Behind the battle: Intelligence in the war with Germany, 1939-45

by Ralph Bennett

By the end of 1942, Ultra had become the richest and most reliable of the many different sources of intelligence, however, the relation between their individual contributions requires analysis. Ralph Bennett's study aims to present a succinct survey and analysis of the military intelligence available to Britain and her allies during World War II. When war began, Britain was as ill-prepared in intelligence as in armaments. Civilian scientists had discovered the principle of radar in the mid-1930s, but everything else had to be learned from scratch in the heat of emergency. In 1939, all three armed services lacked staff trained to appraise and distribute intelligence. Because it had so often been unreliable in the past, field commanders were reluctant to accept it and had to learn new ways. First signs of improvement came in mid-1941, when Ultra targeted naval vessels and bomber aircraft onto so many of Rommel's supply ships that the Afrika Korps almost withered on the vine. From then on intelligence played an increasingly indispensable part in final victory. Ultra won the Battle of the Atlantic, driving the U-boats back to coastal waters by June 1943. A lower grade code gave Montgomery the vital first news of the whereabouts of the German tanks as he planned the breakthrough at Alamein. Only "Bomber" Harris refused to give intelligence the credit it deserved, for reasons investigated in "Behind the Battle".

Genres: History

224 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 1994

Reviews

[Rob Kitchin · Rating 2 out of 5]

The back cover blurb for Behind the Battle states: “Many recent studies have covered aspects of the military intelligence available to Britain and her allies during the Second World War, but until now no succinct and authoritative survey of the whole field has existed.” Unfortunately, this book does not provide a survey of the whole field and neither does it seem authoritative. Rather, it principally focuses on Ultra and the use and misuse of intelligence gleaned from decrypting German enigma encoded radio traffic in various theatres throughout the war. All other forms of intelligence gathering including aerial photography, the use of agents, interrogating and eavesdropping on prisoners, and Y traffic (the interception of localised radio traffic along the front line) are largely ignored and dealt with in a very cursory way. Further, how intelligence was implemented in the field is also largely restricted to how Ultra was used tactically. To be sure, Ultra proved highly useful for revealing strategic intelligence and shaping the Allied response. However, it would have been very interesting to get an overview of all forms of intelligence employed, with some detailed vignettes of particular cases and personalities. Even with respect to the analysis of Ultra the discussion tends to provide a broad brushstroke overview, rather than providing some in-depth illustrations. The focus on Ultra should not perhaps be a surprise given that Bennett worked at Bletchley, where enigma traffic was decoded during the war. That Bennett pushes the argument that the only meaningful intelligence came via Ultra, often in a very tiresome fashion, however is less forgivable, providing an overly narrow view of the many ways in which intelligence was gathered and used. If you are interested in Ultra, then you might find this book of interest; if you want a broader overview of British intelligence operations during the war then you’ll need to look elsewhere.