On Heidegger's Being and Time is an outstanding exploration of Heidegger's most important work by two major philosophers. Simon Critchley argues that we must see Being and Time as a radicalization of Husserl's phenomenology, particularly his theories of intentionality, categorial intuition, and the phenomenological concept of the a priori. This leads to a reappraisal and defense of Heidegger's conception of phenomenology. In contrast, Reiner Schürmann urges us to read Heidegger 'backward', arguing that his later work is the key to unravelling Being and Time . Through a close reading of Being and Time Schürmann demonstrates that this work is ultimately aporetic because the notion of Being elaborated in his later work is already at play within it. This is the first time that Schürmann's renowned lectures on Heidegger have been published. The book concludes with Critchley's reinterpretation of the importance of authenticity in Being and Time . Arguing for what he calls an 'originary inauthenticity', Critchley proposes a relational understanding of the key concepts of the second part of Being and Time : death, conscience and temporality.
Simon Critchley (born 27 February 1960 in Hertfordshire) is an English philosopher currently teaching at The New School. He works in continental philosophy. Critchley argues that philosophy commences in disappointment, either religious or political. These two axes may be said largely to inform his published work: religious disappointment raises the question of meaning and has to, as he sees it, deal with the problem of nihilism; political disappointment provokes the question of justice and raises the need for a coherent ethics [...]
Just watch the movie "Being There" - Peter Sellers fairly walks the waters of brilliance! Forget Herr Heide's endless reconfiguring language into wording fit for his laboring contractions. Birth he gives not.
Philosophers Simon Critchley and Reiner Schurmann take a stab at presenting novel interpretations of posthumous philosopher Martin Heidegger's masterwork Being and Time. Critchley in facts offers two interpretations. One interpretation says that we should read Heidegger's work as both continuous with the phenomenological method of his mentor Edmund Husserl and a radical, existential break from said method.
Similar claims have been made before about Heidegger but Critchley's interpretation is novel in his explication of the three main concepts Husserl and Heidegger were employing: intentionality, categorial intuition, and the a priori. Intentionality concerns the way in which our minds are directed toward conscious objects. Categorial intuition concerns the way in which our minds are hardwired to perceive these conscious objects. The a priori is related to the way in which these sets of hardwired frameworks constitute the mind.
Critchley's second offering argues that we ought to read Heidegger against himself with respect to the contents of Division II of Being and Time. There, Heidegger argues that we live our lives mostly in the inauthentic mode, doing and saying and thinking what everyone else does. But Heidegger boldly asserts that in order to live a truly authentic life, we need to take stock of the fact that our short lives are truly our own and make use of important moments (Heidegger calls these, vaguely, "Situations") to break with what everyone else does.
Pace Heidegger, Critchley makes a case for what he calls "originary inauthenticity." This view states that because we were born into a world not of our own creation, because certain facts about who we are, where we're from, and who we know are already given for us in advance, no grand existential life-project will ever give us a sense of authentic mastery. Even what we think of as our very consciences are conditioned by our social circumstances.
There's something to this case of Critchley's. I think it's overstated, however, and sort of misses the point, but I won't get into it. Nor will I address the interpretation offered by the other philosopher in this volume, the interpretation of Reiner Schurmann. That's because I think the interpretation is pretty boring, and basically amounts to an argument that there's a continuity between Heidegger's earlier and later work.
The audience for this book is post grad philosophy students. That wasn’t clear to me before I bought it. I was hoping for some exposition of Heidegger’s ideas but the experience was incredibly frustrating and disappointing from beginning to end; I am none the wiser. This is the sort of wanky bullshit that gives philosophologists (ref Pirsig’s distinction between philosophy and philosophology) a bad name. If philosophy doesn’t give the average man a tool or perspective with which to more powerfully meet the challenges and opportunities of the world then it fails. This book failed me.