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Responsible Parties: Saving Democracy from Itself
How popular democracy has paradoxically eroded trust in political systems worldwide, and how to restore confidence in democratic politics
Democracies across the world are adopting reforms to bring politics closer to the people. Parties have turned to primaries and local caucuses to select candidates. Ballot initiatives and referenda allow citizens to enact laws directly. Many democracies now use proportional representation, encouraging smaller, more specific parties rather than two dominant ones. Yet voters keep getting angrier. There is a steady erosion of trust in politicians, parties, and democratic institutions, culminating most recently in major populist victories in the United States, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere. Frances Rosenbluth and Ian Shapiro argue that devolving power to the grass roots is part of the problem, not the solution. Efforts to decentralize political decision‑making make governments and especially political parties less effective and less able to address constituents’ long‑term interests. To revive confidence in governance, we must restructure our political systems to restore power to the core institution of representative democracy: the political party.
Democracies across the world are adopting reforms to bring politics closer to the people. Parties have turned to primaries and local caucuses to select candidates. Ballot initiatives and referenda allow citizens to enact laws directly. Many democracies now use proportional representation, encouraging smaller, more specific parties rather than two dominant ones. Yet voters keep getting angrier. There is a steady erosion of trust in politicians, parties, and democratic institutions, culminating most recently in major populist victories in the United States, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere. Frances Rosenbluth and Ian Shapiro argue that devolving power to the grass roots is part of the problem, not the solution. Efforts to decentralize political decision‑making make governments and especially political parties less effective and less able to address constituents’ long‑term interests. To revive confidence in governance, we must restructure our political systems to restore power to the core institution of representative democracy: the political party.
336 pages, Paperback
First published October 2, 2018
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
October 6, 2024
The authors argue that democratic reforms to give voters more choice, such as in candidate selection or to increase proportionality, actually undermine democratic decision making.
The Westminster system, with two strong, disciplined parties, incentivises convergence on the “median” voter and generally leads to more coherent policy platforms and democratic decision making in the long term.
By contrast, coalition governments in proportional systems, or candidates selected by primaries / open-lists, are more irresponsible policymakers forced to cater to insular minorities with intense preferences. They will try to protect their own voters while externalising the costs onto other groups, with no incentive to govern for the majority of people. This is a recipe for poor and expensive public policy. Democracies should resist the temptation to respond to voter disaffection with democratic reforms that will hamper policymaking and further entrench disaffection.
This is a self consciously contrarian and counter intuitive argument and at first I found myself fairly sympathetic to it.
This was somewhat undone by the authors' unacknowledged and unexamined normative assumptions about e.g. who the "median" UK voter is and what constitutes "responsible" politics. They are reflexively dismissive of Corbyn, seeing him as an aberration catapulted to leadership by the same misguided democratic reforms they rail against. The politics he represented is dismissed as fundamentally unserious, at best.
This is a familiar view among British political scientists, for whom any politics not centred on middle class homeowners is considered fundamentally illegitimate, or even dangerous populist demagoguery. This normative bias blinds the authors to the fact that the idealised "median" voter in the UK is a product of the electoral system itself. Middle-class homeowners and pensioners in suburban swing seats are more politically advantaged than young renters or gig economy workers in urban centres, whose votes are largely wasted. Accordingly, Westminster politics converges on the former group at the direct expense of the latter, with very poor outcomes in policy areas like welfare, social insurance, redistribution etc. Contrary to the authors' argument about better and more responsible policymaking, the Westminster system's track record in these areas does not compare favourably to the PR systems of Western Europe.
The authors do belatedly address this point in the final chapter, albeit briefly and rather unconvincingly. They argue that larger single-member districts is the route to better policy outcomes in these areas. Ideally every constituency should constitute a microcosm of the UK as a whole. As for the better track record of PR systems, there is a throwaway sentence that the PR advantage on redistribution might be dissipating in the face of declining union membership and left party fragmentation. This argument is contradicted by even the most cursory glance at Scotland, where PR and centre left electoral competition has meant better redistributive policies, like the introduction and increases to Scottish Child Payment, and even plans to introduce rent controls. On this axis, these are significantly better policies than anything offered by the majoritarian Westminster parties.
Oddly, I don't feel these criticisms totally undercut the book. I found myself intrigued by the case put forward and it felt honestly argued. The authors offer some useful insights on making better public policy. I think even supporters of more proportional systems could get something from it - if only to hone our own arguments in favour of PR.
The Westminster system, with two strong, disciplined parties, incentivises convergence on the “median” voter and generally leads to more coherent policy platforms and democratic decision making in the long term.
By contrast, coalition governments in proportional systems, or candidates selected by primaries / open-lists, are more irresponsible policymakers forced to cater to insular minorities with intense preferences. They will try to protect their own voters while externalising the costs onto other groups, with no incentive to govern for the majority of people. This is a recipe for poor and expensive public policy. Democracies should resist the temptation to respond to voter disaffection with democratic reforms that will hamper policymaking and further entrench disaffection.
This is a self consciously contrarian and counter intuitive argument and at first I found myself fairly sympathetic to it.
This was somewhat undone by the authors' unacknowledged and unexamined normative assumptions about e.g. who the "median" UK voter is and what constitutes "responsible" politics. They are reflexively dismissive of Corbyn, seeing him as an aberration catapulted to leadership by the same misguided democratic reforms they rail against. The politics he represented is dismissed as fundamentally unserious, at best.
This is a familiar view among British political scientists, for whom any politics not centred on middle class homeowners is considered fundamentally illegitimate, or even dangerous populist demagoguery. This normative bias blinds the authors to the fact that the idealised "median" voter in the UK is a product of the electoral system itself. Middle-class homeowners and pensioners in suburban swing seats are more politically advantaged than young renters or gig economy workers in urban centres, whose votes are largely wasted. Accordingly, Westminster politics converges on the former group at the direct expense of the latter, with very poor outcomes in policy areas like welfare, social insurance, redistribution etc. Contrary to the authors' argument about better and more responsible policymaking, the Westminster system's track record in these areas does not compare favourably to the PR systems of Western Europe.
The authors do belatedly address this point in the final chapter, albeit briefly and rather unconvincingly. They argue that larger single-member districts is the route to better policy outcomes in these areas. Ideally every constituency should constitute a microcosm of the UK as a whole. As for the better track record of PR systems, there is a throwaway sentence that the PR advantage on redistribution might be dissipating in the face of declining union membership and left party fragmentation. This argument is contradicted by even the most cursory glance at Scotland, where PR and centre left electoral competition has meant better redistributive policies, like the introduction and increases to Scottish Child Payment, and even plans to introduce rent controls. On this axis, these are significantly better policies than anything offered by the majoritarian Westminster parties.
Oddly, I don't feel these criticisms totally undercut the book. I found myself intrigued by the case put forward and it felt honestly argued. The authors offer some useful insights on making better public policy. I think even supporters of more proportional systems could get something from it - if only to hone our own arguments in favour of PR.
March 17, 2020
This is probably the most wonky, serious political science book I've ever read. The focus is on mechanism, how does government function well, what needs to happen so that people are engaged with government and feel the government is doing the best it can to serve the most people; much less emphasis is placed on what specific policies serve the greater good or promote certain moral goals.
I independently came to the view that the way political parties in the US, most importantly the Democratic Party, were heading was wrong; I thought that the tendency toward making the Democratic presidential primary system into a microcosm of the general election was exactly the opposite of what was needed, that parties need better control over who gets to run for offices under their banner, that parties were turning into little more than a set of random people with a D or R next to their name. I saw an article on essentially this topic that included an interview with the authors of this book, and it resonated with me.
The main position advocated by the authors is that strong parties, exactly two of them, with large diverse legislative districts, and a strong legislature, is the best possibility for truly accountable government and a truly engaged electorate. They acknowledge up front that their position is not popular among political scientists, nor among the general public. They make their case extremely well, with solid arguments and tons of case examples from several centuries of history throughout the world.
By "strong party" they mean a party that has the authority to set a platform, to participate in the choice of candidates who will advance that platform, to discipline candidates who work against the platform, and, ultimately, to be held accountable by the electorate if the platform is not working well. They discuss at great length the tendency to "democratize" political parties by asking voters to decide everything ("decentralization"), and explain why this is a problem.
I find my positions swayed by their arguments. I used to think a many-party system was the best, but I see the problems now. I used to think focused competing factions was the best, but I can see the value in having large, diverse parties that hew toward some sort of middle ground. I'm not completely convinced by everything the authors state, but I am thinking about a lot of things.
The book is engagingly written, with a great many pithy observations that had me nodding my head and saying "Yes! Exactly!" in my head (sometimes out loud). There is even a touch of humor.
There are a couple of issues that bothered me. One, I am not a political scientist, and the book is jargon-heavy in spots. I had to keep reviewing previous parts of the book to remind myself what was under discussion. In some cases, there was no real explanation previously, and I had to look up information elsewhere. Two, much of the book is political history, which is probably of great interest to historians and political scientists, but did little ultimately to set the stage for the substantive argument being put forth, until perhaps getting to more recent times. These are, ultimately, minor concerns; I enjoyed the book very much regardless.
I independently came to the view that the way political parties in the US, most importantly the Democratic Party, were heading was wrong; I thought that the tendency toward making the Democratic presidential primary system into a microcosm of the general election was exactly the opposite of what was needed, that parties need better control over who gets to run for offices under their banner, that parties were turning into little more than a set of random people with a D or R next to their name. I saw an article on essentially this topic that included an interview with the authors of this book, and it resonated with me.
The main position advocated by the authors is that strong parties, exactly two of them, with large diverse legislative districts, and a strong legislature, is the best possibility for truly accountable government and a truly engaged electorate. They acknowledge up front that their position is not popular among political scientists, nor among the general public. They make their case extremely well, with solid arguments and tons of case examples from several centuries of history throughout the world.
By "strong party" they mean a party that has the authority to set a platform, to participate in the choice of candidates who will advance that platform, to discipline candidates who work against the platform, and, ultimately, to be held accountable by the electorate if the platform is not working well. They discuss at great length the tendency to "democratize" political parties by asking voters to decide everything ("decentralization"), and explain why this is a problem.
I find my positions swayed by their arguments. I used to think a many-party system was the best, but I see the problems now. I used to think focused competing factions was the best, but I can see the value in having large, diverse parties that hew toward some sort of middle ground. I'm not completely convinced by everything the authors state, but I am thinking about a lot of things.
The book is engagingly written, with a great many pithy observations that had me nodding my head and saying "Yes! Exactly!" in my head (sometimes out loud). There is even a touch of humor.
There are a couple of issues that bothered me. One, I am not a political scientist, and the book is jargon-heavy in spots. I had to keep reviewing previous parts of the book to remind myself what was under discussion. In some cases, there was no real explanation previously, and I had to look up information elsewhere. Two, much of the book is political history, which is probably of great interest to historians and political scientists, but did little ultimately to set the stage for the substantive argument being put forth, until perhaps getting to more recent times. These are, ultimately, minor concerns; I enjoyed the book very much regardless.
April 19, 2020
You needn't necessarily plod through all the latter chapters to get the core lesson of the book, which typically means I'd give a less raving review, but this is the book I've recommended most to people over the last 6 months, so I've increased the rank. I happen to agree pretty whole-heartedly with the argument of the authors. More democracy within parties, without restrictions, is a disaster. Following party and national elections in the US and UK over the last 10-15 years is enough to prove this. The authors do a nice job explaining the mechanics of why that should be so... and then give you plenty of examples from continental Europe that are not particularly useful unless you're writing school paper.
June 13, 2021
A very important book about a very important subject. However, the only parts you need to read are the first three chapters, the chapters about Britain and America, as well as the last chapter. The rest of the book essentially just reiterates the points already made with example after example. I would recommend this book (or at least most of it) to anyone with strong opinions on electoral systems.
November 18, 2018
Makes a fairly clear case that too much democracy can kill democracy.
July 21, 2019
If I were to write a one-word review, it would read "Good". If I were allowed to expand it to two words, I would add the word "Not".
Longer review TBA.
Longer review TBA.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews