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James Longstreet and the American Civil War: The Confederate General Who Fought the Next War
The American Civil War is often called the first “modern war.” Sandwiched between the Napoleonic Wars and World War I, it spawned a host of “firsts” and is considered a precursor to the larger and more deadly 20th century wars. Confederate Gen. James Longstreet made overlooked but profound modern contributions to the art of war. Retired Lt. Col. Harold M. Knudsen explains what Longstreet did and how he did it in James Longstreet and the American Civil The Confederate General Who Fought the Next War.
Initially, commanders on both sides extensively utilized Napoleonic tactics that were obsolete because of the advent of the rifled musket and better artillery. Some professional army officers worked to improve tactics, operations, and strategies. On the Confederate side, a careful comparison of Longstreet’s body of work in the field to modern military doctrine reveals several large-scale innovations.
Longstreet understood early that the tactical defense was generally dominant over the offense, which was something few grasped in 1862. Longstreet’s thinking demonstrated a clear evolution that began on the field at First Manassas in July 1861, developed through the bloody fighting of 1862, and culminated in the brilliant defensive victory at Fredericksburg that December. The lethality with which his riflemen and artillery mowed down repeated Union assaults hinted at what was to come in World War I. Longstreet’s ability to launch and control powerful offensives was on display at Second Manassas in August 1862. His assault plan at Chickamauga in Georgia the following September was similar, if not the forerunner to, World War II tactical-level German armored tactics. Other areas show progressive applications with artillery, staff work, force projection, and operational-level thinking.
Longstreet was not the sole agent of modern change away from the Napoleonic method, but his contributions were significant and executed on a large scale. They demonstrated that he was a modern thinker unparalleled in the Confederate Army.
Unfortunately, many Civil War students have a one-sided view of Longstreet, whose legacy fell victim to bitter postwar Southern politics when “Old Pete” supported Reconstruction bills, accepted postings with the Grant Administration, and criticized Robert E. Lee. Many modern writers continue to skew the general’s legacy.
This book draws heavily upon 20th century U.S. Army doctrine, field training, staff planning, command, and combat experience and is the first serious treatment of Longstreet’s generalship vis-a-vis modern warfare. Not everyone will agree with Knudsen’s conclusions, but it will now be impossible to write about the general without referencing this important study.
Initially, commanders on both sides extensively utilized Napoleonic tactics that were obsolete because of the advent of the rifled musket and better artillery. Some professional army officers worked to improve tactics, operations, and strategies. On the Confederate side, a careful comparison of Longstreet’s body of work in the field to modern military doctrine reveals several large-scale innovations.
Longstreet understood early that the tactical defense was generally dominant over the offense, which was something few grasped in 1862. Longstreet’s thinking demonstrated a clear evolution that began on the field at First Manassas in July 1861, developed through the bloody fighting of 1862, and culminated in the brilliant defensive victory at Fredericksburg that December. The lethality with which his riflemen and artillery mowed down repeated Union assaults hinted at what was to come in World War I. Longstreet’s ability to launch and control powerful offensives was on display at Second Manassas in August 1862. His assault plan at Chickamauga in Georgia the following September was similar, if not the forerunner to, World War II tactical-level German armored tactics. Other areas show progressive applications with artillery, staff work, force projection, and operational-level thinking.
Longstreet was not the sole agent of modern change away from the Napoleonic method, but his contributions were significant and executed on a large scale. They demonstrated that he was a modern thinker unparalleled in the Confederate Army.
Unfortunately, many Civil War students have a one-sided view of Longstreet, whose legacy fell victim to bitter postwar Southern politics when “Old Pete” supported Reconstruction bills, accepted postings with the Grant Administration, and criticized Robert E. Lee. Many modern writers continue to skew the general’s legacy.
This book draws heavily upon 20th century U.S. Army doctrine, field training, staff planning, command, and combat experience and is the first serious treatment of Longstreet’s generalship vis-a-vis modern warfare. Not everyone will agree with Knudsen’s conclusions, but it will now be impossible to write about the general without referencing this important study.
284 pages, Kindle Edition
Published May 4, 2022
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66 people want to read
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
July 21, 2023
Do you ever pick up a book that grabs your attention and you end up reading the book in several days? This book was one of those books, and if I could give it a rating, it would be higher than 5-stars. I was completely blown away and captivated by retired Lt. Col. Harold M Knudsens book “James Longstreet and the American Civil War: The Confederate General Who Fought the Next War”. I first saw the book on Amazon a year ago, and it was running for nearly $70, and then I realized it was $32.95 on Savas-Beatie, the publisher of the books website. I have been wanting and waiting to read this book for some time and had hesitation on whether to buy it now or wait, but boy was I glad I finally did because it is definitely a book I would hold up with a high degree of respect and appreciation for. Anyone who is a Civil War buff should read this book, because it is a revelation and frankly, I think James Longstreet himself would be flattered by Mr. Knudsen’s work of art.
James Longstreet for years sadly had his legacy erased by followers of the Lost Cause ideology and bitter and often times jealous confederate generals who fabricated this negative image of him due to his politics. Longstreet was ahead of his time, a true military innovator, and in my opinion one of the best generals in the war (next to George Thomas). Longstreet tactically recognized the futility of Napoleonic tactics with the development of modern weaponry, he realized the primacy of tactical defense; as the war progressed, Longstreet utilized terrain to his advantage, and from his experiences at Fredericksburg, Antietam and Malvern Hill, he saw the importance of well placed and well dug earthworks. He was a progenitor of maximizing firearms capability over what is called a “kill zone” at Fredericksburg, he used fire support coordination at Gettysburg, and at Chickamauga he used a prototype form of “schwerpunkt” in which he massed his forces to strike over a smaller area instead of en echelon formation like Picketts Charge.
After Antietam, Longstreet began to realize that a “Defensive-Offensive” strategy was what the Confederacy needed to win the war. instead of advocating for invading the north, he advocated for the Confederacy to use it’s interior lines to create numerical superiority against specific Union forces, in which the Confederacy would wrest the initiative from the Union and then maneuver to strike them on favorable terms. Longstreet was not an entirely defensive minded general; he called for a strategic defense, but tactically was more than willing to switch to the offensive if the advantage seemed to lay with the Confederacy.
It strikes me as genius that Longstreet was using “Schwerpunkt”, combined arms warfare, artillery coordination, “kill zone” tactics, and earthworks before they were put into effect in the World Wars when armies had tanks, and radios. All of these things Mr. Knudsen brought to light in this book, and I was truly impressed. I have to say, that I did read Robert Citinos books that talked about German “Bewegungskrieg” and I noticed a lot of similarities in the German way of war and that of the Confederacy, but Knudsens book seems to give me reason to believe the Civil War was truly the first modern war, and that Longstreet was one of those who was a forward thinker and one of the best commanders the Confederacy had.
I could probably sit here and write multiple paragraphs more, but I think the reader should buy the book, and read it. You will not be disappointed. I give special thanks to Theodore P. Savass for publishing these awe-inspiring books, and Mr. Knudsen for his talents with the pen. My hope is to be as good a writer as he is. I earnestly hope he will write more books, because I will definitely read them and buy them.
James Longstreet for years sadly had his legacy erased by followers of the Lost Cause ideology and bitter and often times jealous confederate generals who fabricated this negative image of him due to his politics. Longstreet was ahead of his time, a true military innovator, and in my opinion one of the best generals in the war (next to George Thomas). Longstreet tactically recognized the futility of Napoleonic tactics with the development of modern weaponry, he realized the primacy of tactical defense; as the war progressed, Longstreet utilized terrain to his advantage, and from his experiences at Fredericksburg, Antietam and Malvern Hill, he saw the importance of well placed and well dug earthworks. He was a progenitor of maximizing firearms capability over what is called a “kill zone” at Fredericksburg, he used fire support coordination at Gettysburg, and at Chickamauga he used a prototype form of “schwerpunkt” in which he massed his forces to strike over a smaller area instead of en echelon formation like Picketts Charge.
