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Why war?: Ideology, theory and history
"Instead of proposing another theory of war, their goal is a more modest one of raising the theoretical consciousness of historians. Specifically, they argue that '1) ideology does influence theory, 2) historians do have ideologies as well as theories . . . about which they are not always conscious or consistent, and 3) we can better understand, compare, and evaluate what historians are saying when we comprehend their ideological and theoretical perspectives.' They attempt then, to classify historical interpretations of war according to their ideological/ theoretical orientations, however covert."-- Perspective "Nelson and Olin .. . are concerned with enhancing history's social utility by advancing its capacity to produce generalizations that can explain or predict events and are subject to empirical testing. Their exploration of historical generalization focuses on an issue itself of the highest importance, the causes of war; but their aim is also to create a model for historical generalization applicable to other issues. They argue that to understand generalizations in history, one must recognize their roots in theory, and that historians' theories in turn proceed from their own ideologies. To demonstrate, they survey theories about the causes of war that have come out of conservative, liberal, and radical ideologies. . . . any historian will profit from this rigorous approach to the problem." -- Choice "Learned and suggestive, this book clarifies much of what is already known, and points toward new ways of understanding."-- Library Journal
- GenresHistory
201 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1979
About the author
Keith L. Nelson
6 booksProfessor Emeritus, History at University of California
Keith Nelson first came to Orange County in 1965 as one of the founding faculty of the Department of History at the University of California, Irvine. Nelson’s teaching and research interests lie in the fields of American foreign relations, Cold War history, the socio/economic impact of war, and religious studies. He and Olin are co-authors of Why War? Ideology, Theory, and History, a study available in paperback. In 2011 he was named UCI Emeritus Professor of the Year.
Keith Nelson first came to Orange County in 1965 as one of the founding faculty of the Department of History at the University of California, Irvine. Nelson’s teaching and research interests lie in the fields of American foreign relations, Cold War history, the socio/economic impact of war, and religious studies. He and Olin are co-authors of Why War? Ideology, Theory, and History, a study available in paperback. In 2011 he was named UCI Emeritus Professor of the Year.
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
September 12, 2016
More like 3.5 stars. An interesting read.
This book of historiography starts out with a wonderful set of definitions of 'conservative' (although they could have given more of the communal good aspect of conservative thought), 'liberal' and what they refer to as 'radical' (largely Marxist or otherwise leftist) thought. This beginning alone would make the book worth reading by students who have no idea of the concepts as they have developed. In the US in particular, the terms are thrown around with little sense by political pundits who all profess in their own beliefs what should be labelled as 'liberal' ideology. (Yes, most of your conservatives profess mostly liberal ideals.)
Beyond that, this little gem of a book makes a wonderful think piece. Indeed, I spent a great deal of time thinking of arguments against the position of the authors. I disagree with their very reason for writing the book, but I'm happy they did. It's nice to argue.
The authors' main argument is that in explaining the causes of wars, historians tend to fall into one of of the above theory groups. After defining the theories themselves, the authors give examples of each type of theoretical analyses, focussing on World War I and World War II. The examples were interesting, especially as many of the historians cited have faded from the scene since the 1979 appearance of the book.
My arguments arose as a result of what I would describe as their attempts at making square pegs fit into round holes and round pegs fit into triangular holes. (I was watching my 1 year old grandson doing the same recently with the same persistence.)
This was one of my points of contention with the authors. Although they freely admitted that their examples were not perfect, they still presented their arguments in a somewhat absolute manner.
I took umbrage to an even greater extent to their main argument. I agree with them that historians are not able to present their causal arguments in a neutral, not informed by bias manner. Indeed, I would go even further and argue that historians who see themselves as practitioners of a 'social science' are more prone to falling into the trap of guiding their analyses by 'theories'. Such are our authors. (I won't start developing my own thoughts on history as a social sciences here.)
I would suggest that many historians, of a more humanist stance, would not necessarily undertake their analyses under any of the three theories suggested here. Rather, they are under the spell of their own personal biases. Our authors do not seem to consider this possibility.
The struggle towards 'objectivity' has been an issue for historians for the last two centuries. Some have defined themselves as social scientists and have attempted to delineate theory driven methods. Others continue to see themselves as humanists who try to limit their subjective biases while admitting their faults. Most aspire to some form of objectivity, however they may define that term.
Within the field of historiography, theories of the why and the how of history are now rampant, usually tied to broader theories in philosophy or the social sciences. Given the broad spectrum of ideas out there, Why War? seems to be a product of simpler times. I would recommend it as a good starting place for understanding that historians are never what they claim to be.
This book of historiography starts out with a wonderful set of definitions of 'conservative' (although they could have given more of the communal good aspect of conservative thought), 'liberal' and what they refer to as 'radical' (largely Marxist or otherwise leftist) thought. This beginning alone would make the book worth reading by students who have no idea of the concepts as they have developed. In the US in particular, the terms are thrown around with little sense by political pundits who all profess in their own beliefs what should be labelled as 'liberal' ideology. (Yes, most of your conservatives profess mostly liberal ideals.)
Beyond that, this little gem of a book makes a wonderful think piece. Indeed, I spent a great deal of time thinking of arguments against the position of the authors. I disagree with their very reason for writing the book, but I'm happy they did. It's nice to argue.
The authors' main argument is that in explaining the causes of wars, historians tend to fall into one of of the above theory groups. After defining the theories themselves, the authors give examples of each type of theoretical analyses, focussing on World War I and World War II. The examples were interesting, especially as many of the historians cited have faded from the scene since the 1979 appearance of the book.
My arguments arose as a result of what I would describe as their attempts at making square pegs fit into round holes and round pegs fit into triangular holes. (I was watching my 1 year old grandson doing the same recently with the same persistence.)
This was one of my points of contention with the authors. Although they freely admitted that their examples were not perfect, they still presented their arguments in a somewhat absolute manner.
I took umbrage to an even greater extent to their main argument. I agree with them that historians are not able to present their causal arguments in a neutral, not informed by bias manner. Indeed, I would go even further and argue that historians who see themselves as practitioners of a 'social science' are more prone to falling into the trap of guiding their analyses by 'theories'. Such are our authors. (I won't start developing my own thoughts on history as a social sciences here.)
I would suggest that many historians, of a more humanist stance, would not necessarily undertake their analyses under any of the three theories suggested here. Rather, they are under the spell of their own personal biases. Our authors do not seem to consider this possibility.
The struggle towards 'objectivity' has been an issue for historians for the last two centuries. Some have defined themselves as social scientists and have attempted to delineate theory driven methods. Others continue to see themselves as humanists who try to limit their subjective biases while admitting their faults. Most aspire to some form of objectivity, however they may define that term.
Within the field of historiography, theories of the why and the how of history are now rampant, usually tied to broader theories in philosophy or the social sciences. Given the broad spectrum of ideas out there, Why War? seems to be a product of simpler times. I would recommend it as a good starting place for understanding that historians are never what they claim to be.
April 28, 2013
An exploration of how conservative, liberal, and Marxist historians differ in their interpretations of World Wars I and II. A good introduction to all the well-known historians of the period.
May 15, 2009
This is book that I had for an IR class in college that was supplemental material and I thought I would give it a read. After having graduate level history the book makes a lot of sense.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews