Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge: Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, London, 1965, volume 4

by Imre Lakatos, Alan Musgrave

ISBN10: 0521096235

Two books have been particularly influential in contemporary philosophy of science: Karl R. Popper's Logic of Scientific Discovery, and Thomas S. Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Both agree upon the importance of revolutions in science, but differ about the role of criticism in science's revolutionary growth. This volume arose out of a symposium on Kuhn's work, with Popper in the chair, at an international colloquium held in London in 1965. The book begins with Kuhn's statement of his position followed by seven essays offering criticism and analysis, and finally by Kuhn's reply. The book will interest senior undergraduates and graduate students of the philosophy and history of science, as well as professional philosophers, philosophically inclined scientists, and some psychologists and sociologists.

Genres: Philosophy, Science, Nonfiction, History Of Science, Modern

282 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1970

About the author

Philosopher of mathematics and science, known for his thesis of the fallibility of mathematics and its 'methodology of proofs and refutations' in its pre-axiomatic stages of development, and also for introducing the concept of the 'research programme' in his methodology of scientific research programmes.
More at Wikipedia.

Reviews

[Andrew Noselli · Rating 3 out of 5]

If all science is methodologically falsifiable due to the inherent biases and distortions emanating from the negative heuristics of the unstable human brain's connectivity of consciousness, then perhaps Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend were all making essentially the same point: that the knowledge-state of the present is not fit for the transubstantiation of human consciousness on this earthly plane of existence. Three stars.

[Harris Bolus · Rating 5 out of 5]

Just as great as I had hoped for! Feyerabend unexpectedly stole the show with a fantastically clear, well argued essay. I hope I can write like that some day. Masterman was fantastic too.

Unfortunately, I still don’t sympathize with either his or Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis. I wish I could say exactly why, but part of the problem is that I’m never satisfied by the way they’ve been expressed. Kuhn seemed to defeat his own argument for incommensurability when, after spending long pages discussing translation and gestalt-switches needed to understand radically different theories, he gave the example of (successfully) teaching Aristotelian physics to undergraduates. Although his point was that they saw the primary texts differently before and after having it explained, what I take away is the ease and clarity with which one can understand and compare theories like Aristotle’s and Newton’s physics. There’s certainly a process of wrapping your head around a different worldview, but commensurability abounds. My assessment of Kuhn generally is that he just says lots of nice things without thinking too hard about how they fit together.

Highly recommend! But read at least Popper and Kuhn first.

[Daniel Schulof · Rating 3 out of 5]

Unlike Popper’s ideas on conjectures/refutations/falsification, which strike me as hugely profound and have come to play a central role in my own thinking about the acquisition of scientific knowledge, Kuhn’s ideas on the dynamics of scientific progress seem largely semantic. Even when they’re not, they rarely strike me as profound or useful in an explanatory sense. The responsive critiques contained herein read as more persuasive than Kuhn’s original paper. An overrated intellectual figure and an overrated idea.

[A YOGAM · Rating 4 out of 5]

Dieser Sammelband, hervorgegangen aus dem Londoner Kolloquium von 1965, ist ein wissenschaftstheoretisches Schlüsselwerk: Er dokumentiert die erste intensive Kollision zwischen der etablierten rationalistischen Methodologie (insbesondere dem kritischen Rationalismus Karl Poppers und seiner Schüler) und dem historisch-soziologischen Modell des wissenschaftlichen Wandels von Thomas S. Kuhn.
Das Buch markiert einen Wendepunkt in der Philosophie der Wissenschaft, indem es die Grundfrage neu stellt: Ist wissenschaftlicher Fortschritt ein primär rationaler Prozess der Kritik und kumulativen Erkenntnis – oder ein historisch-soziologischer Umbruch, in dem rationale Kriterien zeitweise suspendiert werden?
Kuhns Herausforderung an die Rationalität
Kuhns Beitrag „Reflections on My Critics“ verteidigt seine Konzepte des Paradigmas und der Normalwissenschaft. Philosophisch ist dies die entschiedenste Herausforderung an den Rationalismus:
Normalwissenschaft als Dogma: Kuhn argumentiert, dass die meiste wissenschaftliche Arbeit dogmatisch sei, weil sie auf der Stabilität eines Paradigmas beruhe, dessen Grundannahmen nicht laufend infrage gestellt werden. Dies steht im direkten Gegensatz zum Popper’schen Ideal permanenter Kritik und Falsifikation.
Inkommensurabilität und Relativismus: Die Debatte entzündet sich vor allem an Kuhns These der Inkommensurabilität – der Unvergleichbarkeit verschiedener Paradigmen. Wenn Kriterien für Wahrheit und Fortschritt paradigmabhängig sind, wie kann ein Paradigmenwechsel rational begründet werden? Für die Popperianer droht hier ein historischer Relativismus, der die Idee objektiver Rationalität gefährdet.
Lakatos’ Synthese und die Rationalisierbarkeit der Wissenschaft
Die theoretisch nachhaltigste Antwort stammt von Imre Lakatos. Sein Versuch, Poppers Rationalismus mit den historischen Befunden zu versöhnen, kulminiert in der Methodologie wissenschaftlicher Forschungsprogramme.
Rettung der Rationalität: Lakatos hält daran fest, dass wissenschaftlicher Fortschritt rational rekonstruierbar sein muss. Er verlagert die Einheit der Bewertung von einzelnen Theorien auf ganze Forschungsprogramme, die durch einen „harten Kern“ verbunden sind.
Progressiv vs. degenerativ: Ein Forschungsprogramm ist progressiv, wenn es neuartige Vorhersagen ermöglicht; es ist degenerativ, wenn es nur ad hoc bekannte Tatsachen nachträglich erklärt. Damit akzeptiert Lakatos eine gewisse Form von Dogmatismus innerhalb des „harten Kerns“, solange das Programm insgesamt empirisch fruchtbar bleibt.
Die Etablierung der historischen Wissenschaftstheorie
Rückblickend ist dieser Band mehr als eine Debatte zwischen Popper, Kuhn und Lakatos: Er begründet die historisch informierte Wissenschaftstheorie als verbindlichen Standard. Normative Modelle der Rationalität müssen seither auch deskriptiv erklären können, warum die realen historischen Episoden der Wissenschaft – von Newton bis Einstein – rational rekonstruierbar sind.
So wird dieser Sammelband zu einem bleibenden Dokument des Versuchs, die Ordnung der Vernunft im Angesicht der Unordnung der Geschichte zu bewahren.

[Pardis TD · Rating 5 out of 5]

I had a Russian professor who once told me "You can criticize each article you want", it reminded me of the great Imre Lakatos, a true feminist, and a true science supporter. He is the philosopher who inspired me the most, at a tender age of 17 when I laid eyes on his books, my mind changed, it went from child to adult. Constructive criticism means pleasure, and to me reading him was extremely rewarding, and validating. I am aware of his lack of notoriety, but he remains my perhaps utmost favorite modern philosopher, and as I didn't have a tutor during my early science years, I always remembered what he and his colleagues, Feyerabend and Kuhn taught me and applied them to my research methods. Mind-opening. I just like him.

[Selda Nayir · Rating 1 out of 5]

It just does not worth reading. the entire book is focused on downgrading ideas of Thomas Kuhn's book 'Structure of scientific revolutions', which is much well written and has a structure that can be followed.

[Tyler Munn]

This was a great follow-up to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. This book is a great way to catch up on the big perspectives in Phil of Science.

[Lucille Nguyen · Rating 5 out of 5]

A well written series of articles dealing with the ideas of scientific knowledge and its processes. Thoughtful works from giants in their field.

[B · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book starts off pretty good, but then the last few authors wind up talking about their own super-abstract ideas rather than talking about Kuhn—and at great length.

Kuhn seems to be its own example of a paradigm. It really seems to standalone and be incommensurate. I wish I could see more engagement like this, but then I also wish this were more engaged.

The first couple of authors (esp. Masterman are very interesting).

[Nanto]

Kalo ditanya isinya, saya harus buka lagi. Lagian gak yakin dulu dah ngerti isinya. :D

[Kimball]

It was recommended by James Bach. I am interested in philosophy. I would like to read it.