Francouzský filosof Félix Ravaisson patří k u nás dosud nedoceněným inspiračním zdrojům filosofie 20. století, a to především díky svému spisu O zvyku (De l’habitude, 1838). Ve své systematické úvaze vychází především z Aristotela, ale i z francouzských spiritualistů (Maine de Biran) a přírodovědců přelomu 18. a 19. století. Svou analýzu zvyku zasazuje na jedné straně do kontextu obecné filosofie přírody, aby stanovil, jaký typ jsoucna může získat zvyk (trvalou dispozici). Na druhé straně vztahuje fenomén zvyku k filosofii ducha, neboť duch, který získává určitý návyk, přestává být plně sebevědomý a plně svobodný, získává zčásti neměnnou "přirozenost". Fenomén zvyku ukazuje na ontologickou jednotu přírody a ducha. Jak v přírodě, tak v oblasti svobody, která se stala zvykem, nacházíme tutéž nereflektovanou spontaneitu.
Ravaissonovo pojedání o zvyku významně zasáhlo do dějin francouzského myšlení. Například Bergson vypracovával svou dualitu mezi bezprostředním a zprostředkovaným poznáním v návaznosti na závěrečné pasáže spisu O zvyku. S Ravaissonovým pojetím zvyku se vyrovnávali fenomenologičtí autoři, jako Paul Ricoeur ve své Filosofii vůle, či Maurice Merleau-Ponty.
Jean Gaspard Félix Ravaisson-Mollien was a French philosopher and archaeologist. He was a student of Schelling and a teacher of Bergson. His philosophy fits in the tradition of French Spiritualism. He was influenced by Maine de Biran re-actualized the Aristotelian Metaphysics and critique of eclectism of Victor Cousin in La philosophie en France au XIXe siècle. He did not occupy a university chair, but he was the conservator of the department of antiquities at the Louvre, president of the jury of the Aggregation of philosophy in France and Inspector General of Libraries.
“The moral world is the highest domain of freedom. It proposes its own end to and for itself, and it commands itself in executing action. But, just as in movement, if it is the will that poses the goal in space, and determines the direction, it is not the will – or at least it is not reflective will – that works out and devises in advance the very production of movement; for this can only arise from the depths of instinct and desire, where the idea of nature becomes being and substance. In the same way, in the moral world the understanding distinguishes the end and the will proposes it, but it is neither the will nor the abstract understanding that can initially stir the powers of the soul at their source so as to push them towards the good. It is the good itself, at least the idea of the good, which descends into these depths, engendering love in them and raising that love up to itself. Will constitutes only the form of the action; the unreflective freedom of Love constitutes all its substance, and love can no longer be distinguished from the contemplation of what it loves, nor contemplation from its object; and it is this that forms the source, the basis and the necessary beginning: this is the state of nature, whose primordial spontaneity envelops and presupposes all will. Nature lies wholly in desire, and desire, in turn, lies in the good that attracts it. In this way the profound words of a profound theologian might be confirmed: ‘Nature is prevenient grace’. It is God within us, God hidden solely by being so far within us in this intimate source of ourselves, to whose depths we do not descend.”
Expected a mundane read, got a still original attempt at bridging idealism and materialism, body and mind. Great success, despite the swampy wording for an uninitiated schmuck like me.
A fascinating read that takes you far further than you would think to begin with. Ravaisson's PhD thesis spans many spheres of philosophical debate, simultaneously taking on Hume and Immanuel Kant, and looking to show how habit is what enables us to cross the boundary between phenomena and noumena.
" Hence habit is not an external necessity of constraint, but a necessity of attraction and desire. It is, indeed, a law, a law of grace...it is the final cause that increasingly predominates over efficient causality and which absorb the latter into itself."