In this gripping essay, Hugh White explores Australia’s fateful choice to back America to the hilt and oppose China. What led both sides of politics to align with America so absolutely? Is this a case of sleepwalking to war? What tests might a new government face?
White assesses America’s credibility and commitment, by examining AUKUS, the Quad, Trump and Biden. He discusses what the Ukraine conflict tells us about the future. And he argues that the US can neither contain China nor win a war over Taiwan. So where does this leave our future security and prosperity in Asia? Is there a better way to navigate the disruption caused by China's rise?
This is a powerful and original essay by Australia’s leading strategic thinker.
Hugh White is the author of The China Choice and How to Defend Australia, and the acclaimed Quarterly Essays Power Shift and Without America. He is emeritus professor of strategic studies at ANU and was the principal author of Australia’s Defence White Paper 2000.
Librarian Note: There is more than one author in the Goodreads database with this name.
Hugh White (born 1953) is a Professor of Strategic Studies at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre of the Australian National University in Canberra, Australia, long time defence and intelligence analyst, and author who has published works on military strategy and international relations. He was Deputy Secretary for Strategy and Intelligence in the Australian Department of Defence from 1995 until 2000 and was the inaugural Director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). (Source: Wikipedia)
This is Hugh White’s third Quarterly Essay on China. Through all his essays White has pursued the theme of Australia’s relationship with China and how it must be acknowledged that China is on the rise and America in the decline and Australia needs to make difficult decisions in its relationship with both countries. The title of this essay is an appropriation of the Australian historian, Christopher Clark’s World War 1 study titled “The Sleepwalkers. How Europe Went to War 1914.” I am not sure if the analogy holds. One of the worst failures in Australian diplomacy occurred when Foreign Affairs Minister Marise Paine called for an international inquiry into the outbreak of COVID in Wuhan and Prime Minister Scott Morrison followed up by fully supporting his minister. They should have known that autocratic, glass jawed China would interpreted this as a great insult. It was not the thing to say to our largest trading partner. President Donald Trump had made stronger attacks on China’s response to the COVID outbreak. Australia is not the US. Relationship between the two countries had been on the slide since foreign interference legislation and the banning of Huawei. In typical Chinese style they implemented their wolf warrior diplomacy and used trade bans to “punish” Australia. Prior and since then there have been incalculable number of articles, papers and books about China and the West’s relationship with it. Hugh White has been at the fore front of this discussion with his own strong views. There are two strands to White’s article, one is Australia and its relationship with both China and US. The second is China and the US and will that lead to war. White doesn’t mention the Thucydides’ Complex, but it certainly will come into play in the two behemoth’s tussle. Since Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan things have certainly increased the tensions. I read an article by an ex-PRC academic who argued that Xi Jinping will have to invade Taiwan if he is to be seen as a great Chinese leader. I once had a female Chinese student in my high school class who had recently arrived from China and did not say much in class till I was listing the countries in North East Asia and wrote Taiwan on the white board. Well, she went ballistic “No, no Taiwan China.” For me and the other teacher it was an interesting response. I am not sure what will eventuate, but I think the Chinese need to realise that Taiwan is a very different country to what it was in 1972 when the West started to implement the One China policy. I have visited Taiwan; it is a vibrant democracy, with young people who firstly identify as Taiwanese before being Chinese. (Taiwan has a vibrant coffee culture.) As Putin is discovering in Ukraine, when you start a war, you never know where it will go. I wonder do the Chinese realise that Taiwan has the ability to fire missiles at the mainland. Finally, I worry that America is involved, and things begin to go against it then nuclear weapons will be a serious consideration. I believe that White is somewhat too certain about the demise of the US. I remember in the 1980s with the rise of Japan America was being written off. It concerns me greatly that the American Government of either Republican or Democratic persuasion, and the American public will not be in the mood for another Afghanistan. White has continued his valuable contribution to the topic of Australia and China and USA. Sadly, the LNP Government have been at the worst encouragers of conflict, at the best, rank amateurs in the world of diplomatic relationships with the PRC. Dutton’s “Prepare for war” claim was the height of stupidity, something you’d expect on a social media post not from the soon to come Leader of the Opposition. Other than climate change America’s relationship will be the challenge of this century. Hopefully with a change in government and with the contribution from people like White the military/intelligence will decrease and Australia will develop not a subservient relationship but a respectful and independent relationship with the People’s Republic of China.
