hoover left office four years later, the Great Depression had made a mockery of such hopes. The ongoing global economic catastrophe had exposed the fragility of the postwar economic recovery, plunging millions in the industrialized world into destitution. As governments throughout the world prioritized their immediate needs over long-term collaboration, the drift towards disarmament and peace were reversed, with Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931 heralding the dawn of a new, more violent era in global affairs. Though Hoover and his secretary of state, Henry Stimson, sought to respond to the crises as best they could, Robert Ferrell finds that their efforts were burdened by assumptions and policies that were increasingly discredited by ongoing events. This he demonstrates through a careful accounting of the administration’s response to international developments, showing how in nearly every instance their good intentions fell short of providing an effective response.
These failings did not come from a lack of capability. As Ferrell details, the administration was staffed by capable individuals with considerable experience in foreign affairs, and none more so than the president himself. A mining engineer and business executive, Hoover spent several years living abroad and enjoyed a global reputation thanks to his extensive humanitarian work. While Stimson’s background in this regard fell short of the president’s, he brought with him to the office successful service both as war secretary during the Taft Administration and as governor-general of the Philippines. What separated the two men more in Ferrell’s view was their respective attitudes, as Hoover did not share Stimson’s admiration for military men and disdained the older man’s “slackness” in his work ethic.
Initially these differences mattered little, as the two were of like mind when it came to their commitment to continuing the policies of their Republican predecessors. Eager to cut the budget, Hoover supported efforts to reduce military costs, and Stimson spent much of his first year in office preparing for an arms conference in London intended to limit the size of the world’s navies. The London Naval Conference did indeed result in an agreement that forestalled a naval arms race between the major powers, yet it also exposed the increasing strains of such efforts. The acceptance of a ratio of large cruisers that was below parity with Great Britain and the United States triggered a political crisis in Japan that stimulated the militarist elements in their system.
Moreover, this diplomatic success was almost immediately overshadowed by the growing economic calamity of the Great Depression. The crisis threatened the carefully-constructed debt settlement agreements of the 1920s, which fueled a serious disagreement between Hoover and Stimson. While the latter was willing to write off the wartime debts owed by European nations to the United States, Hoover recognized the political impossibility of any such effort. The best he could do was to agree to a moratorium on repayments, which forestalled a likely repudiation of those debts by Germany and France but did nothing to address the much larger problem they posed to global economic health.
As the depression worsened, the major powers explored more radical options for relief. Foremost among these was Japan, who in September 1931 launched a seizure of Manchuria from a weakened China. This overt repudiation of the Versailles settlement and the Kellogg-Briand Pact demanded a vigorous response, yet in the end the most the administration did was announce their refusal to recognize the legality of Japan’s aggression. The Stimson Doctrine as it came to be called (despite Hoover’s subsequent attempts to name it after himself in an effort to pad out his thin record of achievement as president) embodies in Ferrell’s view all of the flaws in the United States’ interwar reliance on legalism and moral suasion, as it achieved nothing beyond demonstrating the hollowness of the postwar order.
The impact of the Great Depression made it unlikely that any other realistically possible response would have succeeded. As a portrait of policymakers swept up by forces beyond their reckoning Ferrell’s book is highly persuasive, and his account has largely stood the test of time. Despite its age and the considerable amount of documentary evidence that has become available since the book’s original publication, it has yet to be bettered as a study of America’s foreign policy during the early 1930s. Within the events described in it can be seen the seeds of another world war, one that they probably could not have prevented even if they knew that it was coming. It is that tragedy which makes Ferrell’s study not just worthwhile reading but a poignant one as well.
June 18, 2015
Heavy responsibility - I'm the only one so far to review this - haha.
The book itself resembles something that was read once upon a time in a university political science course. There's copious footnotes and a generous bibliography. The author is looking back on the '30's from the vantage point of the 50's.
The book will seem very dry to some, due to its subject matter, yet it's sprinkled throughout with personal details about the players, most of whom, with the exception of Hoover, F.D.R., and possibly Stimson, most modern readers won't be familiar with. Who knows the Undersecretary of State at the end of the Hoover Administration, for example.
One gets a good sense, though, of how dramatically foreign policy thinking, and hope in general, was different during the '30's. The nation could still remember Wilson's dream of a War to End All Wars, and the Kellogg-Briand Act and non-recognition of "ill-gotten" territory was today's news. Of course, Hitler and the Japanese were right around the corner to blow those utopian dreams to dust.
Introduced into this hopefulness was the hopelessness of the Depression. This effectively meant that any expensive means of enforcing foreign policy, such as armed conflict, were not on the table. What resulted was a lot of talk, talk, talk. It's difficult to imagine the U.S. of today getting involved in the endless minutiae of arms limitation talks that tried to estimate the effects of guns versus ships, but here it is - in all its meandering glory.
F.D.R. makes a relatively brief appearance in the book, near the end. I have some suspicion that the author favored Hoover over F.D.R. He does much to try to dispel Hoover's bad image by describing his good intentions, his tireless work ethic, and the many strategies he considered to upright the economic ship that was floundering on his watch.
It's more difficult to gauge the author's view of F.D.R. He points out, as standard biographies of F.D.R. have, that Roosevelt was effectively disengaged from Hoover in the period between his election and his assumption of office. He also points out (as others have) that Roosevelt had a vexing habit of agreeing with everyone who came into his office, and that he often later assumed an opposite course without notifying them first. This is well known. Perhaps most disturbing, though, is the author's casual drop of a footnote about F.D.R.'s possible culpability in creating a climate in which the U.S. was assured of an attack on Japan. On the plus side for F.D.R., the author seems to excuse him from investing seriously in an international conference on currency evaluation soon after he took office in favor of attending to urgent domestic business. There also is interesting talk of a possible assassination plot against F.D.R. which he may actually have taken seriously.
This would be best for someone who is at least familiar with the historical era, and for someone who has some interest in foreign policy. Some history generalists, however, may also get a kick out it. It's somewhat obscure, but it involves important policies and ideologies still relevant, and - as mentioned, it's also rich with detail to help avid history readers connect the dots with reading they've already done.
The book itself resembles something that was read once upon a time in a university political science course. There's copious footnotes and a generous bibliography. The author is looking back on the '30's from the vantage point of the 50's.
The book will seem very dry to some, due to its subject matter, yet it's sprinkled throughout with personal details about the players, most of whom, with the exception of Hoover, F.D.R., and possibly Stimson, most modern readers won't be familiar with. Who knows the Undersecretary of State at the end of the Hoover Administration, for example.
One gets a good sense, though, of how dramatically foreign policy thinking, and hope in general, was different during the '30's. The nation could still remember Wilson's dream of a War to End All Wars, and the Kellogg-Briand Act and non-recognition of "ill-gotten" territory was today's news. Of course, Hitler and the Japanese were right around the corner to blow those utopian dreams to dust.
Introduced into this hopefulness was the hopelessness of the Depression. This effectively meant that any expensive means of enforcing foreign policy, such as armed conflict, were not on the table. What resulted was a lot of talk, talk, talk. It's difficult to imagine the U.S. of today getting involved in the endless minutiae of arms limitation talks that tried to estimate the effects of guns versus ships, but here it is - in all its meandering glory.
F.D.R. makes a relatively brief appearance in the book, near the end. I have some suspicion that the author favored Hoover over F.D.R. He does much to try to dispel Hoover's bad image by describing his good intentions, his tireless work ethic, and the many strategies he considered to upright the economic ship that was floundering on his watch.
It's more difficult to gauge the author's view of F.D.R. He points out, as standard biographies of F.D.R. have, that Roosevelt was effectively disengaged from Hoover in the period between his election and his assumption of office. He also points out (as others have) that Roosevelt had a vexing habit of agreeing with everyone who came into his office, and that he often later assumed an opposite course without notifying them first. This is well known. Perhaps most disturbing, though, is the author's casual drop of a footnote about F.D.R.'s possible culpability in creating a climate in which the U.S. was assured of an attack on Japan. On the plus side for F.D.R., the author seems to excuse him from investing seriously in an international conference on currency evaluation soon after he took office in favor of attending to urgent domestic business. There also is interesting talk of a possible assassination plot against F.D.R. which he may actually have taken seriously.
This would be best for someone who is at least familiar with the historical era, and for someone who has some interest in foreign policy. Some history generalists, however, may also get a kick out it. It's somewhat obscure, but it involves important policies and ideologies still relevant, and - as mentioned, it's also rich with detail to help avid history readers connect the dots with reading they've already done.
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