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America's Frozen Neighborhoods: The Abuse of Zoning
This book examines local zoning policies and suggests reforms that states and the federal government might adopt to counter the negative effects of exclusionary zoning
“[A] tale . . . well told by Robert Ellickson. . . . It’s a valuable contribution to the growing movement against NIMBYism.”—Peter Coy, New York Times
In this book, Robert Ellickson asserts that local zoning policies are the most consequential regulatory program in the United States. Many localities have created barriers to the development of less costly forms of housing. Numerous economists have found that current zoning practices inflict major damage on the national economy. Using Silicon Valley, the Greater New Haven, Connecticut, area, and the northwestern portion of Greater Austin, Texas, as case studies, Ellickson shows in unprecedented detail how the zoning system works and recommends steps for its reform.
Zoning regulations, Ellickson demonstrates, are hard to dislodge once localities have enacted them. He develops metrics to measure the existence and costs of exclusionary zoning, and suggests reforms that states and the federal government could undertake to counter the detrimental effects of local policies. These include the cartelization of housing markets and the aggravation of racial and class segregation.
“[A] tale . . . well told by Robert Ellickson. . . . It’s a valuable contribution to the growing movement against NIMBYism.”—Peter Coy, New York Times
In this book, Robert Ellickson asserts that local zoning policies are the most consequential regulatory program in the United States. Many localities have created barriers to the development of less costly forms of housing. Numerous economists have found that current zoning practices inflict major damage on the national economy. Using Silicon Valley, the Greater New Haven, Connecticut, area, and the northwestern portion of Greater Austin, Texas, as case studies, Ellickson shows in unprecedented detail how the zoning system works and recommends steps for its reform.
Zoning regulations, Ellickson demonstrates, are hard to dislodge once localities have enacted them. He develops metrics to measure the existence and costs of exclusionary zoning, and suggests reforms that states and the federal government could undertake to counter the detrimental effects of local policies. These include the cartelization of housing markets and the aggravation of racial and class segregation.
320 pages, Hardcover
Published October 18, 2022
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
January 8, 2023
In “America’s Frozen Neighborhoods,” Robert Ellickson, Professor of Property and Urban Law at Yale Law School, argues that local zoning designs have become exceedingly exclusionary, favoring incumbent homeowners over housing consumers. Surveying three metropolitan areas with varying degrees of restrictive zoning tendencies (Silicon Valley, Greater New Haven, and Northwest Greater Austin), Ellickson describes how proposals to increase residential density, especially in Silicon Valley and Greenwich, CT, have been dead on arrival, blocked by activist NIMBY “residentialists” seeking to preserve and calcify the existing order. Ellickson argues that, by capturing local governments, this housing "cartel" has effectively stymied any neighborhood level efforts to intensify housing development and created a “zoning straitjacket” that inflicts severe externalities on housing consumers.
Ellickson finds that all three examined metro areas have differing degrees of exclusionary zoning practices that serve as microcosms for local zoning issues across the country. From mandated large lot sizes in New Haven, to restricted development areas pushed by Silicon Valley environmentalists, to the more lenient development policies in Austin (coupled with greater state authority to deny enforcement of local zoning ordinances), the zoning straitjacket has suffocated any hopes of greater residential development and worsened the housing crisis. Ellickson argues that the solution this local filibustering is a combination of more involved federal and state policies, including expansion of housing vouchers, grants-in-aid to state agencies against exclusionary zoning, policies such as tying mortgage interest deductibility to the level of neighborhood multifamily residential development, and the mobilization of consumer groups (including civil rights activists, environmentalists, construction unions) to resolve consumer collective action problems against vocal and organized homeowners. While “America’s Frozen Neighborhoods” doesn’t offer panaceas to the ills of exclusionary zoning, it does suggest fresh and encouraging methods to combat the housing supply cartel and weaken the “home rule” advantages it has historically enjoyed in local town halls and zoning boards.
Ellickson finds that all three examined metro areas have differing degrees of exclusionary zoning practices that serve as microcosms for local zoning issues across the country. From mandated large lot sizes in New Haven, to restricted development areas pushed by Silicon Valley environmentalists, to the more lenient development policies in Austin (coupled with greater state authority to deny enforcement of local zoning ordinances), the zoning straitjacket has suffocated any hopes of greater residential development and worsened the housing crisis. Ellickson argues that the solution this local filibustering is a combination of more involved federal and state policies, including expansion of housing vouchers, grants-in-aid to state agencies against exclusionary zoning, policies such as tying mortgage interest deductibility to the level of neighborhood multifamily residential development, and the mobilization of consumer groups (including civil rights activists, environmentalists, construction unions) to resolve consumer collective action problems against vocal and organized homeowners. While “America’s Frozen Neighborhoods” doesn’t offer panaceas to the ills of exclusionary zoning, it does suggest fresh and encouraging methods to combat the housing supply cartel and weaken the “home rule” advantages it has historically enjoyed in local town halls and zoning boards.
February 14, 2023
Numerous other books have pointed out how the abuse of zoning leads to higher housing costs for everyone. What does this book add to the debate?