After Antietam, Longstreet began to realize that a “Defensive-Offensive” strategy was what the Confederacy needed to win the war. instead of advocating for invading the north, he advocated for the Confederacy to use it’s interior lines to create numerical superiority against specific Union forces, in which the Confederacy would wrest the initiative from the Union and then maneuver to strike them on favorable terms. Longstreet was not an entirely defensive minded general; he called for a strategic defense, but tactically was more than willing to switch to the offensive if the advantage seemed to lay with the Confederacy.
It strikes me as genius that Longstreet was using “Schwerpunkt”, combined arms warfare, artillery coordination, “kill zone” tactics, and earthworks before they were put into effect in the World Wars when armies had tanks, and radios. All of these things Mr. Knudsen brought to light in this book, and I was truly impressed. I have to say, that I did read Robert Citinos books that talked about German “Bewegungskrieg” and I noticed a lot of similarities in the German way of war and that of the Confederacy, but Knudsens book seems to give me reason to believe the Civil War was truly the first modern war, and that Longstreet was one of those who was a forward thinker and one of the best commanders the Confederacy had.
I could probably sit here and write multiple paragraphs more, but I think the reader should buy the book, and read it. You will not be disappointed. I give special thanks to Theodore P. Savass for publishing these awe-inspiring books, and Mr. Knudsen for his talents with the pen. My hope is to be as good a writer as he is. I earnestly hope he will write more books, because I will definitely read them and buy them.
May 7, 2024
James Longstreet is seen as the reason why the South lost the Battle of Gettysburg. He is still vilified to this day mostly due to supporting the Reconstruction policies of the North after the war. Harold Knudsen argues that Longstreet was the South's best general. Lee called him "the Capitol soldier." Others praised him for his military capabilities. Also, in comparison to many officers on both sides, Longstreet had a lot more experience than others. Kundsen uses his own military experience to demonstrate Longstreet was the Confederacy's best general. This is not a traditional biography. This solely covers Longstreet's military career in the Civil War. If you are looking for a full-length biography, you will not find that here. However, if you are interested in military history, this is for you. The chapters on Gettysburg were well analyzed and Knudsen argues well that Lee lost that battle because he lacked a clear objective and continued fighting a battle that George Meade and his men had a clear advantage. I enjoyed reading Knudsen destroying the Lost Cause arguments in those chapters. He analyzed Lee's options and provided the flaws in each one or simply stated if Lee had done this it is pure speculation. The more I read about Gettysburg the more convinced that Longstreet was correct. This was a refreshing read and a must read for Civil War and military history readers.
May 17, 2024
This book evaluates Confederate General James Longstreet’s career during the American Civil War. It shows how the general learned from his earlier experiences in the Civil War and incorporated that learned knowledge into his subsequent decisions and strategic thinking. What the author points out is how Longstreet evolved into an industrialized war commander as opposed to the typical Napoleonic thinking of warfare at that time. Linear formations, especially during assaults, were being discarded in favor of strategic defensive formations behind defensive works. Then, when on the offensive, column formations that could concentrate the attackers onto specific points were becoming recognized as a more successful plan. The author shows how much of Longstreet’s strategic thinking and tactics became common practice in the industrialized warfare during the 20th century.
August 27, 2024
This was good. Longstreet is going through a very necessary re-examination after having his reputation all but destroyed by Lost Cause sycophants and this book does a good job at showing that he was ahead of his time in military thinking. The author compares moves Longstreet made in the Civil War with moves generals have made in more recent wars and argues that his tactical mind was thinking ahead, trying to find advantages without the useless waste of his men. I think the author made the arguments well.
July 6, 2022
Excellent
If someone wants to read an objective analysis of the role of Longstreet and his role in the Civil War this.is it. Mr. Knudsen relays.on his own experience as an Army officer and current doctrinal techniques to argue that Longstreet was an officer who realized that the Civil War was one were the techniques and tactics of Napoleon and his acolytes where not appropriate. In many ways I feel he anticipated Molly's views on war in the latter part of the 19th century.
If someone wants to read an objective analysis of the role of Longstreet and his role in the Civil War this.is it. Mr. Knudsen relays.on his own experience as an Army officer and current doctrinal techniques to argue that Longstreet was an officer who realized that the Civil War was one were the techniques and tactics of Napoleon and his acolytes where not appropriate. In many ways I feel he anticipated Molly's views on war in the latter part of the 19th century.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews