Alfred J. Rieber has been teaching and writing Russian and Soviet history for more than fifty years. He was a participant in the first year of the Soviet-American cultural exchange in 1958-59 and has returned to the Soviet Union and Russia many times to lecture and conduct archival research. He began teaching at Northwestern and then moved to the University of Pennsylvania where he taught for twenty–five years and chaired the History Department for ten years, now holding the title of Professor Emeritus. For the past twenty-two years he has taught at Central European University (CEU) in Budapest, Hungary where he was also chair of the History Department for four years, and upon retirement was elected by the university Senate as University Professor Emeritus. He has been a visiting professor at the University of Chicago and Columbia University. In 1966 he was awarded the E. Harris Harbison Prize of the Danforth Foundation as one of the ten best teachers in the U.S. He has won additional teaching awards at Penn and CEU where he was elected professor of the year by the entire student body in 1997 and 1998. The American Philosophical Society awarded him the Henry C. Moe Prize in 1985.
From the outset, Rieber begins with the main argument that most conflicts originate in the borderlands of empires and his work is divided cogently into subsections that follow the ideologies, instruments of national power, borderland dynamics, and crises of the Eurasian powers from the 16th century through WWI. The bulk of his discussion includes the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, Qing, Safavid, and British empires. Prussia and later the German empire was included as a peripheral mention in the contestation for the Eurasian borderland within the book. Not given its own subsections, Rieber limits Prussian and German interaction to the late 18th century partitions of Poland, the influence of Baltic Germans in Russian society and foreign policy decisions, and the German intervention during Russia’s Civil War and Intervention. Rieber focused on three main overall themes throughout the work, which included the complexity of state-building Eurasia, persistence of problems that geographical and cultural diversity posed to the rulers and the ruled in their different aspirations, and the variety of responses – reform, repression, revolt – that they devised to resolve these problems. This work serves as a launch point for his comprehensive research of the Soviet Union’s unique experience in the borderlands, Stalin and the Struggle for Supremacy in Eurasia. Having read this book previously, this provided me with a full understanding of these three overall themes applied to the Russian Empire as well as the Soviet Union. The author outlines two types of frontiers as they relate to great powers of the time, an inner cultural frontier faced toward the center and an outer inherently unstable military frontier facing territories occupied by rival powers. As my research and career focus lies with the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and present day Russian Federation, my attention was drawn to concepts relating to these entities throughout the reading. Rieber describes the outer inherently unstable military frontier of the Russian Empire in great detail. The work includes Russia’s wavering policy of pan-slavism and being champions of Orthodoxy, mixing religious (orthodox), national (Great Russian), and Ethnic (Slavic) elements in various combinations throughout the 18th and 19th centuries to secure its foothold in the borderlands of Serbia, Galicia, South Caucasus, Crimea, Bessarabia, the Kresy, and Trans-Caspia (Central Asia). While WWI spelled the end of the imperial era, Rieber argues that the new nation-states found roots in the previous empires. The dynastic idea was dead, replaced with the concept of leaders or a secular ruler. Their legitimacy and power was now derived from political theology and personal charisma, but ideological regimes had roots in imperial past. New rulers adopted some of the same techniques of nationalizing their rule over ethnic populations, as in Stalin’s idea of “nationalist in form socialist in content”, borrowed in part from Austro-Marxists. Rieber divides imperial institutions into the military, bureaucracy, and ruling elites. He describes these as the supporting elements to the imperial ideology. Imperial institutions are described as a three-part strategy of varying weights based on the borderland issue at hand. There is an evolution of imperial rule consisting of concessions and bargaining alternating with coercion and repression. The reactions by groups in the borderlands ranged from armed resistance through passive acceptance to active cooperation with authorities. The military, bureaucracy, and local ruling elites were exercised according to the specific issue at hand. Until the mid-19th century, the Russian military was utilized extensively and performed excellently, serving as mediator to the Prussian-Habsburg rivalry, clearing Ottoman Turks from the northern black sea, establishing a Russian presence on the Danube River (allowing influence in Balkans), and expelling the Ottomans and Iranians from the South Caucasus. Russia utilized the German local elites to integrate the Baltic littoral successfully in the 18th century. The center gave privileges and language rights to German landowners (Baltic Barons) and gave them access to ruling elite. Peter I also encouraged their commissioning into the Russian officer corps. Rieber succinctly provides his view on why Russia was one of the more effective empires in the ruling of numerous frontiers. He offers that the ascendency of Russia in controlling the borderlands is due to four main reasons; the creation by Peter the Great and continuation of Catherine II of the ability to rapidly move and finance military actions, the general success of the cooption of elites (except the Poles), extensive colonization in the Pontic Steppe, Trans Caspia, and Inner Asia, and a reforming tradition that enabled the ruling elite to restore control and rebuild its military and financial institutions after internal revolts (as in Poland), and defeats in the Crimean and Russo-Japanese Wars Portions of Rieber’s work dwells on areas extensively researched previously by others. In the portions of the work where Rieber describes the relations between the British and Russian empires, his writing does not offer much beyond what has been expansively provided in Peter Hopkirk’s The Great Game, with Hopkirk’s work being referenced throughout the section. Rieber’s final chapter on post-imperial legacy draws comparisons between imperial and post-imperial policies in the borderlands. He comprehensively describes the objectives of these policies - assimilation, resettlement, expulsion - and the responses of minorities, which ranged from accommodation to resistance. His description of the interplay among the Russian, Habsburg, and Ottoman empires in the Balkans offers an extensive look into a region, which is seldom expanded on when discussing major Russian foreign policy. This work is meticulously written and is an excellent complement to Rieber’s subsequent book on Stalin. At over 600 pages of research, he succinctly outlines the struggles between the continent’s major imperial powers. This book offers any scholar of Eurasian history a nearly all-encompassing overview of the most hotly contested spaces in Eurasia, which still persist today among nation-states born from empires.