Generational failure — Sleepwalk to War (Hugh White)
Hard-nosed, sobering, and important. High White takes us brief journey through the assumptions Australia’s (and America’s) foreign policy establishments have made and finds them wanting. On my reading, the core argument is that Australia (and much of the developed world — but that is a different topic) has been free-riding on American guarantees of security to which it cannot credibly commit.
White argues that the only thing that America should truly be concerned about — by dint of its secure geography — is a Eurasian hegemon able to concentrate resourcing and attention to dominating America. This doesn’t seem to be remotely feasible for China, given many regional competitors — namely Europe, India, and Russia. So, the argument goes, American isolationism makes strategic sense and the American voters implicitly understand this (or, perhaps more realistically, they’re tired of endless intervention). So if you’re relying on America to underwrite the security of your region, you might be delusional. Indeed, the stakes are so much higher for China, so we should expect America to blink first. If it turns out that America (and its electorate) is not willing to sustain a war for dominance in Asia, which seems to be the case, then the logic underlying the regional order, alliances, and strategic positions evaporate. Hence the inability for America to credibly commit.
Part of the essay draws on the Russia-Ukraine war for strategic and tactical lessons. Strategically, White argues convincingly that space should be made for adversaries to participate in world order with dignity and respect (cf. Germany after WW1 against Germany after WW2). Otherwise, we introduce imbalances into the system which usually end up in violence (see: Ukraine, and potentially Taiwan). White also comments that paeens to the rejuvenation of the liberal world order, since America seems to have no clue or plan about the endgame in Eastern Europe, are perhaps overstated. Tactically, sanctioning China’s economy is far costlier, and the sea around Taiwan is much easier to control and harder to supply weapons through.
White concludes the essay with calls to take China’s rise seriously, and to imagine a regional order where Australia will be stuck between several great powers (including Indonesia). Foreign policy and military planning will need to adjust to this new reality. Especially foreign policy with close neighbours, such as the Pacific island nations or south east Asia. White notes that Australian foreign policy is more about denial, image and symbolism than realistic assessments of the balance of power.
In his Quarterly Essay "Sleepwalk to War", Hugh White partly makes the argument that Australia should abandon its commitment to defending Taiwan from Chinese aggression. White contends that America's military power is waning relative to China's, and that a war over Taiwan could escalate into a catastrophic nuclear conflict that the U.S. ans its allies cannot win. He claims Australia has been "sleepwalking" by unquestioningly supporting America's stance on Taiwan without grappling with these new strategic realities.
White's central premise - that the power balance in Asia is shifting decisively in China's favor - is well-supported by economic projections and analysis of military capabilities. His warning that Australia could be dragged into a disastrous U.S.-China war over Taiwan if it maintains its current policy is sobering and worthy of serious consideration.
However, White's proposed solution of pressuring America to capitulate to China's demands regarding Taiwan is deeply flawed. Abandoning Taiwan would not only shatter America's credibility as an ally and embolden further Chinese aggression, but would represent an unconscionable betrayal of democratic values. White glosses over the moral implications of handing 24 million free Taiwanese people over to Beijing's authoritarian rule.
White also fails to substantiate his assumption that China would be satisfied by conquering Taiwan and would not continue making expansionist moves in the region. His analysis seems overly focused on military confrontation between the U.S. and China as the primary risk, ignoring other hazards like economic warfare, cyberattacks, and "grey zone" aggression that a dominant China could unleash.
