On the Origin of Objects

by Brian Cantwell Smith

On the Origin of Objects is the culmination of Brian Cantwell Smith's decade-long investigation into the philosophical and metaphysical foundations of computation, artificial intelligence, and cognitive science. Based on a sustained critique of the formal tradition that underlies the reigning views, he presents an argument for an embedded, participatory, "irreductionist," metaphysical alternative. Smith seeks nothing less than to revise our understanding not only of the machines we build but also of the world with which they interact. On the Origin of Objects is the culmination of Brian Cantwell Smith's decade-long investigation into the philosophical and metaphysical foundations of computation, artificial intelligence, and cognitive science. Based on a sustained critique of the formal tradition that underlies the reigning views, he presents an argument for an embedded, participatory, "irreductionist," metaphysical alternative. Smith seeks nothing less than to revise our understanding not only of the machines we build but also of the world with which they interact. Smith's ambitious project begins as a search for a comprehensive theory of computation, able to do empirical justice to practice and conceptual justice to the computational theory of mind. A rigorous commitment to these two criteria ultimately leads him to recommend a radical overhaul of our traditional conception of metaphysics. Everything that exists—objects, properties, life, practice—lies Smith claims in the "middle distance," an intermediate realm of partial engagement with and partial separation from, the enveloping world. Patterns of separation and engagement are taken to underlie a single notion unifying representation and that of subjects' "registration" of the world around them. Along the way, Smith offers many fascinating the distinction between particularity and individuality, the methodological notion of an "inscription error," an argument that there are no individuals within physics, various deconstructions of the type-instance distinction, an analysis of formality as overly disconnected ("discreteness run amok"), a conception of the boundaries of objects as properties of unruly interactions between objects and subjects, an argument for the theoretical centrality of reference preservation, and a theatrical, acrobatic metaphor for the contortions involved in the preservation of reference and resultant stabilization of objects. Sidebars and diagrams throughout the book help clarify and guide Smith's highly original and compelling argument. A Bradford Book

Genres: Philosophy, Computer Science, Metaphysics, Nonfiction, Artificial Intelligence, Science

432 pages, Paperback

First published October 11, 1996

Reviews

[Patrick · Rating 4 out of 5]

An extremely smart and, to use one of the author's favorite words, feisty account of an objectless ontology that purports to chart a middle course between constructionism and realism. The basic argument, which draws on computer science, physics, and both analytic and continental philosophy, is that the universe is in permanent flux and that there are no ontologically prior distinctions that can be drawn in it, but that distinct objects are nonetheless wrestled out of the "flex and slop" of being. The message is one of human pluralism out of metaphysical monism, in which computation emerges as a gradualistic process which illustrates how registration and interaction are separate from representation, which he takes as belonging to the purely human side of things.

I found this book after watching Cantwell Smith's excellent lecture on computation providing a middle groundwork between the discursive realm of Heidegger and co, and the mechanistic realm respresented by Pascal.

[Zo · Rating 4 out of 5]

One of those funny books where I found myself agreeing with most of what Smith is saying but also annoyed at its repetitiveness and its tendency to lapse into speculation that lacks substance. The best part of the book is the opening discussion of computation. There he has genuine insights and arguments that threaten the coherence of a theory of computation. I would love to read disagreements and responses, because I think he articulates a persuasive view. From there, things get a little shakier. I like the way he situates physics relative to his larger metaphysical project -- especially his use of the notions of individuality, particularity, and fields (physics is all particularity, no individuality). The broader metaphysical claims he goes into about the interdependence of ontology/intentionality/representation/etc are all things I'm inclined to agree with, but I don't think he makes much progress in advancing our understanding of these concepts, or staking out clear claims as to what parts of more "traditional" theorizing are mislead. Maybe that is *all* that can be done, but I'd like to think more substantive accounts can be had -- even if they agree with Smith's conclusions about the lack of sharp boundaries involved in most of these questions. In many ways, aside from the parts on computation and physics I don't think he is doing much to go beyond the type of metaphysics someone like Heidegger or Merleau-Ponty advanced; and while he writes engagingly, his style does not match theirs in conveying import and power. Still want to look more into his recent work on AI, because I think he that is where he is at his best,