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The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History
In the 19th-century classic, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History , Alfred Thayer Mahan argued the paramount importance of naval superiority in peace and war. This work is still considered definitive today, but as Chester Starr, eminent historian of antiquity, points out in this
thought-provoking volume, Mahan's theories have led to serious distortions in the way historians interpret the role of naval power in antiquity.
Trade by sea was always important in providing raw materials as well as luxuries, but only rarely was it protected by an established navy. As Starr reveals, two nations that did protect their trade routes--Athens and Carthage--both fell after long duels with land-based forces, Sparta and Rome.
And though Rome went on to create the most perfected and widely based naval structure in antiquity, when Rome fell it was due to invasions by land, not by sea.
Starr describes major naval battles in fascinating detail, and he examines technological developments as they help to illuminate the limitations of galleys in warfare. Ranging from the Bronze Age to the fall of the Roman Empire, this innovative study provides an important corrective to Mahan's
thesis, both as applied to ancient history and to modern strategic thinking.
thought-provoking volume, Mahan's theories have led to serious distortions in the way historians interpret the role of naval power in antiquity.
Trade by sea was always important in providing raw materials as well as luxuries, but only rarely was it protected by an established navy. As Starr reveals, two nations that did protect their trade routes--Athens and Carthage--both fell after long duels with land-based forces, Sparta and Rome.
And though Rome went on to create the most perfected and widely based naval structure in antiquity, when Rome fell it was due to invasions by land, not by sea.
Starr describes major naval battles in fascinating detail, and he examines technological developments as they help to illuminate the limitations of galleys in warfare. Ranging from the Bronze Age to the fall of the Roman Empire, this innovative study provides an important corrective to Mahan's
thesis, both as applied to ancient history and to modern strategic thinking.
128 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1988
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
October 12, 2020
Though Chester Starr claims in his epilogue that the lessons drawn from his book are “not for an ancient historian to presume to suggest,” as an ancient historian, Starr frequently proves to do just that (p.84). The book, The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History is divided into five chapters that provide the context and highlight the examples that Starr considers to be most representative of ancient sea power, referencing both Athens and Rome. While Starr provides an abridged foundation of sea power in the ancient world, he also draws out timeless lessons from those ancient examples, engaging a reader more versed in modern history.
Starr’s introduction begins, where many stories of naval history begin, with Alfred Thayer Mahan’s book, whose title is notably similar to Starr’s. Starr criticizes Mahan’s definition of sea power as missing “a more circumspect assessment of the place of sea power” (p.4). In Chapter 1, Starr fills in the holes that he believes Mahan left by exploring the “earliest stages” of the Mediterrean to about 1000 B.C. and creating the basis for how sea power could develop along the Mediterranean (p.8). It is within this chapter that Starr provides his first modern connection to the “rulers of England” in contextually explaining how states come to look to the seas for power and opportunity (p.13). Chapter 2 continues Starr’s chronology of the region, looking at the time period between 1000 B.C. and the emergence of Athen’s sea power. While relying on the archaeological record due to the lack of historical resources during this time period, the chapter reaffirms Starr’s claim that sea power is more nuanced than Mahan’s definition-- emphasizing the political, economic and technological factors that play a role in forming a sea power state.
In the next three chapters, Starr focuses on more specific examples of sea power. Chapter 3 tells the story of Athens’s rise as a sea power, and acknowledges the limits of sea power, conceding that the final blow “must come by land” (p.34). Once again a parallel is made to more modern leaders, including Napoleon Bonaparte and Adolf Hitler, who failed “the sea power test,” and therefore did not last very long (p.49). Chapter 4 accounts for the political and especially naval technological advancements in the Mediterranean through a narrative of how the Hellenistic state system was destroyed by “the manner in which sea power was used” (p.52). In the last chapter, Starr explores Rome’s use of sea power in order to make the argument that while Rome’s influence on land is well remembered, its abilities on the sea have largely been overlooked.
In the epilogue, Starr reasserts that the major sea powers explored in the book were limited by what they were able to do on land. As mentioned in the introduction, Starr attempts to play off any ability to draw out lessons from these examples, and yet the book frequently serves to do just that.
Starr’s introduction begins, where many stories of naval history begin, with Alfred Thayer Mahan’s book, whose title is notably similar to Starr’s. Starr criticizes Mahan’s definition of sea power as missing “a more circumspect assessment of the place of sea power” (p.4). In Chapter 1, Starr fills in the holes that he believes Mahan left by exploring the “earliest stages” of the Mediterrean to about 1000 B.C. and creating the basis for how sea power could develop along the Mediterranean (p.8). It is within this chapter that Starr provides his first modern connection to the “rulers of England” in contextually explaining how states come to look to the seas for power and opportunity (p.13). Chapter 2 continues Starr’s chronology of the region, looking at the time period between 1000 B.C. and the emergence of Athen’s sea power. While relying on the archaeological record due to the lack of historical resources during this time period, the chapter reaffirms Starr’s claim that sea power is more nuanced than Mahan’s definition-- emphasizing the political, economic and technological factors that play a role in forming a sea power state.
In the next three chapters, Starr focuses on more specific examples of sea power. Chapter 3 tells the story of Athens’s rise as a sea power, and acknowledges the limits of sea power, conceding that the final blow “must come by land” (p.34). Once again a parallel is made to more modern leaders, including Napoleon Bonaparte and Adolf Hitler, who failed “the sea power test,” and therefore did not last very long (p.49). Chapter 4 accounts for the political and especially naval technological advancements in the Mediterranean through a narrative of how the Hellenistic state system was destroyed by “the manner in which sea power was used” (p.52). In the last chapter, Starr explores Rome’s use of sea power in order to make the argument that while Rome’s influence on land is well remembered, its abilities on the sea have largely been overlooked.
In the epilogue, Starr reasserts that the major sea powers explored in the book were limited by what they were able to do on land. As mentioned in the introduction, Starr attempts to play off any ability to draw out lessons from these examples, and yet the book frequently serves to do just that.
August 10, 2017
Enjoyable. Engaging. Assumes a fair amount of pre-knowledge on the subject, but you can still appreciate it if you are new to the field.
March 8, 2020
This is a "I beg to differ" book. Starr argues that sea power was in fact not central to the power struggles of the ancient world (and also that Mahan is overrated in general). For this, he quickly recounts which city or empire used ships for which purposes, when, and where. Not much more analysis goes into this, and a keen student of ancient history will already know most of the events Starr briefly touches upon.
April 3, 2013
I came to this book not as an historian but as an author--to build my understanding of ancient ships and warfare on the sea for a fantasy novel I'm writing. I found it rather helpful but sometimes his poor writing style caused unnecessary confusion or amusement. The first sentence in the first chapter says, "The Mediterranean Sea, to repeat an earlier observation, was the center of Greek and Roman life." This made me laugh. The opening of the second chapter also provides some amusement: "The centuries immediately after 1000 B.C. are almost without history." In actual fact, they had just as much history as any other century, though perhaps not as much relevance.
As the author sets the scene in the first chapters he includes information that bears no real relevance to the topic at hand and uses a ponderous writing style. After all, why say "sea trade" when you can say, "the movement of physical objects within each basin"? He says of the strait of Gibraltar: "the underwater sill here, known to ancient geographers, led to a difference in water level between the ocean and the Mediterranean that produced a major eastward current in the latter." He neglects to define an underwater sill, and ancient geographers really have nothing to do with the point of the sentence, nor for that matter, with the point of the book. His discussion of sea power never ventures west of the Mediterranean, so this whole sentence lacks pertinence. He goes on to discuss how the "downstream current of some six knots" that pours through the Hellespont "requires careful navigation", but this also lacks relevance to building or maintaining a navy to control the sea.
It surprised me to read in the other reviews that this book claimed to refute the importance of navies in shaping the ancient world, though when I looked for it I found the dust jacket flap held a statement to that effect. The book gives good arguments for the opposite conclusion. Once Mr. Starr gets into his chosen subject matter his writing becomes more engaging and less obtuse, even if it argues against the stated thesis.
As the author sets the scene in the first chapters he includes information that bears no real relevance to the topic at hand and uses a ponderous writing style. After all, why say "sea trade" when you can say, "the movement of physical objects within each basin"? He says of the strait of Gibraltar: "the underwater sill here, known to ancient geographers, led to a difference in water level between the ocean and the Mediterranean that produced a major eastward current in the latter." He neglects to define an underwater sill, and ancient geographers really have nothing to do with the point of the sentence, nor for that matter, with the point of the book. His discussion of sea power never ventures west of the Mediterranean, so this whole sentence lacks pertinence. He goes on to discuss how the "downstream current of some six knots" that pours through the Hellespont "requires careful navigation", but this also lacks relevance to building or maintaining a navy to control the sea.
It surprised me to read in the other reviews that this book claimed to refute the importance of navies in shaping the ancient world, though when I looked for it I found the dust jacket flap held a statement to that effect. The book gives good arguments for the opposite conclusion. Once Mr. Starr gets into his chosen subject matter his writing becomes more engaging and less obtuse, even if it argues against the stated thesis.
March 12, 2012
This is a nice short book on the use of sea power in the Classical world. The author highlights not just the successes but the limitations of sea power for the Greeks, Carthaginians, Egyptians, and Romans.
August 13, 2009
A study of the impact command of the sea has had upon the great land empires throughout history.
April 7, 2016
Ancient History, western. Basically just the Mediterranean. This is a very dry read with not very much analysis. This reads more like a history textbook. Very disappointing.
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews