Japanese Army In World War II: The South Pacific And New Guinea, 1942–43

Osprey Battle Orders #14

by Gordon L. Rottman

The 1941 Japanese Pacific onslaught saw the defeat of Allied forces on all fronts, with the Philippines, Netherlands East Indies, and Commonwealth possessions falling under their control. During 1942-43, the Japanese consolidated their gains and redeployed forces in an attempt to break the Southern Lifeline between America and Australia. These plans were affected by the defeat at Midway, which forced the Japanese onto the defensive. This book examines Japanese forces employed in the follow-on conquests of 1942-43, and describes how unit organization, weaponry, and equipment were found lacking in the harsh environment of the Solomon Islands and on New Guinea.

Genres: War, World War II, History, Military History

96 pages, Paperback

First published December 10, 2005

About the author

Gordon L. Rottman served for 26 years in the US Army in Special Forces, airborne infantry, long-range reconnaissance patrol, and military intelligence assignments in the Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve. He has worked as a Special Operations Forces scenario writer for 14 years at the Army's Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana where he developed training exercises for Special Forces.
Gordon began writing military history books in 1984 and is currently a full-time author. He has written 50 books for Osprey. He is married with four children and lives in Cypress, Texas.

Reviews

[Martin Koenigsberg · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Japanese Army Started WWII with high aspirations, a very high opinion of itself, and very little idea of what fighting the Allies would be like. Gordon Rottman, a noted author on military topics and a Veteran of the Osprey Publishing house takes us through the Japanese Land Military approach to warfare- as it applied to the South Pacific and New Guinea in 1942-43. The Japanese had optimised their army for fighting the Chinese, and ignored their crushing defeat at Khalkhin Gol at the hands of the same Soviet Mechanised Army the German were busy dominating, so the Jungles and Islands of the South Pacific came as the same shock it was to Americans and Australians. They adapted, adjusting their formations, and attacked, carried by the the Navy. When the Allies counterattacked, defensive warfare was really a new experience for the Soldiers of the Empire, and then they began to feel the weight of the American/Australian Industrial complex....

Taking us through the Japanese army on the whole, and then the campaigns of focus in particular, Rottman really uses the 96 page Osprey "Battle Orders" series format well. LOTS of pics, maps, diagrams and tables to digest and understand the subject. Rottman shows how Weak Strategy, Poor Coordination with their IJN Partners (Many in the Army Did NOT Know of the Defeats at Midway , Santa Cruz Islands or Leyte- until Mid 1945), a fatal disdain for Intelligence (realistic appraisal of American Firepower were seen as "Defeatist"(!!!!!!!!!)), and laughable logistics, really self-sabotaged Imperial ambitions from the start. In the end, the only Amphibious operations the Japanese excelled at were evacuations, although they did learn how to exact a terrible price until forced by weight, skill and logistical superiority to retreat. My father was an Officer in this Theater, and came to appreciate Allied Skill at simply bypassing Japanese "Fortresses", learned from these early battles. I found it a really good read on the topic.

A junior reader over about 12 should be able to comprehend this book, as it does not have many adult themes or too much graphic casualty detail. For the Gamer/Modeller/Military Enthusiast, the intended market- a clear winner. Lots of information to inform Scenario and Diorama development, and a lot of detail on Expedition and Force Packages. The Maps are good and well explained, and there are great org charts and tables. This could be a Campaign Guide by itself. Even the Terrain guys get thrown a few bones with some typical bunker and perimeter layouts. I think this is a strong Rec for the IJA, US Army, US Marines, Pacific Theatre, New Guinea, or Australian Army shelves in the WWII library.

[James Crawford · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is another of the Osprey series of books on military history, and, as such, is filled with photos and information. It also has a lot of maps showing military actions, and breakdowns of Japanese military units. The book is more for people interested in the details of the fighting, rather than just looking for an overall summary of what happened.

One of the interesting things the author discusses is the declining production of military goods by Japan as the war went on.

The author summarizes Japanese tactics:

1.A preference for offensive operations.
2.A heavy reliance on strength of will (spiritual strength)
3.Emphasize surprise and rapid movement.
4.Preference for encircling the enemy rather than using frontal attacks.
5.Preference for moving in two or three columns.

The second one is what caused the Japanese untold trouble, of course. They believed that by sheer strength of will they could overcome U.S. advantages in military equipment. That didn't really work, and as the war went on, it worked even less well. Eventually it became a series of battles in which the Japanese had virtually no hope of winning; the main idea was to take as long to be defeated as possible, and kill as many Americans as possible, hoping that the U.S. citizens would become tired of the war and demand their government negotiate some kind of ending.

In the field, the Japanese found themselves on the defensive and astonished at how much military material the U.S. was producing, but the higher-ups were slow on the uptake.

"The major flaw in Japanese intelligence was cultural prejudice and an attitude created in the IJA that looked disdainfully on the capabilities of foreign armies, real or perceived." The Japanese of the time had a considerable superiority complex, and they felt that other nations were just not as good as they were. This led them to underestimate the strength of who they were facing, and underestimate the tenacity that the other countries would fight with.