Outlines of the History of Ethics

by Henry Sidgwick

"The work of a master in the subject, who in a few pregnant pages has sketched out skillfully and judicially the history of Greek, of medieval, and of English reflections on the aims and laws of human conduct." --William Wallace (at time of first publication)

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction

320 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1988

About the author

Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) was an English utilitarian philosopher and economist. He was the Knightbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Cambridge from 1883 until his death, and is best known in philosophy for his utilitarian treatise The Methods of Ethics. He was one of the founders and first president of the Society for Psychical Research and a member of the Metaphysical Society and promoted the higher education of women. His work in economics has also had a lasting influence.

Reviews

[Steven H · Rating 5 out of 5]

THE ENGLISH UTILITARIAN PHILOSOPHER REVIEWS PAST ETHICAL THEORIES
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Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900) was an English utilitarian philosopher and economist, as well as one of the founders (and first President) of the Society for Psychical Research. He also founded Newnham College in 1875, a women-only constituent college of the University of Cambridge, which was only the second Cambridge college to admit women.

He wrote in the Preface to this 1886 book, “I have taken pains to keep Ethics as separate as I conveniently could from Theology and Metaphysics, and also from Politics; this separation, however, is naturally less complete in some parts of the subject than in others; e.g., in dealing with the medieval period the relations of Ethics to Theology are necessarily more prominent than in the modern period… I have aimed at the greatest possible impartiality and ‘objectivity’ of treatment; and in order better to obtain this result I have not attempted to deal with contemporary modes of ethical thought… except in a very brief and summary way.” (Pg. vi)

He outlines, “the subject of Ethics… includes (1) an investigation of the constituents and conditions of the Good or Wellbeing of men considered individually, which chiefly takes the form of an examination into the general nature and particular species of (a) Virtue or (b) Pleasure, and the chief means of realizing these ends; (2) an investigation of the principles and most important details of Duty or the Moral Law… (3) some inquiry into the nature and origin of the Faculty by which duty is recognized and, more generally, into the part taken by Intellect in human action, and its relation to various kinds of Desire and Aversion; (4) some examination of the question of human Free Will. It is connected with Theology, in so far as a Universal Good is recognized … and again, so far as morality is regarded as a Code of Divine appointment. It is connected with Politics, so far as the wellbeing of any individual man is bound up with the wellbeing of his society; and again with Juridprudence… so far as morality is identified with Natural Law. Finally, almost every branch of ethical discussion belongs at least in part to Psychology…” (Pg. 10-11)

In his discussion of Socrates and Plato, he observes, “It was no peculiar flight of Plato’s idealizing imagination that made him place the absolute control of his ideal state in the hands of philosophers; it was an immediate application of his master’s cardinal doctrine that no one can be fit to govern men who does not know man’s true end or good.” (Pg. 26) Later, he adds, “Plato, without definitely abandoning the Socratic limitation of philosophy to the study of human good, has deepened the conception of human good until the quest of it takes in the earlier inquiry into the essential nature of the external world, from which Socrates turned away.” (Pg. 39)

He suggests of goods such as beauty, good birth, welfare of progeny, etc., “These Aristotle attempts to exclude from the philosophic conception of wellbeing nor to include in his formal definition of it. The deliberate looseness which is thus given to his fundamental doctrine characterizes more or less his whole discussion of ethics. He plainly says that the subject does not admit of completely scientific treatment; his aim is to give not a perfectly definite theory of human good, but a practically adequate account of its most important constituents.” (Pg. 57-58) Later, he adds, “One defect in Aristotle’s account of Virtue… is that Benevolence is not recognized… Thus mutual kindness, if not strictly a virtue, is an indispensable element of human wellbeing… in the narrower and intenser form which we specially call Friendship, it is needful to complete the happiness even of the philosopher.” (Pg. 66)

He notes, “it may be fairly said that Stoics and Epicureans made rival offers to mankind of the same kind of happiness; the philosophical peculiarities of either system may be equally traced to the desire of maintaining that independence of the changes and chances of life which seemed essential to a settled serenity of soul… the Epicurean sage, no less than the Stoic, is to be happy even on the rack; that his happiness, too, depends almost entirely upon insight and right calculation, fortune having very little to do with it.” (Pg. 83-84)

He points out, “It is… in jurisprudence rather than philosophy that the independent contribution of Rome to the development of human thought is mainly to be found; accordingly, the most interesting manifestation of the Stoic influence on Cicero is given when he comes to treat of morality in its jural aspect.” (Pg. 97)

He suggests, “when the Church, through Constantine, entered into organic relation with civil society, the tendency of its more enthusiastic members to advocate an ascetic breach with man’s natural life took a new direction. Total renunciation of the world and mortification of the flesh were no longer held to be prescribed to all Christians as the sole way of salvation… A double morality was thus gradually developed out of the original simplicity of Christian teaching: a distinction was established between ordinary Christian virtue and monastic virtue…” (Pg. 127-128)

