At 2:00am on October 2, 2001, Robert Stevens entered a hospital emergency room. Feverish, nauseated, and barely conscious, no one knew what was making him sick. Three days later he was dead. Stevens was the first fatal victim of bioterrorism in America.
Bioterrorism expert Leonard Cole has written the definitive account of the Anthrax attacks. Cole is the only person outside law enforcement to have interviewed every one of the surviving inhalation-anthrax victims, along with the relatives, friends, and associates of those who died, as well as the public health officials, scientists, researchers, hospital workers, and treating physicians. Fast paced and riveting, this minute-by-minute chronicle of the anthrax attacks recounts more than a history of recent current events, it uncovers the untold and perhaps even more important story of how scientists, doctors, and researchers perform life-saving work under intense pressure and public scrutiny. Updated with new information about Ivins and a series of upcoming Congressional hearings into the FBI’s conduct in this case, The Anthrax Letters amply demonstrates how vulnerable America was in 2001 and whether we are better prepared now for a bioterror attack.
This is a bit dated, and the added material at the end was a little scattered and unfocused. It was intended to tie in the originally unmentioned eventual FBI prime suspect (who removed himself by suicide) and later bits of evidence, opinion, and other miscellaneous information to counter the final impression of the original version of the book - that an earlier named person of interest was likely responsible. Some of what was in the added material deserved much more focus, for example the very likely 12th case of inhalation anthrax. A person known to have a very high level of exposure (higher and better documented than other patients with anthrax), with classic presentation, and who, though anthrax was never identified in specimens from his body, DID have anthrax spores found on his clothing and in his car - yet the CDC ignored its' own guidelines and declined to even classify this as a "suspected" case? Why? But as to the book overall, it is written in an easy to read, breezy style that you don't want to put down. This is not a timeline explanation of the investigation, in fact there are major aspects of the investigation that are only barely mentioned, and some of that in the add-on chapters. But what this book does a great job with is explaining the personal experiences of the victims, and how everything unfolded from a medical point of view. Anthrax infection is rare in the U.S., and inhalation anthrax is exceedingly rare. This is especially so in the southeast where the first two cases, at two different hospitals, presented. But rapid identification is essential for proper treatment, which is what makes this story so compelling, and tragic. Reading it from the point of view of the patient, doctors, and then public health officials who had no idea what they were dealing with but did recognize the urgency made this a page turner. It does make one wonder today, are we safer? Could it happen again?
This is the second book I've read on the anthrax attack. The first, The Killer Strain: Anthrax and a Government Exposed (2003) by Washington Post journalist Marilyn W. Thompson is a good book (with a different emphasis), but this is a better one. Written by Rutgers University Professor Leonard A. Cole, who is an expert on bioterrorism, The Anthrax Letters is both more extensive and goes into greater depth than Thompson's book.
Perhaps the most important thing (from my point of view) that Professor Cole does is argue convincingly against the FBI's disaffected loner theory of who did it. Instead Cole presents a lot of evidence that strongly suggests that Al Qaeda may indeed have been responsible.
First of all, the leading suspect, Attorney General John Ashcroft's "person of interest," Steven Hatfill, actually had an alibi. He was working in another state at the time some of the letters were mailed in Trenton, New Jersey. More importantly though, Cole sees a link between Iraq's known bioweapons program and Al Qaeda; he believes that the Ames anthrax strain in the Daschle letter was possibly purified and concentrated by "the Iraqi BW team." (p. 201)
Furthermore the fact that there were at least two types of "weapons" sent by mail suggests more than a lone perpetrator. Additionally, the mystery of why the tabloid people in Florida were targeted (and indeed how they became targets) is explained when one learns that two of the suspected 9/11 hijackers rented an apartment from Gloria Irish, the wife of Mike Irish, editor of the Sun tabloid, an American Media Inc. publication. One of the men, Marwan Akl-Shehhi, told her that he was a pilot and was taking flying lessons. (p. 42) And it is not to be forgotten that the Al Qaeda suspects were interested in learning to fly crop dusters. That alone makes it clear that they expected to have access to and intended to use either chemical or biological weapons. Finally, there is the unsettling fact that one of the hijackers was actually treated for a black lesion on his leg that could very well have been cutaneous anthrax.
Cole also suggests that it was no coincidence that the anthrax attacks began less than a month after September 11, 2001.
To all of this I would add the fact that the Bush administration has become entirely mute on this question, which may suggest that they know who did it but for reasons unknown to us are not telling. What could those reasons be? Originally I thought it was because the FBI had bungled the evidence and didn't have enough left to stand up in court, or that something about the perp or information he or she had would be embarrassing to the government. Now I think it is possible that Al Qaeda was indeed responsible but the Bush administration won't acknowledge that because it would have to reveal secret information about our counter-terrorism program, and also possibly because such information may work into the hands of Al Qaeda's desire to psychologically terrorize the US population.
Another interesting point that Cole brings up is the question of exactly how many cases of anthrax illness were caused by the mailed spores. He reports that there were eleven confirmed cases with five deaths. However, as noted in the final chapter, there is a twelfth case that the CDC would not confirm, that of postal inspector William Paliscak who had inhaled dust in which there were spores, and who had anthrax spores on his clothing and in his car. The problem is that the CDC was not able to culture anthrax from blood samples taken from Paliscak. Cole speculates that Paliscak and possibly others at the Brentwood postal facility did indeed contract anthrax, asking, "Could bacilli have been embedded in the brains of Bill Paliscak and others who were exposed to spores...?" He adds that there were eight deaths at Brentwood in the year following the anthrax attack when usually there are only two a year. Four of the people who died had inexplicably enlarged hearts. (p. 237)
Also significant is Cole's point that what we learned from the attacks is that we are not nearly as well prepared as we thought, and that the use of the postal service as a means of disseminating a bioterrorist weapon was greatly underrated. What was not realized prior to these attacks was that anthrax spores in the size of about three microns would easily slip through the 20-micron pores in a typical envelope resulting in cross-contamination of the mail. The two women, Kathy Nguyen and Ottilie Lundgren, who died of inhalation anthrax even though spores were never found in their homes or in their mailboxes, were probably the victims of cross-contamination. Cole posits that by the time the mailboxes were swabbed the spores had dissipated. In support of this idea Cole quotes Harvard microbiologist Matthew Meselson as saying, "a single organism [of anthrax] has a chance of initiating infection." (p.110)
This raises the question of how many other people died because of their exposure to the bacterium, cases that were either not reported or unrecognized as anthrax killings.
This leaves me with an idea. Cole reports that how the perps got the very, very fine and slippery weapons-grade anthrax spores into the envelops without getting some into the air and eventually into their lungs is not known. With Al Qaeda's complete disregard for human life, they may not have warned their operatives of the dangers. Perhaps the FBI ought to look for some dead Al Qaeda operatives in the US and double-check the cause of death.
--Dennis Littrell, author of the mystery novel, “Teddy and Teri”
Covers the anthrax scare starting 7 days after 9/11.
Published in 2003 it's a little out of date, but it does have a number of interesting bits of info.
The FBI wants us to believe an american did it, but could any american have done this just 7 days after 9/11?
At the time, the FBI wanted us to believe a fellow named Hatfill did it, they trashed his reputation, got him fired, made him unemployable. But now they think someone else did it. Someone who is conveniently dead.
Like all books published before 2003 that mention Iraq, the author leaves no doubt that Saddam had WMD.
Why? 1. Saddam wanted people to believe he had them so he wouldn't be attacked. 2. A number of high level defectors including his 2 sons in law said he had them.
His sons in law were generals who claimed to have overseen Iraq's development of wmd. p125
This edition was published shortly after the FBI closed the case. Would have appreciated a few more insights into the fundamentals of the case -- though I presume those would only emerge with time.
OK unless you are doing research into the events around the 2001 anthrax "attacks" don't read this. If you are interested in the sequence of events up until 2003 - read this book!