What do you think?
Rate this book
A Realist Theory of Science (Classical Texts in Critical Realism
First Published in 2008. Now acknowledged as a classic in the philosophy of science, A Realist Theory of Science is one of the very few books which has transformed not only our understanding of science, but that of the nature of the world it studies. Since its original publication in 1975, the book has inspired the multi-disciplinary and international movement of thought known as critical realism; and its ideas have been influential across the whole spectrum of the sciences, arts and humanities and in a diverse array of social practices and professions.
In this book, Roy Bhaskar sets out to revindicate ontology, critiquing the reduction of being in favor of knowledge, which he calls the epistemic fallacy. Employing a transcendental argument from the nature of experimental activity, he establishes a critique of the dominant positivist and neo-Kantian traditions in the philosophy of science, developing a new ontology in which concepts of structure, difference and change come to the fore. Then, analyzing the nature of scientific discovery and development, he shows how, against both the empiricist and rationalist traditions, science can come to have a posteriori knowledge of natural necessity.
The resultant position, which the author characterizes as transcendental realism, has the power to resolve many traditional philosophical problems, such as the problem of induction. At the same time it lays the basis for radically new accounts of social science, ethics and the project of human emancipation.
A new introduction to this edition by Mervyn Hartwig decribes the significance of A Realist Theory of Science throughout the humanities world, and offers an expert critique of its content.
In this book, Roy Bhaskar sets out to revindicate ontology, critiquing the reduction of being in favor of knowledge, which he calls the epistemic fallacy. Employing a transcendental argument from the nature of experimental activity, he establishes a critique of the dominant positivist and neo-Kantian traditions in the philosophy of science, developing a new ontology in which concepts of structure, difference and change come to the fore. Then, analyzing the nature of scientific discovery and development, he shows how, against both the empiricist and rationalist traditions, science can come to have a posteriori knowledge of natural necessity.
The resultant position, which the author characterizes as transcendental realism, has the power to resolve many traditional philosophical problems, such as the problem of induction. At the same time it lays the basis for radically new accounts of social science, ethics and the project of human emancipation.
A new introduction to this edition by Mervyn Hartwig decribes the significance of A Realist Theory of Science throughout the humanities world, and offers an expert critique of its content.
304 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1975
25 people are currently reading
563 people want to read
About the author
Roy Bhaskar
50 books22 followersRoy Bhaskar (born May 15, 1944) is a British philosopher, best known as the initiator of the philosophical movement of Critical Realism.
Bhaskar was born in Teddington, London, the elder of two brothers. His Indian father and English mother were Theosophists.[1]
In 1963 Bhaskar began attending Balliol College, Oxford on a scholarship to read Philosophy, Politics and Economics. Having graduated with first class honours in 1966, he began work on a Ph.D. thesis about the relevance of economic theory for under-developed countries. This research led him to the philosophy of social science and then the philosophy of science. In the course of this Rom Harré became his supervisor.
Bhaskar was born in Teddington, London, the elder of two brothers. His Indian father and English mother were Theosophists.[1]
In 1963 Bhaskar began attending Balliol College, Oxford on a scholarship to read Philosophy, Politics and Economics. Having graduated with first class honours in 1966, he began work on a Ph.D. thesis about the relevance of economic theory for under-developed countries. This research led him to the philosophy of social science and then the philosophy of science. In the course of this Rom Harré became his supervisor.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews
August 16, 2022
This book can only aptly be described as a demolition of Humean empiricism (or what Bhaskar calls "empirical realism") and secondarily of neo-Kantian "transcendental idealism", one that strikes me in its essentials as extremely persuasive. Bhaskar defends both a realist ontology independent of humans and a relativistic epistemology produced by science as an ongoing social activity. He makes a "transcendental" argument for realism, arguing that for the practice of experimental science to be possible and intelligible, there must exist a reality structured by universal, necessary mechanisms independent of our knowledge of it. The purpose of experimental science, on this account, is to actively structure phenomena such that the existence of these mechanisms can be isolated (via intentional creation of a "closed system") and tested empirically. After finishing this book, I am rather surprised that Bhaskar's work is not more widely discussed in mainstream philosophy of science.