Furthermore, White's dismissal of America's ability to maintain its position in Asia seems premature. He overlooks the potential for U.S. economic and technological reinvigoration, as well as the strengthening of regional alliances and partnerships to counterbalance China.
His policy prescriptions read more like a capitulation to inevitability than a pragmatic reassessment of national interests. While White raises important questions about the risks of America's Taiwan policy that deserve rigorous debate, his essay ultimately suffers from blinkered analysis and an unwillingness to wrestle with the full implications of his recommendations. His core argument that Australia should abet China's regional dominance in the name of avoiding war is unconvincing.
Wildly underrates any economic tradeoffs in the Aus-China-US relationship. Contains a long scree about potential war over Taiwan, for example, without once mentioning semiconductors. Some really powerful arguments sprinkled throughout, but overall is too blinkered by its national security lens. Iy
Well, it's a bit expensive for an essay but in this case it is probably worth the $25. Hugh White has written, what appears to me anyhow, as a reasonably objective view of Australia's current relations and future outlook with China. Inevitably, Australia's relations and Alliance with the USA are wrapped up in this. The subtitle, more or less, explains White's basic thesis that Australia has an unthinking alliance with America and this could well lead us to "sleepwalk" our way into a conflict (read war) with China. And, from Australia's perspective, such a war would be catastrophic, to say the least. Like many in Australia I've wondered how we could have gone from a very positive relationship with China just a few years ago to the situation we've had in the last year where the Australian Secretary of the Department of Home affairs suggested that the "drums of war" were sounding...and we needed to be prepared. This theme was enthusiastically taken up by Peter Dutton, the Minister for Defence, who suggested we needed to be prepared for war and announced the scrapping of the contract with France for submarines and the planned purchase of nuclear powered subs for Australia. As numerous commentators have pointed out the only real use for the extended range of nuclear powered subs would be to patrol the South China Sea ....much to the ire of China. White makes the obvious point, that one way or the other we are going got have to come to terms with China being THE great power in the region. Pretty soon their economy will be larger than the US economy (probably already is so in PPP terms). And pretty soon their military might will equal or exceed that of the USA. (I think I've seen elsewhere that with various war-games, the US results predict that they cannot win a (conventional) war with China ....and the alternative, of a nuclear war, is both uncertain and "unthinkable"). I found it very scary that the thinking in the USA and in Australia seemed to be so woolly or "unthinking". White says that "the reality is that America has no clear and settled objective in its contest with China. Slogans such as 'a free and open Indo-Pacific' merely try to mask this crucial omission. In truth, however, America aims to retain primacy. This is no model of a new role for America in the new Asia of the twenty-first century". Likewise, the thinking in Australia is equally woolly ...more or less along the lines of "All the way with LBJ" and we can see where that got us in the Vietnam war. And so, we are led down the pathway of the QUAD with the UK, Japan, USA and India supposedly cooperating as a bloc to counter the power of China. But I think , White argues fairly cogently that the QUAD is not going to work. For a start, India has little interest in the Pacific; Britain's interests are pretty remote; the USA will probably decide that it really doesn't need to be a power in East Asia ...especially if it involves confrontation with China. And all that would leave Australia really in the lurch. As I read him, White is saying that Australia needs to grasp the nettle and acknowledge that China, for all its faults, is going to become THE great power in our region and we need to deal with that as best we can. And that doesn't mean going to war with China. In fact, the large proportion of Chinese already living in Australia (and expressing views through the recent election) is indicative of the fact that we probably can come to some sort of mutually beneficial relationship with China. But we also need to be talking-up some sound reasoning to the USA and we should not underplay the significance of our voice in Washington. And we should CERTAINLY NOT be goading the USA into war with China or talking ourselves into war with China. White mentions...but without much detail .....that we should be taking a lot more notice of Indonesia and the other SE Asian nations. But especially Indonesia, one of the putative great powers, and sitting right on our doorstep. I was glad to seek measures being taking yesterday to provide significant resources to Indonesia to help it combat foot and mouth disease. Clearly, a few hundred million dollars of aid here could potentially save many billions of dollars if F&M found its way into Australia. The scariest aspect of White's essay is that he underlines the sloppy thinking in both Canberra and Washington. In fact, the lack of thinking. And leaving the thinking up to the likes of the Departments of Defence and the Spooks is a recipe for disaster. I mean. basically, these establishments really thrive best in conflict situations. That's when they have a purpose and when they get unlimited funding and promotional opportunities. In short, they should never be the source of objective information about international strategy. Contributors? Yes. But not the originators or source of advice. Can the Labor party undo the work of Dutton and the right of Australian Politics? It remains to be seen. Certainly, the jingoistic appeal to danger and the need to bolster our defences has been an election winner in Australia over many years. But I would hope that saner voices (like those of Hugh White) might gradually start to have some impact on Australia. Though, I know, even among my well educated friends, the number who have (rather suddenly) come to see China as aggressive and a threat which we should resist with all our might is significant. The idea that we are going to have to learn to deal with China as THE great power in our region seems to have escaped them. And the idea that America, when the chips are really down, might abandon us, has not entered their heads. Nor has the idea that there might be other pathways than blindly following the USA into a conflict situation with China over Taiwan. Really, quite a powerful essay. Well worth reading and worth five stars by my reckoning.
Not a great one. White's essay pretty thin, and then the correspondence is unusually repetitive and hollow, not adding much other than lengthy appreciation for the original piece
I first found out about this Quarterly Essay through a fellow member at the Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) Western Australia branch. I had heard of Hugh White through my studies of International Relations at university; and let's be honest if i hadn't then the degree would have had no intrinsic value within Australia. I had already booked a ticket to attend the lecture and i was excited to hear what he had to say as Australia grapples with its international identity after decades of inconsistent engagement with China and greater Asia.
The lecture was built around and from the writings and thoughts of this quarterly essay and was worth the time to attend such an informative lecture. If you have not been able to attend one of Hugh White's recent lectures, then do not despair because reading his material or a YouTube search will easily remedy that short fall.
Hugh White develops his argument from the mistakes that have been made in the modern political past and highlights the inability of consecutive Australian governments from developing a forward-thinking international relations policy that has Australia letting go of their security blankets, the United States and the United Kingdom. He presses home the point of the AUKUS agreement and the reality of its failings and inconsequential delivery that it will give by not meeting the needed targets. He also delved into the need for Australia to develop a defense policy that is independent and realistic, and more importantly does not allow Australia to be dragged into a war with China that Australia could not hope to win or for a Taiwan that America is unsure that it would want to defend.
The thing that stands out for me and continues to be a thorn in my side is that he does not look towards ASEAN as an important vessel and organisation that Australia should work towards full membership. It irritates me and shall always annoy me until Australia realizes that it is an Asian country and not some remote colony of a Britain that is no longer great. Hugh White as with all other south-east coast Australian politicians and academics just can't bring themselves to commit to the reality of geography. He does point out that Australia should not throw away our alliances and strategies that do work such as the United States and he did highlight the use of forming relationships with India and Japan was simply foolish.
Building relationships with India, Japan, and China should be for the same reasoning. White mentions this on a number of occasions at individual points in the essay and this is the most sagely advice that can be offered. The relationship development should be simply based on mutual respect and economic opportunity not insecurity and weakness of state craft, as it was with the Morrison government and the village idiot - Peter Dutton. Their quasi-war mongering language goes to show their lack of understanding and complete lack of respect for the change that has and is taking place in the world.
Hugh White points out that the reality is that we are living for the medium to long term in a multi-polar world. This means that we need to accept that China is a dominant neighbor who is not going away and needs to be respected and engaged. Australia needs to stop saber rattling and needs to manage the dialogue with the CCP and the Chinese people. There is a difference and until Australia's so-called leaders understand this, they will continue to fear the unknown side Asia that they try to ignore and kneel as the weak servant before the unreliable bipolar bald eagle.
