Une nouvelle lecture de Lukacs et Heidegger voilà la recherche de Lucien Goldmann : rapprocher ces deux grands philosophes, le marxiste et l'existentialiste, dans une analyse qui renverse les perspectives coutumières. Cet important texte posthume démontre une communauté fondamentale, leur rupture avec la pensée traditionnelle mais aussi leurs différences. Des vues originales mais désormais classiques éclairent d'un jour nouveau les concepts fondamentaux des deux philosophes.
Lucien Goldmann was a French philosopher and sociologist of Jewish-Romanian origin. A professor at the EHESS in Paris, he was a Marxist theorist.
Goldmann was born in Bucharest, Romania, but grew up in Botoşani.
He studied law at the University of Bucharest and the University of Vienna under the Austromarxist jurist Max Adler.[1] In 1934, he went to the University of Paris to study political economy, literature, and philosophy.[1] He moved to Switzerland in November 1942, where he was placed in a refugee camp until 1943.[1] Through Jean Piaget's intervention, he was subsequently given a scholarship to the University of Zurich,[1] where he completed his PhD in philosophy in 1945 with a thesis entitled Mensch, Gemeinschaft und Welt in der Philosophie Immanuel Kants (Man, Community and world in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant).
“…for Lukacs and Heidegger the knowledge of history and historical action could only be philosophical (or, which is the same thing, ontological) since positivist knowledge is reserved for everything which takes place in the world outside this action.”
Written in 1970, based on lectures conducted a few years prior, Lucien Goldmann sought to draw a connection between two of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century. Whilst Lukács' work moved from neo-Kantianism to a very Hegelian-inspired form of Marxism (a kind of confused mix of Luxemburgism and Leninism), and Martin Heidegger’s work, which, comparatively represents a hermeneutic phenomenology, Goldmann remains convinced of their elective affinities. This is of course a view which was not unfounded, since Heidegger and György Lukács shared a love for neo-Kantianism and German philosophy more broadly, despite both intellectuals wanting to move beyond it.
Goldmann sees Heidegger’s Romanticist focus on technology, authenticity and history, as owing a great deal to Lukács’ concept of reification. Whilst Lukács speaks of ‘totality’, Heidegger speaks of ‘Being’ (Dasein), where Lukacs speaks of ‘praxis’, Heidegger speaks of ‘Zuhandenheit’ (manipulation, roughly). The differences in terminology, Goldmann claims, are due to both differences in audience and tradition. Lukacs’ work is written in the context of radical political and trade union activity, whilst Heidegger’s work is written for the educated, and philosophically advanced, aimed at those engaging with German philosophy.
This difference in audience and aim, despite shared roots, is clearly demonstrated in Lukács’ 1967 introduction to ‘History and Class Consciousness’, where Lukacs is aware that much of his audience may not be aware of the philosophical tradition he’s responding, and working within, as he warns them to skip the more difficult sections of his essay ‘Reification…’. Lukács seeks to demonstrate the limits of 'bourgeois' philosophy, much of which is composed of his neo-Kantian contemporaries and friends (like Emil Lask, Dilthey, Weber etc). Compare this to Heidegger, whose writings are much more challenging and seek to question and in some ways undermind the very definitions of neo-Kantianism.
However, whilst both writers sought to reach different audiences, both philosophers agree, fundamentally in opposing simplistic positivism, and the typical subject-object ontologies that have embarrassed philosophy hitherto. Both authors want to transcend, what Lukacs calls “public opinion survey” and reach a notion of historical truth, beyond pure ontic (ontic, meaning anterior to ontology, positivist data) fact collecting. Of course, Lukács’ result is a Marxist-Leninist historiography, and for Heidegger, the result is a Romanticist interpretation of history, and a focus on authenticity.
During Goldmann’s explanation, he does inject some of his ideas on structuralism and Piaget’s psychology. As the introduction puts it, “this book contains as much Goldmann as it does Heidegger and Lukacs”. Separating the ontic and the ontological, Lukacs looks at how the proletariat has a subject-object relationship relating to their social epistemic standpoint. Muddied by reification and the desire to conserve their privileged class position, the bourgeoisie’s praxis is clipped by crises, lapses, evident in the objective reification that Lukacs describes so eloquently in History and Class Consciousness, in the first section of his essay ‘Reification..’. However, the proletariat does not struggle under these same limitations, as “their understanding of reality is oriented towards revolutionary action capable of provoking the transformation of society”, which is, of course, the “historic mission” of the proletariat. Whereas, Heidegger’s historiography, is one of Being, and rejects typical notions of epochs, which Marxists are more inclined to adhere to. But, whilst both Lukacs and Heidegger's historiography may not adhere to the rules of positivists, Goldmann is quick to remind us that this doesn’t mean they’re incoherent. “coherence shouldn’t be understood in a logical sense… [it] must be conceived of an as a relative, as functional… on the basis of praxis.”
Contradictions in a society like ‘equality’ and ‘liberty’ for example, under liberal ideology, are of course contradictory. Both cannot coexist, as many conservatives like to remind us. This is a problem of false consciousness, which can only be remedied by a revolutionary praxis. Goldmann also here draws on the Luxemburgist and ‘young Marx’ inspired elements of Lukacs, which despite Lukacs critique of both, appear to have a great deal of influence in his work. Of course, although Goldmann doesn’t point this out, Lukacs’ work, for political reasons would not be able to be overly open about this influence (as his biography would later show).
Finally, Goldmann explains the notions of science in both Lukacs and Heidegger. For Lukacs, science is Marxism, the truth is fundamentally Marxist. However, Heidegger acknowledges science’s validity in a different way, seeing it as a separate field of inquiry, set apart from his study of Being.
This formulates connections i was privy to already. But ironically, the most interesting chapter here is the one that doesnt talk about Heidegger/Lukacs. Of course, the chapter im referring to is the chapter on Su ject-Object and Function. Really good for fleshing out the dialectical relation between Meaning and Materiality, significance structure and economic constraints