Castlereagh and Adams: England and the United States, 1812-1823

by Bradford Perkins

This volume, the last of a trilogy devoted to Anglo-American relations for three decades after 1795, develops the themes already visible in the author's The First Rapprochement and Prologue to War. This is the story of America's search for true independence and recognition as a sovereign power, with the political, economic, and psychological implications that accompany independence and sovereignty. After declaring war on England in 1812, the United States sought release from the conflict, release on terms that might fall short of victory but could not be considered dishonorable. This accomplished by the Treaty of Ghent at the end of 1814, the Americans sought to settle other issues with England, issues of old and new, in a series of negotiations after the war. Fortunately they faced, in the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Castlereagh, and his superior, Lord Liverpool, two men who valued Anglo-American friendship and refused to be deterred by the outcries of British nationalists. After Castlereagh's suicide in 1922, George Canning took over the Foreign Office and presided over British policy. At the climax of this new rapprochement, Canning offered to join with the United States in declaring against European intervention in Latin America. The Americans preferred to act alone, as they did in Monroe's famous message of 1823, a decision that marked the completion of American diplomatic independence.

Although other works touch upon particular episodes covered in this volume, no prior work has dealt with Anglo-American relations as a single theme during the period, 1812-1823. The author's unusually wide research in British materials enables him to reassess many familiar topics. British policy at Ghent is viewed in a fresh light, thus opening the way to a reappraisal of the success of the American negotiators and of the treaty itself. The postwar settlements are treated as a unit, and an attempt is made to understand the American policy of Lord Castlereagh, hitherto usually oversimplified. Finally, thanks in part to the use of new material from the Canning papers and in part to the general approach of this volume, a new emphasis appears in the discussion of the Monroe Doctrine.

Genres: 19th Century

374 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 1964

About the author

Bradford Perkins was an American historian known for his influential work on American diplomatic and foreign relations history. The son of historian Dexter Perkins, he taught at UCLA before joining the University of Michigan, where he spent most of his career and later became Professor Emeritus. A Guggenheim Fellow and Bancroft Prize recipient, he also served as president of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations and lectured internationally.

Reviews

[Jerome Otte · Rating 4 out of 5]

A fairly comprehensive study of Anglo-American relations preceding, during and after the War of 1812. The book is actually part of a trilogy on the subject. The author appears like an Anglophile, but can still write good history.

The author also seems to show a personal dislike to controversy and war, or, more accurately, the people he accuses of stirring these things up, while showing a bias for diplomats and the like. He also seems to be under the impression that the British were the only ones that ever tried to reconcile their differences with the US while the Americans were hellbent on the opposite.

These minor oddities aside, Perkins does give us a good well-researched history of Anglo-American relations from 1812-1823. Perkins’ writing is clear and elegant, and he easily makes sense out of the diplomacy of the time period. His treatment of the Monroe doctrine is also quite interesting: Perkins argues that it was by British diplomatic efforts that European powers were convinced to stay out of Latin American affairs, rather than by the Monroe doctrine and the efforts of American diplomats.