The facts about the extent of global poverty are pretty staggering, as Thomas Pogge explicitly demonstrates from the outset of this book. At the time of publication, "46 percent of humankind live[d] below the World Bank's $2/day poverty line" and 43 percent of those people fell "below the World Bank's better-known $1/day poverty line." Yet "shifting merely 1 percent of aggregate global income - $312 billion annually - from the [wealthiest 903 million people] to the [poorest 2.8 billion people] would eradicate sever poverty worldwide." That such a goal could be achieved by citizens in affluent nations giving only 1% of their income to the poor is itself a pretty compelling reason to do so. But is not a strong philosophical reason, and Pogge rightly endeavors to show why the wealthy have a moral duty to help the poor.
Pogge begins from the admirable position of arguing from a framework of negative, rather than positive, duties. It is a much easier task to show that the wealthy have a duty to aid the poor if we assume that people have a general duty to help those in need. It is a far more difficult task to argue, as Pogge does, that we have a duty to help the poor because we contribute to their impoverished state. He points to two aspects of the current global order to make his point:
1. "Any group controlling a preponderance of the means of coercion within a country is internationally recognized as the legitimate government of this country's territory and people - regardless of how this group came to power, of how it exercises power, and of the extent to which it may be supported or opposed by the population it rules."
2. Recognition of a coercive government as legitimate "means also that we accept this group's right to act for the people it rules and, in particular, confer upon it the privileges freely to borrow in the country's name... and freely to dispose of the country's natural resources."
However, Pogge fails to effectively capitalize on the power of these two observations. Much of this failure is do to the fact that this book is actually a collection of Pogge's previously written essays, which he has attempted to arrange as chapters in the most logical order. A complete argument for a duty to aid the global poor does not appear until the final essay/chapter, nearly 100 pages after he raises the two salient points above. The structure of the book distances the premises of his argument from their justifications, challenging the reader to piece together the fragments of his overall claim.
Still, the fragments are there, and if the reader has followed him thus far, Pogge would do well to offer a specific call to action. Instead, his major recommendations involve the creation of global oversight committees, a messy political procedure very far removed from ordinary citizens, and one that seems unlikely to emerge in the near future. A more pertinent message would direct the individual reader on the best ways to alleviate poverty, perhaps by donating to specific charities or lobbying one's elected officials on specific issues. So World Poverty and Human Rights offers a complete, yet fragmented, argument for aiding the global poor, but doesn't quite connect with readers not involved with political systems in their daily lives. But it is certainly worth reading for those who have the patience and lack of prejudice to follow and engage Pogge's arguments.