He asserts, “The moral philosophy of Thomas Aquinas is, in the main, Aristotelianism with a Neo-Platonic tinge, interpreted and supplemented by a view of Christian doctrine derived chiefly from Augustine… Thus the summum bonum for man is objectively God, subjectively the happiness to be derived from loving vision of His perfections; although there is a lower kind of happiness to be realized here below in a normal human existence of virtue and friendship, with mind and body sound and whole and properly trained for the needs of earthly life.” (Pg. 141)

He argues, “the impressive earnestness with which [Samuel] Clarke enforced the doctrine of rational morality only rendered more manifest the difficulty of establishing ethics on an independent philosophical basis; so long at least as the psychological egoism of Hobbes was not definitely assailed and overthrown. Until this was done, the utmost demonstration of the abstract reasonableness of social duty only leaves us with an irreconcilable antagonism between the view of abstract reason and the self-love which is allowed to be normal in man’s appetitive nature… still, if a man has to choose between absurdity and unhappiness, he will naturally prefer the former; and Clarke… is not really prepared to maintain that such preference is irrational.” (Pg. 183-184)

He contends, “[Hume and Adam Smith] err in underrating the complexity of the moral sentiments, and in not recognizing that,.. they are now, as introspectively examined, different from mere sympathy with the feelings and impulses of others; they are compounds that cannot be directly analyzed into the simple element fo sympathy, however complicated and combined.” (Pg. 218)

He states, “In unity, consistency, and thoroughness of method, Bentham’s utilitarianism has a decided superiority over [William] Paley’s. He throughout considers actions solely in respect of their pleasurable and painful consequences, expected or actual; and he fully recognizes the need of making an exhaustive and systematic register of these consequences, free from the influences of common moral opinion … And since the effects by which alone he estimates conduct are all empirically ascertainable… all political or moral inferences drawn by Bentham’s method lie open at every point to the test of practical experience.” (Pg. 239-240)

He points out, “the widespread acceptance of the Darwinian theory, has had effects on ethical thought… It has tended… to thrust aside the Benthamite criterion and method for determining the good and bad tendencies of actions; first, by substituting for ‘balance of pleasure over pain’ some more objective biological conception---such as the ‘preservation of human society’… as the end by conduciveness to which actions and characters are to be estimated; and secondly, by substituting for empirical utilitarian reasoning an attempt to deduce moral rules from biological or sociological laws. This latter procedure is sometimes called ‘establishing morality on a scientific basis.’” (Pg. 254-255)

Sidgwick’s “Methods of Ethics” gives a much better perspective on his own views, while also summarizing a number of other ethical views; but this smaller volume will still interest those seriously studying ethical theory.

[Nathan · Rating 4 out of 5]

The book is easy to read albeit sometime boring. Some thinkers are so obscure to the current reader it is hard to make sense of it. Nonetheless, this book is great to help us understand Sidgwick’s own ethical philosophy. Overall I really liked the book, it is mostly correct if not a little bit old. This should be a preface to The Methods of Ethics.

The review of ancient philosophy is showing its age, but I mean he barely misses anything. It’s a very interesting vision of ancient philosophy that Sidgwick does develop. The discussion on Christianity was interesting, it covered a pretty broad range of thinker. His discussion of English ethics is much more obscure and filled with discussion of now-irrelevant philosophers. However this discussion is central to understanding where Sidgwick situates himself intellectually and to understanding his influences. This include the discussion on intentional ethics and utilitarianism, I was happy to see this discussion continued in this work. The discussion in German ethics was also pretty interesting. He does anticipate negative utilitarian tendencies and yet do not give in to pessimism, but what a bleak ending.

This book should be read before reading other works by Sidgwick. It is an easy book to read which is packed with with much learning.

[Noah Jones · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was written in 1886 by one of the most important moral philosophers of that time. Sidgwick was one of the greatest utilitarian philosophers, and he paid more attention to the history of ethics than others. The English in this book has gotten dated, it obviously stops in the late 1800s, and it is slanted toward English-speaking ethics, but with all that said, I think it holds up as a concise and fair “outline.” I have a soft spot for Sidgwick, despite his typical Enlightenment philosopher flaws.

[Mario · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is exactly what it purports to be: an outline of the history of ethics, from Ancient Greece to English ethical thought at the end of the nineteenth century. What makes it a particularly good resource is that it doesn't tackle each subject separately, but joins them together in a more flowing way, so that you can see, for instance, the transition from Aristotle to the Stoics, rather than either in isolation. It is not entirely devoid of opinion, but that would likely be impossible anyway, and I never found fault with Sidgwick's occasional criticism, but fans of particular philosophers might find something to gripe about.

On the whole, it is well worth reading if you are interested in the subject.