This is the first of two volumes describing the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy from the Notebooks and the Tractatus to Philosophical Investigations and his other later writings. Volume I is divided into two parts: Part I surveys the whole of Wittgenstein's work, while Part II examines in detail the central ideas of his early system. Although Pears focuses on the internal organization of Wittgenstein's thought, he also investigates the origins of Wittgenstein's philosophy, relating it to the philosophies of his predecessors and contemporaries. Revealing how the details of Wittgenstein's work fit into its general pattern, Pears offers scholars, students, and non-specialists alike unusually clear insight into the philosopher's thought.
A phenomenological language is always a language for describing the world as we found it, phenomena not things in themselves. 98. Pears wendet sich gegen beide extremen Interpretationen, wonach Gegenstände entweder sense data oder phsikalische Punkte seien. S.100 Ishiguros und McGuinness Interpretation, nach der die Gegenstände von den Elementarsätzen abhängen. (Nur im Zusammenhang mit dem Satz hat Name Sinn). Namen sind nur Dummy-Namen. Pears meint, objects müßten im Prinzip accessible sein (weil sie der Welt, wie wir sie finden, angehören) ?? Ishiguro: The reference of a name is fixed partly by the propositional contexts in which it makes sense. 105 Pears führt dagegen 2.02331 an. Entweder ein Ding hat Eigenschaften, die kein anderes hat... Das scheint zu zeigen, daß es doch definite decriptions von Gegenständen geben kann.