1. The first few chapters focus on the suburbs of three different metro areas (New Haven, Austin, and Silicon Valley/San Jose) thus adding practical examples of how regulation has become more restrictive over the decades, or at least has failed to change to meet rising demand for housing. However, he doesn't directly address the link between these metro areas' policies and their radically different housing prices. He points out that Austin is generally more pro-growth, perhaps because Texas law does not favor the creation of tiny suburbs to the same extent as California or Connecticut law. But even in Texas, zoning laws are rarely liberalized in already-developed areas.
2. Ellickson discusses the motives of homeowners who favor the status quo; rather than focusing on narrow causes like racism or property values, Ellickson sees a broader problem, which he terms "status quo bias." New housing might have both positive and negative impacts on a neighborhood; he argues that people are naturally predisposed to fear possible costs more than to value possible benefits.
3. Ellickson argues that restrictive covenants in subdivisions, by creating minimum lot sizes or prohibiting new apartments, might also limit housing supply. He suggests, however, that this problem is less serious than zoning, because "Few covenant schemes bind more than 1 percent of the area of municipality." But if all covenants put together bound nearly all of a municipality, covenants might be as limiting as zoning. (On the other hand, I don't know whether this is the case or whether there is any relevant data out there). A stronger argument is that because covenant-governed communities are so small (typically including less than 100 units) an obsolete covenant is easier to reform than obsolete zoning.
4. In his last chapter or two, Ellickson discusses reforms that might be politically feasible. He suggests an increased number of housing vouchers to make housing available to the poor, rather than expensive public housing projects. One obvious problem with this idea is that vouchers increase demand for housing without increasing supply, thus making housing more expensive for non-voucher-holders. In addition, I wish Ellickson had responded to commentators who argue that European nations seem to have no difficulty building large amounts of public housing. In this part of the book, Ellickson's most interesting discussion is his critique of New Jersey's court-created "Mount Laurel doctrine." New Jersey courts limit exclusionary zoning not by eliminating zoning, but by allowing a builder who proposes that at least 20 percent of its units be subsidized low/moderate income units can sue hostile municipalities. But this remedy only works if a builder can be found who will be able to build low-income units and still make a profit. The New Jersey courts also required each municipality to calculate their "fair share" of housing need, a paperwork-heavy approach that didn't produce much. Ellickson seems to favor a more deregulatory approach.
1. The first few chapters focus on the suburbs of three different metro areas (New Haven, Austin, and Silicon Valley/San Jose) thus adding practical examples of how regulation has become more restrictive over the decades, or at least has failed to change to meet rising demand for housing. However, he doesn't directly address the link between these metro areas' policies and their radically different housing prices. He points out that Austin is generally more pro-growth, perhaps because Texas law does not favor the creation of tiny suburbs to the same extent as California or Connecticut law. But even in Texas, zoning laws are rarely liberalized in already-developed areas.
2. Ellickson discusses the motives of homeowners who favor the status quo; rather than focusing on narrow causes like racism or property values, Ellickson sees a broader problem, which he terms "status quo bias." New housing might have both positive and negative impacts on a neighborhood; he argues that people are naturally predisposed to fear possible costs more than to value possible benefits.
3. Ellickson argues that restrictive covenants in subdivisions, by creating minimum lot sizes or prohibiting new apartments, might also limit housing supply. He suggests, however, that this problem is less serious than zoning, because "Few covenant schemes bind more than 1 percent of the area of municipality." But if all covenants put together bound nearly all of a municipality, covenants might be as limiting as zoning. (On the other hand, I don't know whether this is the case or whether there is any relevant data out there). A stronger argument is that because covenant-governed communities are so small (typically including less than 100 units) an obsolete covenant is easier to reform than obsolete zoning.
4. In his last chapter or two, Ellickson discusses reforms that might be politically feasible. He suggests an increased number of housing vouchers to make housing available to the poor, rather than expensive public housing projects. One obvious problem with this idea is that vouchers increase demand for housing without increasing supply, thus making housing more expensive for non-voucher-holders. In addition, I wish Ellickson had responded to commentators who argue that European nations seem to have no difficulty building large amounts of public housing. In this part of the book, Ellickson's most interesting discussion is his critique of New Jersey's court-created "Mount Laurel doctrine." New Jersey courts limit exclusionary zoning not by eliminating zoning, but by allowing a builder who proposes that at least 20 percent of its units be subsidized low/moderate income units can sue hostile municipalities. But this remedy only works if a builder can be found who will be able to build low-income units and still make a profit. The New Jersey courts also required each municipality to calculate their "fair share" of housing need, a paperwork-heavy approach that didn't produce much. Ellickson seems to favor a more deregulatory approach.
June 11, 2023
I think the fact that I got through this long a book about zoning policy and enjoyed it strongly suggests I will in fact be subjecting myself to a PhD program.
September 28, 2023
This is an important book. We are in a housing crisis, because of the the abuse of zoning. I’ve known this as. Realtor, but the author offers insights into just how insidious it is.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews