来自上层的革命：苏联体制的终结

by David M. Kotz, Fred Weir, 大卫·M. 科兹

本书对苏联解体的原因给出了全新解释，时下流行的看法是：苏联旧体制的终结是由苏联经济崩溃，人们要求放弃社会主义所引起的。本书对此看法提出了有力的挑战，认为撼动苏联体制根基的，恰恰是苏联内部占统治地位的党一国精精英。本书内容涵盖了从1917年苏联政治体制的确立，到20世纪920年代实走向资本主义，再到1995年共产党力量的惊人复兴等各个关键时期。作者通过对50多名新旧政要的访谈，对苏联解体作了独到的解释。本书对研究苏联和当代俄罗斯的历史，经济和政治极有参考价值。

Genres: History, Russia, Soviet Union, Politics, Economics

261 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2007

About the author

David M. Kotz is Professor of Economics at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, and Distinguished Professor, School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics.

Reviews

[Darya Silman · Rating 5 out of 5]

Published in 2007, RUSSIA'S PATH FROM GORBACHEV TO PUTIN: THE DEMISE OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND THE NEW RUSSIA is a revised and updated version of the 1997 book 'Revolution from Above: The Demise of the Soviet System.' David M. Kotz is an economist who specializes in the process of institutional change in economic history, in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. At the time of the writing, Fred Weir was a Moscow correspondent for Hindustan Times in India, with a keen interest in Soviet and Russian history.

Discussing the end of the Soviet Union, the authors insist on the term 'demise' rather than the widely used 'collapse.' While the latter means the sudden, unpredictable event - as it appeared to many contemporaries - the former implies that the turmoil of 1991 came as the logical conclusion of the 1985-90 attempts to democratize the state socialist system. The Soviet Union was indeed a system that combined socialistic features like the absence of private property/rather fair distribution of money income and capitalistic traits such as the presence of the elite with privileges, unavailable to ordinary citizens. However, their privileges were restricted compared to their Western counterparts: as soon as an apparatchik left his position in the state system, he/she lost access to dachas, special shops, cash flow, etc. The wealth couldn't be inherited. Authors opined that the cause of the demise of the Soviet Union was not the popular uprising of the population craving for change or the flaws of the socialist system's economy in the long run. After all, the Soviet Union's economic growth rate in 1928-75 exceeded that of the USA. Rather, Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika which manifested itself in radical economic reform, glasnost, and democratization of political institutions allowed the elite, backed by disappointed intelligentsia, to change the status quo. Perestroika also created preconditions for the political confrontation, rupturing Russia from the rest of the Soviet Union, between Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin. It's not for nothing that the state-elite was the main winner during the shock therapy, an even more radical than Gorbachev's program of reintegrating Russia into the capitalistic system of world trade.

Though developed by the Western leading economists and supported by the IMF, shock therapy of 1991-95 resulted in Russia's economic contractions and the general population's impoverishment. Instead of gradually replacing the socialist features with capitalistic ones, for example, introducing private property on a small scale, while maintaining state control over middle and large enterprises, the state decided to withdraw completely. Privatization of state property, liberalization of prizes, and the absence of any cap on international trade were meant to prevent Russia from falling back into communism. What followed, however, were six years (up to the 1998 devaluation of the ruble) of rampant enrichment by the new class of oligarchs, the strengthening of the presidential power of Boris Yeltsin (with the parallel weakening of democratic institutions), and mass organized crime and corruption. If there had been any gap when Russia could have moved toward becoming a truly democratic country, it was very narrow, its potential unrealized.

The book's basis is pure economics, with its charts and statistics. Despite being published in 2007, it has only one page of predictions that haven't come true, that is Vladimir Putin stepping down from power. While being highly informative and revealing, RUSSIA'S PATH FROM GORBACHEV TO PUTIN is not meant for an ordinary reader.

[Vincent Fong · Rating 5 out of 5]

First book on recent Russian development, solved many of my concerns on Russian's attitude towards the West and their past.

Authors tactfully included comparison of Yelsin's & Gorbachev's neoliberal approach with the (still-continuing) Chinese economic reform - interesting to see the absence of the Chinese way in the last section, where authors chose to talk vague on idealized theories - on the lessons for future socialism.

It deserves 5-star, but the last section is quite vague.

[Halcyon · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of, if not *the* best, work of history I have ever read. Kotz & Weir begin with a brief but sweeping look at the causes and reality of Soviet stagnation, then moving on to cover how Gorbachev's ill-fated reform programme set in motion the unravelling of the USSR before springboarding into an analysis of the aftermath of this collapse (which also serves as a very concrete lesson on why neoliberal economics is puerile). It is primarily an economic history with substantive morsels of politics thrown in to provide the necessary context.