January 26, 2015
This is a tough read for a "civilian." One explanation for the dense academic style is that it was produced as Bhaskar's PhD thesis at Oxford University and it is curious that it was rejected twice, in earlier drafts, possibly because it cheerfully proposed that a lot of important philosophers were wrong and that the author was in a position to point out and correct their mistakes. That is quite a lot to claim. Still, it was published in 1975, and is now described as a classic in its field so it seemed important to me to know what it says.
The book covers quite a lot of ground and in so doing, it enters into a series of debates with prevailing wisdom, sometimes on incidental topics, that are worth reading for their own sake and can be very insightful. For example, an important aspect of Bhaskar's views about science is that it is a social activity and open to all the types of influence one must accept in any social process. That is not (does not claim to be) an unusual view; he lists many versions of the view that science is social and he notices that science can be affected by non-science considerations such as politics and economics. But science is also a very special or particular type of social activity. In other words, being social does not make it anything other than scientific. Scientists educate and train and inform other scientists, share knowledge, engage in informed and structured exchanges concerning their science and in time they reproduce or transform science before passing it on to the next generation. Science is not done by atomistic individuals and is not produced from scratch. Scientists (including the most original and creative individuals) work by transforming existing science to produce new science. (This of course is partly a restatement of Newton's remark that he saw further because he stood on the shoulders of giants, though that comment at the time was possibly a witticism at the expense of the Astronomer Royal, who was very diminutive.) I suppose another example was his discussion about determinism versus free will, another was his discussion of reductionism and its pitfalls, none of which I will describe here. My point, rather, is that this is the type of book that I am likely to refer back to in all sort of contexts, because of the many sparks thrown off in passing. It is certainly heavily marked with pencil.
The conclusion of this book, again, may be less critical than the arguments used to arrive there. I am not going to attempt a snapshot summary of Bhaskar's opinion about the nature and the role of science, since I must go down in flames at the attempt. My point really is that it is not so much interesting in itself, as it is interesting when set in competition with alternatives and when engaged in debate with rival theories. I don't know yet how well it stands up, even if my first impression is very positive, because I have not yet done the work. But I very much look forward to the next debate when I can put this material to use and see how well it performs.
The book covers quite a lot of ground and in so doing, it enters into a series of debates with prevailing wisdom, sometimes on incidental topics, that are worth reading for their own sake and can be very insightful. For example, an important aspect of Bhaskar's views about science is that it is a social activity and open to all the types of influence one must accept in any social process. That is not (does not claim to be) an unusual view; he lists many versions of the view that science is social and he notices that science can be affected by non-science considerations such as politics and economics. But science is also a very special or particular type of social activity. In other words, being social does not make it anything other than scientific. Scientists educate and train and inform other scientists, share knowledge, engage in informed and structured exchanges concerning their science and in time they reproduce or transform science before passing it on to the next generation. Science is not done by atomistic individuals and is not produced from scratch. Scientists (including the most original and creative individuals) work by transforming existing science to produce new science. (This of course is partly a restatement of Newton's remark that he saw further because he stood on the shoulders of giants, though that comment at the time was possibly a witticism at the expense of the Astronomer Royal, who was very diminutive.) I suppose another example was his discussion about determinism versus free will, another was his discussion of reductionism and its pitfalls, none of which I will describe here. My point, rather, is that this is the type of book that I am likely to refer back to in all sort of contexts, because of the many sparks thrown off in passing. It is certainly heavily marked with pencil.
The conclusion of this book, again, may be less critical than the arguments used to arrive there. I am not going to attempt a snapshot summary of Bhaskar's opinion about the nature and the role of science, since I must go down in flames at the attempt. My point really is that it is not so much interesting in itself, as it is interesting when set in competition with alternatives and when engaged in debate with rival theories. I don't know yet how well it stands up, even if my first impression is very positive, because I have not yet done the work. But I very much look forward to the next debate when I can put this material to use and see how well it performs.
May 9, 2020
A relatively light reading, in comparison to most of the continental material that populated the era. Bhaskar is clearly writing again a sociological reduction of scientific progress - the idea that science is governed and overpowered by social forces and has no actual interest in "truth", much to the chagrin of most working scientists. This defense of science as a claimant of truth takes the form of transcendental realism - a reinstatement of Kant's division of phenomena/noumena, and that the noumenal is science's motivating force for progress. "Critical" comes from the attempt to integrate the sociological account of science - sure, science involves social forces and politics that stray from its declared virtue, but nonetheless scientists are good-willed people that propose, discuss, and debate each other's claims of truth. It also integrates Kuhn's idea of scientific revolution as the way science achieves progress.
