This is an advanced text dealing with Hobson’s (1902) theory of imperialism, but requiring the reader to possess some reasonable familiarity with (if not intimate knowledge of) cognate texts by Hilferding, Lenin, Bukharin, and Luxembourg. Arrighi’s argument, in brief, is that Hobson’s theory of imperialism was a product of its time, and is no longer applicable at the time of writing (1978) due to the internationalisation of capital under US hegemony.
This line of argument proceeds with impressive application of social scientific rigour to a concept Arrighi argues has become fundamentally muddled. Drawing on Weber’s insistence on absolute conceptual clarity, Arrighi at the outset develops a cross-shaped diagram with four poles (‘Colonialism’, ‘Informal Empire’, ‘Formal Empire’, ‘Imperialism’). Imperialism at Hobson’s time of writing was understood as a novel phenomenon, and Hobson thus counterposed it to Formal Empire as it represented anarchy in international relations, rather than the order (under the subordination of an imperial state) of Formal Empire. Colonialism and Informal Empire were attendant forms of overseas expansion, but Hobson sees both as being led by nations (rather than states) and in different ways ultimately reinforcing counterposed nationalisms, eventually undermining the initial overseas expansion. Colonialism was a dead end as it fostered resentment and nationalism of the colonised who would ultimately overthrow their colonial rulers, establishing Informal Empire whereby capitalism acted as a mutually beneficial, positive-sum game integrating the world system and lifting all boats.
Through an extensive historical critique (Chapters 3 and 4), Arrighi demonstrates how historically inaccurate this basic ‘geometry’ of imperialism developed by Hobson was. He did not at all consider the highly varied US and German experiences (of a drive to Informal Empire and Imperialism, respectively), and misconstrued the passage of English imperialism from colonialism through a phase of informal empire before the rise of such contender states in the latter path of 19th Century forced it to revive its Formal Empire and engage in Imperialist aggression to (attempt to) retain its predominance.
Through a maze of increasingly complex diagrammatic representations, Arrighi goes on to argue that a diachronic understanding of cycles of hegemony (rather than a synchronic [and, one might add, methodologically nationalist] geometry of imperialism) presents a far more compelling reading of the complex geopolitical trajectories of emergent capitalist states, the rise and fall of globally dominant powers, and the emergence of global financial flows, than Hobson’s polarity of Imperialism vs. Informal Empire as a simple policy choice for states. The reader struggles with the complexity of the visualisations here and one wonders how helpful they are, though they evidently inform Arrighi’s later (and in my view much superior) masterwork, The Long Twentieth Century (1994/2009). Arrighi cleaves too closely to an underconsumptionist theory of crisis, raising the question of why anti-imperialism could in fact not be a potential state policy of ameliorating economic crises and unintentionally weakening his argument against Hobson’s simple binary. Finally, the closing argument that multinational capital flows serve to undermine territorial state power and geopolitical conflict has ultimately not been borne out by reality (though Arrighi does admit that ‘decades in the future’ such conflicts might arise again he does nothing to spell out the precise circumstances in which this might become the case).
All in all, this book represents an interesting critique of Hobson and a clear staging post on the way to Arrighi’s extremely powerful later studies, but contains weaknesses and a lack of clarity which will likely frustrate many readers.