This work constitutes the first part of a three-volume set which analyzes the strategic and military problems of the era spanning the two world wars. This book covers World War I.
A specialist in the history of American military policy and twentieth century wars and military institutions, Allan R. Millett is professor emeritus at The Ohio State University, where he taught form 1969 until his retirement in 2005.
This collection of scholarly essays on the military effectiveness of the major combatants in both world wars - volume I covering the First World War - has become something of a classic, and it doesn't disappoint. The editors defined that effectiveness in terms of four levels of activity: political, strategic, operational and tactical, and each of the nations' armies and navies are examined thereby. The Great War was a unique military phenomenon in that the most brilliant strategic and operations combinations almost inevitably foundered on the rock of the supremacy of the tactical defense. Since it is almost impossible to find a modern work on the military history of the 20th century that does not have this series in its bibliography, one must conclude that these books are authoritative. Some of the best minds in military history were recruited to write here as well. The only drawback is that the countries invoked (Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Japan, Italy and the United States) had to have been actively involved in both world wars, so unfortunately several important combatants in those wars didn't make the cut, such as Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and China, for example. But other than that, anyone with an interest in how various military and associated organizations functioned (or didn't) in the first half of the 20th century cannot afford to give this series a miss.