While this proposal might seem theoretically dense for a beginner in philosophy of science, it seems to be a safe option for those in the know. Critical realism, as it seems to me here, is nothing radical, but a collection of theories of scientific progress lumped into one. The good thing is that Bhaskar integrates all these disparate theories almost seamlessly into a machinic whole. There weren't points in the book that I was jarred by contradictions. However, I am not sure that the integration of transcendental realism was a convincing move. There were a lot of discussion centred around the ceteris peribus (CP) assumption, which I feel didn't carry much weight.
Overall, I find this to be a comfortable and lucid piece of writing, but the arguments are nothing really new and compelling.
While this proposal might seem theoretically dense for a beginner in philosophy of science, it seems to be a safe option for those in the know. Critical realism, as it seems to me here, is nothing radical, but a collection of theories of scientific progress lumped into one. The good thing is that Bhaskar integrates all these disparate theories almost seamlessly into a machinic whole. There weren't points in the book that I was jarred by contradictions. However, I am not sure that the integration of transcendental realism was a convincing move. There were a lot of discussion centred around the ceteris peribus (CP) assumption, which I feel didn't carry much weight.
Overall, I find this to be a comfortable and lucid piece of writing, but the arguments are nothing really new and compelling.
May 28, 2024
I don’t possess the specialized background to fully grasp everything in this book, as its arguments take place in a highly abstract manner. But what I did glean from it I appreciated and made a lot of sense, and I respect the way Bhaskar proceeds from first principles. I’m surprised this book isn’t more widely known.
October 6, 2024
A Realist Theory Of Science | Roy Bhaskar
Scoring Rubric
1: baseline
2: creative contextualization bcs of covering almost all theories on science to develop new theory by detecting the limitations
2: creative conceptualization bcs of new holistic and groundbreaking comprehension on theory of science
5: total points by 5
Scoring Rubric
1: baseline
2: creative contextualization bcs of covering almost all theories on science to develop new theory by detecting the limitations
2: creative conceptualization bcs of new holistic and groundbreaking comprehension on theory of science
5: total points by 5
January 31, 2013
When I started getting to the end of this I really wished I had been taking notes. I found myself divided on many parts of the text, agreeing with some portions while finding others unnacceptable, and it would have been nice to have them all delineated neatly. Anyway, some general remarks:
I found the committment to the explanatory goal of science in mechanism identification to be perfectly on the mark. I also found his criticism of Humean laws to be very seductive, although I'm hesistant to say I fully accept it. Furthermore, the emphasis on the social activity of science was more or less correct.
However, I find the brand of transcendental arguments that Bhaskar employs to always be on the fishy side. In general I find all transendental arguments to be a bit fishy, actually--not only Bhaskar's. I'm also not sure that his eludication of the action of mechanisms entails that science is wholly, or even mostly, non-predictive. In fact, I'm rather certain that science is not non-predictive, so I would say either that the entailment doesn't hold, or his whole argument is simply wrong. And lastly, I think his rejection of the correspondance theory of truth is premature and mistaken.
Nevertheless, I very much appreciate the never waivering committment to realism.
I found the committment to the explanatory goal of science in mechanism identification to be perfectly on the mark. I also found his criticism of Humean laws to be very seductive, although I'm hesistant to say I fully accept it. Furthermore, the emphasis on the social activity of science was more or less correct.
However, I find the brand of transcendental arguments that Bhaskar employs to always be on the fishy side. In general I find all transendental arguments to be a bit fishy, actually--not only Bhaskar's. I'm also not sure that his eludication of the action of mechanisms entails that science is wholly, or even mostly, non-predictive. In fact, I'm rather certain that science is not non-predictive, so I would say either that the entailment doesn't hold, or his whole argument is simply wrong. And lastly, I think his rejection of the correspondance theory of truth is premature and mistaken.
Nevertheless, I very much appreciate the never waivering committment to realism.
November 15, 2009
The world has three ontological stratifications: the domain of the real, the domain of the actual, and the domain of the empirical.
March 16, 2016
Excellent book on Critical Realism
January 6, 2009
foundation of philosophy of critical realism
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews