This book features a simple yet shockingly original insight, as well as a few stellar case studies of policy reform, but might not offer many surprising stories to those versed in the past 40 years of U.S. policy-making.
Patashnik's main argument is that while political scientists have often focused on how major reform initiatives become law, few have looked at how those reforms either survived or became diluted in the years after that bright moment of change, and fewer have tried to explain why different reforms followed different paths. While laws like the Tax Reform Act of 1986 or the Freedom to Farm Act of 1996 acquired much publicity on passage, the public as a whole quickly lost interest, and further changes often happened sub rosa. Patashnik hopes to draw these reform stories back into a longer narrative.
Patashink argues that in order for a reform to survive, it must not only make real changes in policy, it must change the underlying institutional configuration of the interest groups affected by it, and must therefore prevent the old iron triangles of bureaucracies, congressional committees, and interest groups from reasserting themselves. He shows that the tax act of 1986 was largely a failure over the long-term because the host of interest groups that demanded special tax treatment, and the power of the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee, were not reformed, so once publicity moved on the old tax loopholes began to blossom again. By contrast, he shows how laws like the Airline Deregulation of 1978 and the sulfer dioxide trading regime in the 1990 Clean Air Act persevered because they created new interest group coalitions. The former quickly bankrupted many of the "legacy carriers" like TWA, Pan Am, and Eastern Airlines and also created a host of low-cost airlines that were adverse to re-regulation. The sunset provision that abolished the Civil Aeronautics Board by 1984 also prevented any latent bureaucracy from reasserting itself. For the clean air act, the creation of SO2 trading allocations created a financial interest for existing utilities to perpetuate the trading regime, and provided a much-celebrated model for cap-and-trade proponents everywhere.
In each of these cases, too, Patashink shows how supposedly temporary giveaways to special interests to allow reform passage affected the subsequent history. The exemptions demanded by Senator Robert Byrd for dirty high-sulfur West Virginia coal allowed the perpetuation of many expensive scrubber programs when more cheap Western coal may have moved reform quicker. And the growth of counter-cyclical payments to farmers after the 1996 act cushioned the blow of reform but eventually lead to a re-expansion of the agricultural welfare state in the 2002 act. Still, in each case there was at least a patina of reform that survived fruitfully into the new eras.
As far as I can tell, there was almost no original research done to write this book, so nothing told, or re-told here, will be that surprising. But by merely putting these different reforms into the wider perspective of policy sustainability (to use a much abused contemporary term), Patashnik has performed a valuable and original service.