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A Theory of Content and Other Essays
This collection of new and previously published essays reflects the major research and thought of one of today's preeminent philosophers of mind. The first seven essays are philosophical pieces that focus on mental representation and the foundations of intentionality; these are followed by four psychological essays on cognitive architecture. In his eloquent introduction Fodor shows how the two areas are thematically united and epistemologically related, highlighting his concern in finding alternatives to holistic accounts of mental content. Fodor's philosophical essays develop an informational view of semantics that offers the possibility of atomism about meaning; his psychological essays present a modular view of cognitive architecture that offers the possibility of atomism about perception. These ideas, he points out, are joined in epistemology in way that the books last essay begins to explore. Taken together, the essays represent Fodor's lively attempt to knock the underpinnings from the currently popular relativism to show that the arguments for semantic and psychological holism are insubstantial and that important alternatives exist to be explored.
- GenresPhilosophyNonfiction
282 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1990
About the author
Jerry A. Fodor
28 books88 followersJerry Alan Fodor is an American philosopher and cognitive scientist. He is the State of New Jersey Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University and is also the author of many works in the fields of philosophy of mind and cognitive science, in which he has laid the groundwork for the modularity of mind and the language of thought hypotheses, among other ideas. Fodor is of Jewish descent.
Fodor argues that mental states, such as beliefs and desires, are relations between individuals and mental representations. He maintains that these representations can only be correctly explained in terms of a language of thought (LOT) in the mind. Further, this language of thought itself is an actually existing thing that is codified in the brain and not just a useful explanatory tool. Fodor adheres to a species of functionalism, maintaining that thinking and other mental processes consist primarily of computations operating on the syntax of the representations that make up the language of thought.
For Fodor, significant parts of the mind, such as perceptual and linguistic processes, are structured in terms of modules, or "organs", which are defined by their causal and functional roles. These modules are relatively independent of each other and of the "central processing" part of the mind, which has a more global and less "domain specific" character. Fodor suggests that the character of these modules permits the possibility of causal relations with external objects. This, in turn, makes it possible for mental states to have contents that are about things in the world. The central processing part, on the other hand, takes care of the logical relations between the various contents and inputs and outputs.
Although Fodor originally rejected the idea that mental states must have a causal, externally determined aspect, he has in recent years devoted much of his writing and study to the philosophy of language because of this problem of the meaning and reference of mental contents. His contributions in this area include the so-called asymmetric causal theory of reference and his many arguments against semantic holism. Fodor strongly opposes reductive accounts of the mind. He argues that mental states are multiply realizable and that there is a hierarchy of explanatory levels in science such that the generalizations and laws of a higher-level theory of psychology or linguistics, for example, cannot be captured by the low-level explanations of the behavior of neurons and synapses.
Fodor argues that mental states, such as beliefs and desires, are relations between individuals and mental representations. He maintains that these representations can only be correctly explained in terms of a language of thought (LOT) in the mind. Further, this language of thought itself is an actually existing thing that is codified in the brain and not just a useful explanatory tool. Fodor adheres to a species of functionalism, maintaining that thinking and other mental processes consist primarily of computations operating on the syntax of the representations that make up the language of thought.
For Fodor, significant parts of the mind, such as perceptual and linguistic processes, are structured in terms of modules, or "organs", which are defined by their causal and functional roles. These modules are relatively independent of each other and of the "central processing" part of the mind, which has a more global and less "domain specific" character. Fodor suggests that the character of these modules permits the possibility of causal relations with external objects. This, in turn, makes it possible for mental states to have contents that are about things in the world. The central processing part, on the other hand, takes care of the logical relations between the various contents and inputs and outputs.
Although Fodor originally rejected the idea that mental states must have a causal, externally determined aspect, he has in recent years devoted much of his writing and study to the philosophy of language because of this problem of the meaning and reference of mental contents. His contributions in this area include the so-called asymmetric causal theory of reference and his many arguments against semantic holism. Fodor strongly opposes reductive accounts of the mind. He argues that mental states are multiply realizable and that there is a hierarchy of explanatory levels in science such that the generalizations and laws of a higher-level theory of psychology or linguistics, for example, cannot be captured by the low-level explanations of the behavior of neurons and synapses.
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
December 13, 2017
Aufsätze des Mannes, der die Sprache des Geistes propagiert, ganz lustig, wenn auch stellenweise ein wenig zu übertrieben komisch.
Interessant für mich am ehesten “Substitution Arguments and Individuation of Beliefs”, wo er die anscheinende Binsenwahrheit angreift, daß es einen Unterschied zwischen Sinn und Bedeutung geben müsse. Wenn die Denotation die ganze Bedeutung wäre, so lautet ja das Argument, dann müßten Jocasta und Ödipus’ Mutter koreferrenziell sein. Aber man kann nicht salva veritate auswechseln.
Ähnlich das Kripke-Beispiel mit London und Londres.
Fodor glaubt nicht an diese implizite Prämisse:
Unterschiedlich intentionale Zustände müssen sich entweder im Modus (glauben vs. wünschen z.B.) oder in ihrem Inhalt unterscheiden.
“My story about believing is that it’s a four-place relation, viz., a relation between a person, a prop, a vehicle, and a functional role.”
Also der Name und die Beschreibung Ö’s Mutter sind nur Vehikel. Dann ist natürlich das, was sie transportieren, gleich.
Interessant für mich am ehesten “Substitution Arguments and Individuation of Beliefs”, wo er die anscheinende Binsenwahrheit angreift, daß es einen Unterschied zwischen Sinn und Bedeutung geben müsse. Wenn die Denotation die ganze Bedeutung wäre, so lautet ja das Argument, dann müßten Jocasta und Ödipus’ Mutter koreferrenziell sein. Aber man kann nicht salva veritate auswechseln.
Ähnlich das Kripke-Beispiel mit London und Londres.
Fodor glaubt nicht an diese implizite Prämisse:
Unterschiedlich intentionale Zustände müssen sich entweder im Modus (glauben vs. wünschen z.B.) oder in ihrem Inhalt unterscheiden.
“My story about believing is that it’s a four-place relation, viz., a relation between a person, a prop, a vehicle, and a functional role.”
Also der Name und die Beschreibung Ö’s Mutter sind nur Vehikel. Dann ist natürlich das, was sie transportieren, gleich.
March 17, 2021
A pleasure to read. Fodor gives clear arguments that are easy to follow. You don't have to agree that his solution is the right one to enjoy reading and engaging with his writing.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews