For too long, Dr John Laffin maintains, the military reputation of British Generals in World War I has not been examined critically enough, and he asks how those responsible for catastrophic defeats were able to retain their commands. Haig, whose army suffered 60,000 casualties on the first day of the Battle of the Somme in 1916, was still in command after five months more fighting and another 400,000 casualties. By the war's end the numbers of dead ran into millions - doggedly brave British Empire soldiers who, Laffin believes, were killed, wounded or broken by commanders who were vain, egocentric and incompetent. But the generals, who blamed the dead and junior in rank, cannot be excused on the grounds that there was "nothing else that they could do". Even now, more than 75 years after that "Great War for Civilization", this book raises questions that are uncomfortable. Laffin draws on the memories and writings of those who took part and quotes the judgements of other military historians to provide an analysis of just what went wrong in the generals' leadership, and how it resulted in such appalling and tragic losses - and concludes that they were not merely incompetent but uncaring.
John Laffin was a prolific author with nearly 130 books to his name. Many of his books concerned military history.
Laffin's parents both served in WWI, his father in the 20th Battalion and his mother as a nurse. In 1940, aged 24, having worked with Smith's Weekly and The Wagga Advertiser, he enlisted in the 2nd AIF. He trained as an infantryman and later completed an officer course before serving in New Guinea. While convalescing in Sydney in 1943 he met his wife Hazelle.
After the war Laffin worked for a number of newspapers and magazines, wrote short novels and began his own feature service and editing unit. With his family he left for England in 1956 where he resided for nearly 40 years. He wrote articles for Australian newspapers and taught English, history and geography in secondary colleges.
Laffin traveled extensively in Europe, especially the Western Front areas of WWI and in the Middle East. He returned to Australia in 1995 but Hazelle developed heart problems and died in early 1997. He is survived by his two daughters, Bronwen and Pirenne, and a son, Craig.
A very engaging albeit on the short-side book which anyone with an interest in the Great War should read, maybe even own. His premise is not entirely original but he lays out his stall with cogency and conviction. It is not quite as drastic as "Lions Led by Donkeys" but the view cannot be resisted; the British Army was not the only participant with deficient senior staff and likely it has been thus all down through history (and maybe into the future). I am still trying to understand the "why" of the GW and this helped a bit. He asks a lot of men who were clearly looking over their shoulders aloof from the Front and those with modern fighting experience. Of course, the war was not just about slugging it out with the foe, it was about The Empire and politicians muddied the already muddy waters. Throw in the Frence, Russians and Italians and you begin to think no one would want, for example, Haig's job...
Goes beyond the usual hand-wringing about casualty statistics to offer real alternatives to the "HCI" (high casualty inevitable) tactics. Reread from 2011.
When one asks how much human life counted for the generals at the time, this book gives a concise and documented answer. Not much. When one knows that General Haig's conclusion of the Boer War (machine guns and dum-dum bullets used) was that the cavalry lance was the weapon of the future, it is really questionable as to how such an unimaginitive officer could become Commander in Chief and why such carnage was tolerated.
One sided review of the conduct of Worls War 1. However he conveys his arguments to back his assertions well and succintly. Refutes a lot of the ascertains made by Haig and official British apologists.