Hugh White's work is always qualitative and quantitative, and this is essay reinforces that the standard has neither diminished nor disappeared.
Grand strategist Hugh White implores Australia us to question America on what it wants (and can reasonably expect) from its complex relationship with China, and to reflect on what war between them would mean for Australia, in his long-form essay Sleepwalk to War.
China is increasingly willing to challenge American primacy in Asia, and America has no consistent response. Obama’s “pivot to Asia” had no money, Trump’s trade wars made no sense, and Biden’s rhetoric on defending Taiwan is quickly recanted by his officials. America’s security no longer relies on countering rivals on the Eurasian landmass, as Washington believed it did when facing Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan during World War II, or when Soviet influence ran uninterrupted from East Germany to Vietnam during the Cold War. Back then, at least, Washington and Moscow accepted each other’s respective spheres of influence, facing off only when those spheres were threatened, and mostly indirectly. Now, however, Washington wants to stay in Asia, but Beijing wants it out.
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Diplomatic efforts have been underwhelming. Power-sharing may once have been an option, but nobody knows what this might look like, and it is unlikely to appeal to Beijing, much less work. Framing the rivalry as a showdown between authoritarian and democratic systems plays awkwardly in Southeast Asia, which in any case is making its own accommodations with China. The Quad includes Australia and Japan, but it is really about India, which for a number of reasons is unlikely to be a military counterweight to China.
White beseeches Australian politicians and policymakers to interrogate their American counterparts on what they are genuinely willing to do, and to what ends, as competition with China intensifies. What are they planning in Asia? Why might a war start, and how might it be fought, or avoided? What role do they see for Australia? Sleepwalk to War is unsentimental about Australia’s alliance with America, arguing that unless Washington can clarify its China policy, we must either fight alongside it when Beijing claims Taiwan, or abandon the alliance altogether to avoid a long, bloody and probably unwinnable war.
Sleepwalk to War is insightful enough to recommend (and beautifully written), but too short to make the case to the unconvinced. White is perhaps the best-placed author to take foreign policy back to first principles, the way he did with defence. His policy prescriptions deserve deeper rigour and clearer explanation, namely: treating India as a great power and not just a Quad partner; cooperating pragmatically with Indonesia rather than making convenient political hay out of it; recognising that Pacific states will remember the long neglect (and paternalistic language) of wealthy neighbours when other potential partners come along.
John Mearsheimer once said that great powers do not die in their beds. White doesn’t necessarily agree that China will become the hegemon Mearsheimer fears, but the competing priorities of the world’s current superpower and its likeliest successor should keep Australians awake at night, as we burn the midnight oil and try to find our place.
Actually dreadful. White advances no linear argument and there is a profound lack of clarity in whatever he waffles on about. There is no clear narrative point and in the end it seems to be that his perspective is that the US is useless and spent and that Australia are sleepwalking into war by blindly following them. I must have missed the section where he acknowledged Greg Clark for the sleepwalking analogy. The US is hopeless; no great skill in noticing this. The coalition government postured and prioritised politics over diplomatic nous. The defence department could not develop the functional capability to adequately resource our defence forces. All simple conclusions that even a year 12 student could identify. But what White misses is that China is not monolithic and is prone to all of the same challenges that all other countries are. Equally Australians have chosen a government that has already prioritised normalising Sino relationships and restructuring our global engagement. 6 months of facts have effectively demolished the vacuous generalities of White's argument which just serves to showcase how shit it really was. Do better with your commissioning QE.
He raises a LOT of valid points; especially over Australia’s inability to see that we are part of Asia and that we offend China, ignore Indonesia, insult the island nations (and make jokes on open mikes about them), and forget about India. Lets not sign ourselves up thoughtlessly to a US war. I want to say ‘again’.
Pelosi’s recent visit to Taiwan certainly put that issue back on the table, but the US will never go to war to protect it. Look at the UK just handing Hong Kong over.
I was watching China Tonight and Stan Grant interviewed the Chinese ambassador; ‘Threats were made against Taiwan [pause] on this program [pause] by you.” [bwahaha]
China might well need to invade to ‘save face’ after the pandemic, drought, famine, firestorms and alleged imminent economic collapse [perhaps they just lied about their brilliant economic performance?].
But Xi Jinping retains power after the recent confirmation. Gotta shore up that mandate of heaven reputation.
Clear-eyed and unsentimental, defence policy expert Hugh White lays out an utterly convincing case of how Australia’s foreign policy has run off the rails - in being squeezed between the US and China.
In short, we are over-invested in the idea that the US has a long-term and sustainable commitment to being the dominant power in East Asia and by failing to accommodate ourselves to the reality of China as a growing regional power, we leave ourselves in a precarious position when Washington departs.
White is scathing about the Morrison government’s strategically naive and electorally cynical sabre-rattling over China and, worst of all, its stitched-together AUKUS defence partnership deal with the two major Anglo powers - Trump’s America and post-Brexit Britain - two countries on a slow downward slide.
Keating showed the way on foreign policy 30 years ago. Australia needs to run its own show much more than it has. We are geographically part of Asia and must stop with the fantasy that the UK and the US will save us if and when the s&*t hits the fan.
White produces yet another great analysis of the Australian-Chinese relationship. White analysis stands out from other because of his emphasis on being methodical and his ability to parse through the loaded rhetoric. For his emphasis on being methodical, all of his suggestions are structured into steps and all of his claims have clear numbered reason. Any rhetoric of politicians, academics and commentators is carefully considered and stripped of its connotations to display the point.
White draws on the recent developments in the Australian-Chinese relationship to build his case. He discusses the newly introduced defences procurement deal - AUKUS. He also notes global developments such as Taiwan and Ukraine, and how they will interact with the relationship or perhaps indicate the future of the relationship.
Despite his careful analysis, White does not accurately consider the AUKUS agreement. AUKUS gives Australia access to nuclear powered submarines. It does not set enforce the US to defend Australia. White fails to clarify this point of difference.
Brilliant analysis of the Australian (and American) governments' mishandling of the China issue.
As China becomes even more powerful and the US relatively less powerful then the US will have to gradually or quickly withdraw from East Asia. In the long term it is inevitable but it is in denial. It talks tough but it simply won't be able to defend places like Taiwan without risking a full scale nuclear war with China.
Australia's China policy seems to be simply a matter of hoping that the US will save us from China. It probably won't. It certainly won't save us unless it is in its vital national interest at the time. Alliances and treaties won't count for much of it's going to be too difficult or too expensive to save us.
The author also highlights the idiocy of our submarine policies and procurements.
Sharp, insightful, and always provocative, High White holds the mirror up the the establishment and the groupthink that defines international policy in Australia. White asks (and offers some answers to) some hard questions around our place in the world and our relationships, and how our backwards looking dependence on America to defend us doesn’t serve us now, and is unlikely to serve us in the future, especially if a China lead conflict in our region arises. Hugh argues for strategic independence and genuine, thoughtful relationships with our near neighbors, on our terms. His thesis is, at the very least, worthy of broad consideration within the complex debate at hand.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
A thoughtful and well argued discussion of Australia's foreign policy and alliances. An excellent consideration of the nuances and complexities of the present international situations. Could not be more different from the jingoism, dog whistling and bluster we have heard from recent governments and the Newscorp echo chamber. This has really helped my understanding of the foreign policy challenges we face into the future.
Four stars just because it made its point so clearly and I feel more knowledgeable after reading it. A damn bore to read though, like an excellent academic essay. I never thought international relations could be so tedious to slog through. And I know you read them months apart, but I think coming off the back of the beautifully poetic Waving, Not Drowning made the contrast stark.
A clear-eyed and thoughtful assessment of the current and future state of Australian foreign policy, especially as regards China, the USA, their contest for supremacy in the Asia-Pacific region and how it has and will continue to affect Australia. Thought-provoking, and not a little frightening.
Easy and accessible essay exploring Australian defence and foreign policy. Many won’t agree with Hugh but he succinctly explains the debate and leaves you empathising with many of his positions.
I do love the Quarterly Essay, and this in particular was a ripper. A sobering read. Laying it all out, this feels even more important under the recent change of American government.
What I like about Hugh White is his refreshingly contrary voice of reason in an otherwise very one-sided debate on Australia’s foreign and defence policies vis-à-vis China/US relations.
In this essay, White argues that over the long-term the US will not be able to compete with China for primacy in East Asia. Accordingly, Australia needs to adjust its foreign and defence policies to recognise the development of a post-American regional order. Instead of betting Australia's future on US primacy or that the new order will be a benign multipolar order (US, China, India, Japan), Australia should prepare to be stuck in the middle of great power competition between two regional hegemonies - India and China.
The crux of the argument hinges on whether the US would be willing to fight a powerful China in what would amount to be the largest war since 1945, compounded by nuclear weapons. White uses what he calls the ‘Taiwan Test’ to assess the credibility of America’s willingness to defend its current dominance in the regional order against China. I quote: ‘if it [the US] fails to deter such a challenge, then it cannot avoid its fateful choice. Either it backs down and fatally undermines its position in Asia, or it plunges into a futile and potentially catastrophic war that it will probably lose. If it finds itself facing that terrible choice, by far the most likely as well as the most prudent choice would be to decide not to fight. The alternative would be to plunge into a war so ruinous that victory, even if it could be attained, would be meaningless.’ Victory would be indistinguishable from defeat. The question for Australian policymakers then is: If the US fails to defend Taiwan, then how sure can we be that the US would not also abandon Australia?
White’s concern is that despite the above question mark, Australia maintains hard-line support for the US, and accordingly, has doubled down on loudly resisting China’s growing ambitions (e.g., banning Huawei, calling an international investigation Covid-19, AUKUS). Australia is encouraging the US to confront and contain China instead of helping the US to manage the strategic transition. These actions mean that Australia ‘is an outlier in a region which is quietly getting on with the difficult business of adjusting to the new realities they seem to understand much better than we do.’ Indeed, the AUKUS nuclear submarine deal inextricably ties Australian defence policy to the US and signals to China that the Australian Defence Force is being designed to confront China. This, according to White, means that Australia loses its strategic autonomy. Either Australia is forced into catastrophic war with China, or Australia risks having a military built to support a US government which has no appetite to fight a war to defend Australia.
The essay would have benefited from further discussion on the cultural and political values that influence Australian policymaking. However, I gave this essay four stars because White says what often remains unsaid by Australian policymakers: Australia must not keep all its eggs in the one US alliance basket; it must develop an independent foreign and defence policy that is able to adjust to, rather than just contest, an increasingly powerful China.
Hugh White makes some nteresting and unique arguments in this quarterly essay. Australia should look to move away from its reliance on US power in Asia and look to engage with regional powers such as China, India and Indonesia.
He also argues that a war over Taiwan could be a catastrophic disaster in which nuclear weapons could be utilised by both China and the the US. Not worth it. If China wants Taiwan, the West might just have to accept that.
The new Labor government now has an opportunity to work more with its regional neighbors and put Australia down a new path and prepare it for a new, multipolar Indo-Pacific.
This is an extremely poignant look at the current situation Australia is facing in our region of the world. White's views are astute and also measured. There are many valid points throughout, and the writing is both sensible and concise!
For a different take on this topic, particularly with a more military-focused view, check out Danger on Our Doorstep