To summarise the key takeaways (at the cost of simplifying, and perhaps misinterpreting/bastardizing): After the revolutionary leaders themselves age and new people are brought in, you will inevitably find most of the party-elite are careerist, opportunistic and cynical operators who care only about material privileges. This is because in a command economy the only way to get such a privileged life is to become part of and rise in the ranks of this select group (you cannot go off and say, be an entrepreneur). This likely spawns corruption as the type of people this selects for are the type prone to it, and also because it was one of the only ways to accumulate wealth.

This group would always benefit from a restoration of capitalism; they would officially own their property, meaning it would be inviolable and they would not be re-proletarianized if they lost their positions while also being able to pass it on to their children through inheritance. They would also be able to accumulate more wealth in general through various means which were officially prohibited under socialism. Thus, if they were ever to be unshackled from party discipline they would act according to their interests and move to this effect.

With the onset of economic stagnation, owing to structural issues which the command economy engendered at the stage of development the country had reached, carte blanche was given to a reformer, Gorbachev, by the party to try and remedy the situation. He proceeded to loosen control over society at large and the party-elite (glasnost and democratization), while destroying the economy with ill-thought out economic reforms (perestroika). This gave room for the latter to move to restore capitalism with some form of a mandate from the people, disillusioned and suffering from the economic deterioration, with the aid of a westernizer intelligentsia who were given the chance to broadcast their views loudly and publicly.

Because Gorbachev doggedly stuck to the idea of retaining some kind of reformed socialism, these pro-capitalist defectors from the party who had rallied around Yeltsin moved to take control of the Russian Republic and used it to destroy the Union from within to be able to facilitate the complete restoration of capitalism. Shock therapy is then enacted, causing the most severe economic depression a country has suffered on record, while the president became increasingly authoritarian to suppress the burgeoning opposition.

I found Kotz's arguments to be very convincing, the book is copiously referenced and I was very impressed with his empirics; hard data is provided every step of the way and is partnered with concrete examples to buttress his points. He appears to be some kind of democratic socialist and his sympathies for Gorbachev are clear (he refrains from explicitly and forcefully holding him accountable for the disasters his leadership entailed), and yet his analysis remains, in general, very sober and this really fails to detract from the book.

In terms of his predictions, Kotz is rather prescient when he raises the possibility the constitution will be revised to extend term limits but predicts this won't occur as it would increase instability; Putin's return to the presidency in 2012 did indeed precipitate major protests. He sees the turnaround in Russian economic growth from 1998 being predicated practically solely on increasing oil/gas/mineral prices and can detect no trend of Putin fundamentally breaking away from the neoliberal model, his presidency only continuing the tendency towards authoritarianism which had begun under his predecessor. What indeed he sees as a major shift is his subjugation of the oligarchs, represented by moves such as consolidating state control over the media (formerly privately owned). I am no expert on recent Russian history so I cannot really comment on if these conclusions still hold post-2007. This notwithstanding, it truly is a wonderful book, and should serve as an example of how history *ought* to be written.

[Rob Prince · Rating 5 out of 5]

We're 31 years on since the collapse of communism in E. Europe, 29 years on from the last days of the USSR. There are many explanations of what happened and why, none have been particularly satifying from where I'm sitting.

- Yes there was corruption - but that seems to come with pretty much any state, rich, poor anything in between.
- Yes, a rough history with so much blood in the soil but then there is the heroic and mostly ignored decisive role that the USSR played in defeating Nazism during WW2 - a whole nation who loved their country in spite of Stalin.
- Yes the economy was in a kind of gridlock, but then again this can be overstated... the Soviet Union was an advanced industrialized country and if it couldn't match the West in terms of consumer goods it had one of the best machine tool industries in the world with many branches of its manufacturing world class.
- Yes, there was a pervasive cynicism about the Communist Party leadership but when polled as late as 1989, 1990 in their overwhelming majority the Soviet people were still commited to Socialism... albeit one "reformed" from the Soviet model.

At least these are some of the questions that have been on my mind since the collapse. Had hopes for Gorbachev, to be honest... and have some idea as to what went wrong, rough, undocumented, just stuff rolling around in my head.

And very little that I have read - perhaps Stephen F. Cohen te exception - has come close to getting to the heart of the matter, what happened and why... And then I read Kotz and Weir. Stimulating read. Of course one book does not a comprehensive historical explanation make... still, one of the better books the subject.

Think I met Weir back in the day... but am not sure.

Think it's (it = the collapse of the USSR) irrelevant thirty years on? You're wrong.

Impossible to find in stores but you can read it for free on-line...

[Namrirru · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very technichal. It has a heavy slant on economics.

[Thomas Cavan Gui · Rating 3 out of 5]

首先必須承認作者對蘇聯解體ㄝ原因佮當今俄國深入骨髓ㄝ糜爛攏把握ㄝ相當精準，這有利於剺醒那群一口一個ㄆㄛㄉㄧㄣ大帝ㄝ黃俄孝囝。但我整體來說對這本冊ㄝ評價ㄝ批評濟過贊成，這是因為這本冊已經贏得足夠濟ㄝ呵咾，我ㄇㄞ閣贅述，此外我雖然認同作者大多數ㄝ論證過程佮部分結論，但我無認可作者ㄝ前提。作者咧談蘇聯時，認為蘇聯ㄝ失敗不代表社會主義ㄝ失敗（這點共契丹ㄝ官方論調一致），因此蘇聯解體ㄧㄚㄏ毋是必然。佇ㄐㄧㄉ ㄝ基礎頂，作者為蘇聯續命提出了ㄐㄧㄉ寡有關民主化ㄝ“良方”。這不得不說作者外賓囉，對於蘇聯佮伊ㄝ好朋友，ㄒㄧㄚ°-ㄇㄧㄏ主義攏ㄐㄧㄚㄏ是張ㄝ使隨時換ㄌㄢ-ㄙㄚ ㄝ皮，ㄌㄝㄋㄧㄣ黨ㄐㄧㄚㄏ是蘇聯ㄝ魂，作者顯然無充分意識ㄍㄠ ㄐㄧㄉ ㄝ前提，誤以為社會主義ㄝ興衰佮蘇聯ㄝ存廢有根本關係。作者予蘇聯ㄝ彼賰ㄝ淡薄撇步，可以說招招攏ㆠㄝㄏ ㄌㄝㄋㄧㄣ 黨ㄝ命，這足以說明蘇聯解體是歷史必然。

計說知子莫若父，那麼反過來大概知父莫若子吧。本冊關於蘇聯解體部分ㄝ深度共大陸ㄝ相關著作比起來是遜色ㄝ。蘇聯解體原因ㄝ假說，ㄍㄠ際嘛有十外種，但學術界主流已逐漸認可解體是一場自上而下ㄝ革命。作者佇冊中繼續有力ㄝ論證囉ㄐㄧㄉ ㄝ觀點：經濟出現困難，但ㄧㄚㄏ閣袂至於崩潰；人民希望變革，但猶原是願意姓社；少數民族主義風起雲湧，但多數加盟共和國無願意分爨。歸根結底，蘇共一寡袂記囉初心ㄝ ㄌㄤ，為了一己私利，受了西方蠱惑，輕率ㄝ用命不該絕ㄝ蘇聯送去墳墓。ㄐㄧㄉ ㄝ解釋看似無問題，但關鍵便佇咧這種矛盾究竟是偶發ㄝ ㄧㄚㄏ是結構性ㄝ。

因為作者左派ㄝ立場，伊對休克療法延續囉90年代典型ㄝ局限ㄝ看法，番將俄國改革看作是歐美左右派鬥法ㄝ閣ㄐㄧㄉ戰場，殊毋知俄國ㄝ問題根本不是用左右ㄉㄧㄜㄏ ㄝ通解釋清楚ㄝ（這點契丹ㄌㄤ顯然認識ㄝ比歐美深刻，所以我ㄐㄧㄚㄏ說契丹國ㄝ相關作品品質高於歐美仝類）。作者為了證明俄國ㄝ失敗毋是因為蘇聯流毒而是因為新自由主義ㄝ缺陷，提俄國共契丹比，甚至佮19世紀ㄝ美國比，但ㄉㄧㄜㄏ偏偏毋去比上有可比性ㄝ捷克佮波蘭。作者甚至表示，俄國作為ㄐㄧㄉ个大國，無可能像匈牙利、車臣彼款靠外資私有化，所以私有化賰ㄝ途徑是通過“內部人交易”全部送予權貴。伊難道毋知影捷克證券分配模式佮波蘭ㄝ工人私有化模式嘛。前者俄國ㄧㄚㄏ有類似ㄝ嘗試，後者ㄧㄚㄏ是葉利欽所強調ㄝ“用工廠還予工ㄌㄤ”，捷克波蘭做ㄝ到ㄝ俄���做袂著，蘇聯流毒毋正體現佇遮。

那為ㄒㄧㄚ°-ㄇㄧㄏ說俄國佮契丹無可比性。作者認為契丹之所以成功，是因為契丹國ㄝ漸進模式予國家始終有能力掌控全局，而俄國休克療法傷過激進。但契丹漸進ㄝ基礎ㄉㄧㄜㄏ是毫無基礎，上至趙家ㄌㄤ，下至農民，ㄧㄣ已經無ㄒㄧㄚ°-ㄇㄧㄏ通閣失去，當然ㄉㄧㄜㄏ擁有無比充足ㄝ耐心。相比之分掉這小啊可憐ㄝ雞卵糕，不如閣同心協力用伊做卡大ㄝ。蘇東則不然，有相當厚實ㄝ經濟基礎ㄝ ㄧㄣ必定是長痛不如短痛，東德捷克波蘭匈牙利波羅的海三國等攏證明囉ㄐㄧㄉ點，東歐無少國家採取囉比俄國閣卡激進ㄝ休克療法，顛倒大成功。所以俄國ㄝ問題無佇咧激進，而佇咧伊激進ㄝ目的ㄉㄧㄜㄏ是去分捎雞卵糕。俄國寡頭仝款區別於19世紀ㄝ美國寡頭，美國寡頭是ㆠㄝㄏ用強盜手段去發展產業，俄國寡頭則是ㆠㄝㄏ用強盜手段將權力變現為資本，用實際上是家己ㄝ毛件變成名義頂嘛是家己ㄝ。回首東歐轉型，捷克、波蘭、匈牙利等國ㄝ路徑可以說是各有利弊，為何ㄍㄠ俄羅斯ㄝ模式ㄉㄧㄜㄏ幾乎遮有弊無利？因為俄國精英選擇新自由主義ㄝ原因ㄉㄧㄜㄏ是看中伊弊端所𤆬來ㄝ便捷，這種情況下ㄌㄧ按怎ㄝ使數想新自由主義ㄝ有好ㄝ表現。所以說新自由主義與其說是俄國改革失敗ㄝ因，倒不如說是改革失敗ㄝ果。當然改革如果ㄝ通𤆬來經濟增長那是上好，但伊終究遮是可有可無ㄝ副產品罷了。（有關契丹，俄國，東歐ㄝ對比，可詳見金雁秦暉《十年滄桑》）

當阮進行俄國佮東歐諸國ㄝ對比時，（特別是俄捷、俄波之間）不難發現俄國ㄝ做法要嘛太傷簡單化，要嘛ㄉㄧㄜㄏ是強盜般ㄝ搶劫。確實，俄國ㄝ做法太簡單化囉，甚至可以說是簡單ㄍㄠ囉非蠢即壞ㄝ程度，但俄國精英真正野戇嘛？冊中提ㄍㄠ，蘇聯精英佇十萬ㄌㄤ左右，甚至無超過十萬ㄌㄤ，ㄧㄚㄏ ㄉㄧㄜㄏ是佔不ㄍㄠ全國人口ㄝ千分之一，而相比美國之流，我們宣傳ㄝ彼款ㄝ使隻手遮天ㄝ資產階級佔總人口ㄝ1％-2％左右（所以佔領華爾街運動中ㄝ口號嘛是：阮是彼99％），占比可以說是數十倍於ソ連。決策圈子愈細，伊需顧及ㄍㄠ ㄝ ㄌㄤ便愈少，自然而然ㄉㄧㄜㄏ傾向於咱看起來“短視”ㄝ政策。所以說毋是戇，ㄧㄚㄏ閣是因為歹。引用小企業老師一篇冊評內ㄝ觀點：ソ共是遠先於ソ連瓦解ㄝ。佇單位領主制ㄝ相對穩定佮高度集中下，精英們逐漸深植咧即个國家之中，可以毋依賴於ソ連即个工具進行吸血，所以時機一成熟，ㄧㄣ義無反顧ㄝ拋棄去原本ㄝ外衣，全盤接管囉即个國家，雖然國家是千瘡百孔，但反正ㄧㄣ家己ㄝ使盆滿缽滿。而且即種精英地位相對來說不可繼承，成了ㄐㄧㄉ个具有高度流動性ㄝ階級，即予精英們抑急於拋棄去偽裝，固化已經形成ㄝ小圈子。ソ連按呢ㄝ結局，可以說不論是Lenin抑是Mao Tze-tung攏有所預見，後者甚至採用囉極具烏托邦主義ㄝ手段意欲解決，結果是𤆬來囉閣卡大ㄝ災難，總之結構性矛盾往往解難以避免。ソ連崩壊囉，作為ㄐㄧㄉ个新階級ㄝ黨員歹面囉嘛？無。崩壊ソ共幹部佇總統班子佔75％，中央部門佔74％，地方佔80％，企業家閣是懸達85％，猶是本冊所說ㄝ紅色老闆，即真ㄝ是“咱攏有光明ㄝ未來”。

（PS：歷史終將審判，1993年葉利欽炮轟白宮真ㄝ是網路爽劇劇情，布黨用子彈解散囉不利於康米ㄝ立憲會議，結果利於康米ㄝ俄聯邦蘇維埃予炮彈解散，閣卡有劇ㄝ是，即个事件佮十月革命名字ㄙㄚ°仝，呼作十月事件）