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The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War
David Herrmann's work is the most complete study to date of how land-based military power influenced international affairs during the series of diplomatic crises that led up to the First World War. Instead of emphasizing the naval arms race, which has been extensively studied before, Herrmann draws on documentary research in military and state archives in Germany, France, Austria, England, and Italy to show the previously unexplored effects of changes in the strength of the European armies during this period. Herrmann's work provides not only a contribution to debates about the causes of the war but also an account of how the European armies adopted the new weaponry of the twentieth century in the decade before 1914, including quick-firing artillery, machine guns, motor transport, and aircraft.
In a narrative account that runs from the beginning of a series of international crises in 1904 until the outbreak of the war, Herrmann points to changes in the balance of military power to explain why the war began in 1914, instead of at some other time. Russia was incapable of waging a European war in the aftermath of its defeat at the hands of Japan in 1904-5, but in 1912, when Russia appeared to be regaining its capacity to fight, an unprecedented land-armaments race began. Consequently, when the July crisis of 1914 developed, the atmosphere of military competition made war a far more likely outcome than it would have been a decade earlier.
In a narrative account that runs from the beginning of a series of international crises in 1904 until the outbreak of the war, Herrmann points to changes in the balance of military power to explain why the war began in 1914, instead of at some other time. Russia was incapable of waging a European war in the aftermath of its defeat at the hands of Japan in 1904-5, but in 1912, when Russia appeared to be regaining its capacity to fight, an unprecedented land-armaments race began. Consequently, when the July crisis of 1914 developed, the atmosphere of military competition made war a far more likely outcome than it would have been a decade earlier.
322 pages, Paperback
First published November 28, 1995
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November 1, 2016
The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War by David G. Herrmann is a terrific addition to my library on World War One. I enjoyed this book and will be re-reading it again, more slowly, I am sure, in the coming year. Herrmann’s command of the facts is excellent and his ability to put things in a coherent order made it easier for me to grasp the points he made. I found the book very stimulating for several reasons; three of which were his thoroughness in including all major combatants, his connecting how the activities of one affected the activities of others, and in his detail helped me understand in a deeper fashion the pressures that brought the war preparations to the flashpoint.
Normally, an American is concerned with events in Western Europe, the trench warfare, and the struggle between Germans and the French, British, and eventually the Americans. But, Herrmann’s thorough appraisal of conditions existing in and the actions of Austria-Hungary helped me understand their creation of their part and participation in the crisis more understandable. In this thorough appraisal a number of perhaps unconnected but important points come out. I had always blamed Austria-Hungary for its inflexibility and aggressive behavior toward Serbia as the cause of the war. Germany, to me, was like the big brother who found himself in a fight against his will and was forced by duty into a savage and losing conflict. I never considered, although I may have read it in some other work and passed it by, that Germany always encouraged Austria-Hungary to be stubborn and intransigent. Germany did not believe Russia would fight.(120) It is this kind of thoroughness and insight that makes this book a good read.
Herrmann goes into detail about Germany’s paranoia and fear of, at least, a diplomatic encirclement. In fact, the paranoia of both Germany and Austria-Hungary played a significant part in the psychological buildup of the war. I had never considered in such a detailed way as proven by Herrmann that this fear was a driving motive for the conflict. These are building blocks in my understanding of how this war came about when it did. Herrmann presents them over the course of the book like pieces of a puzzle he masterfully crafts together so that someone like myself, at least, has several palm-slap-to-the-forehead moments where I said to myself, “Oh, I get it!”
One of the factors I did not know or if I had read about I simply dismissed as irrelevant was how European armies were customarily used. The idea that they were often used against their own populations in breaking strikes, acting as policemen, and suppressing civil disturbances, an idea that seems alien and disgusting today in America, is important I think. Herrmann uses this in terms of social control in a way to understand why people at first were so willing to be cannonfodder for the state. Of course, he does not say it in that way but what he says leads me to that conclusion as one of the answers to questions I have about how millions allowed such a thing to happen. The European was a slave to his country, ideals of patriotism, and notions of honor. My wife’s grandfather lost his ship and his fortune and fled to America when the Kaiser appropriated the ship in the first years of the twentieth century, the story is told in her family. The author opened up my mind to see the foundations of the modern European welfare state by the relationship between the European and his government and military. Herrmann brings all of these little points out in his thoroughness and these are just a few that make the book a joy for me to read.
Herrmann’s ability to connect the actions of one to the actions of others is extremely important. This might appear to be common sense but I do not think it is given the credit it deserves in many books on the war. Herrmann consistently hammers away at how European politics were, I would say in my words, a game of dominoes or a game of marbles. One action in the halls of one nation’s government collided with another government and actions and reactions went down the line until the behavior of player D could be followed backwards to the behavior of player A although no one could have foreseen it forward. One conclusion Herrmann’s research draws me into is that while the American president knows he is answerable in some measure to the people the European leaders of that time, particularly kings and high commands, viewed the people as simply a resource to use. I know that is a simplistic generalization but until I am disabused of the notion it is one conclusion that presents itself.
Herrmann did such a great job of pointing out how all of this military buildup was being watched keenly by all sides. Having never really considered the influence of military observers’ opinions about a potential rival or ally’s maneuvers and competence I was fairly intrigued by how Herrmann presented that point. The French consternation at watching the Germans catch up to their military superiority had to be great. Herrmann makes this so obvious. In any event, I think this is one of his strongest points. He clearly shows how one European marble (my analogy) struck others which struck others which struck others in a way that was not controllable or even foreseeable although many knew that eventually a “great war” was coming. They just could not predict when with any success which is why when it happened so many people seemed to be taken by surprise much as you know that your brakes are failing and cannot afford to replace them but still are not prepared for it when you crash your car.
Finally, it is in the details and in their application that Herrmann really showed me the immensity of this problem of the militarization of Europe. While numbers of machine gun bullets and yearly tank production lists can get tedious Herrmann does not weigh his reader down with that kind of information. It is a book of text, a narrative, not charts, with a few maps and a couple of brief appendices. Herrmann provides the reader with details but does not try to overwhelm him with page after page of charts and graphs. He provides detail and then conclusions so that the detail shows as having a point beyond itself. For instance, after discussing the comparative number of divisions, reserves, field guns etc. on page 221 he goes on the next page to say that any advantages and prewar calculations became so much rubbish, ground to powder, so to speak, in the war of national resources to come. He made it clearer to me that while the ability to wage such a war and the scope of its mass murder were a result of the buildup before 1914 that those conditions were replaced by newer technology and the will of nations to grind their young men into ground beef for four incredibly bloody years.
In conclusion, while a book like Herrmann’s and its focus, does not by necessity explain all that needs to be explained about how The Great War was able to happen as far as economics and history such as a work like Carroll Quigley’s Tragedy and Hope, that is not its purpose. Herrmann provided me with a deeper understanding of the whys and wherefores of the conflict. He writes in a way that is fast-paced for my reading and allows facts and conclusions to soak into my thinking. He provides facts but doesn’t belabor them. I really like that. I like his conclusions that were so well-written and thought-provoking. For instance, he makes it so much more clear than other authors about how the small, professional army of Great Britain basically vanished early in the war and how the hubris of European leaders led the way into the war. I suppose that the main reason I like this book is that it provided me with a fresh look at the war from an angle I had not used and in a way that led me to many “aha!” moments. That is the kind of history book that really grabs me even though I might draw conclusions that Herrmann never intended. So, I really like this book in case that was not apparent. It is going to be a book I will come to time and time again.
Normally, an American is concerned with events in Western Europe, the trench warfare, and the struggle between Germans and the French, British, and eventually the Americans. But, Herrmann’s thorough appraisal of conditions existing in and the actions of Austria-Hungary helped me understand their creation of their part and participation in the crisis more understandable. In this thorough appraisal a number of perhaps unconnected but important points come out. I had always blamed Austria-Hungary for its inflexibility and aggressive behavior toward Serbia as the cause of the war. Germany, to me, was like the big brother who found himself in a fight against his will and was forced by duty into a savage and losing conflict. I never considered, although I may have read it in some other work and passed it by, that Germany always encouraged Austria-Hungary to be stubborn and intransigent. Germany did not believe Russia would fight.(120) It is this kind of thoroughness and insight that makes this book a good read.
Herrmann goes into detail about Germany’s paranoia and fear of, at least, a diplomatic encirclement. In fact, the paranoia of both Germany and Austria-Hungary played a significant part in the psychological buildup of the war. I had never considered in such a detailed way as proven by Herrmann that this fear was a driving motive for the conflict. These are building blocks in my understanding of how this war came about when it did. Herrmann presents them over the course of the book like pieces of a puzzle he masterfully crafts together so that someone like myself, at least, has several palm-slap-to-the-forehead moments where I said to myself, “Oh, I get it!”
One of the factors I did not know or if I had read about I simply dismissed as irrelevant was how European armies were customarily used. The idea that they were often used against their own populations in breaking strikes, acting as policemen, and suppressing civil disturbances, an idea that seems alien and disgusting today in America, is important I think. Herrmann uses this in terms of social control in a way to understand why people at first were so willing to be cannonfodder for the state. Of course, he does not say it in that way but what he says leads me to that conclusion as one of the answers to questions I have about how millions allowed such a thing to happen. The European was a slave to his country, ideals of patriotism, and notions of honor. My wife’s grandfather lost his ship and his fortune and fled to America when the Kaiser appropriated the ship in the first years of the twentieth century, the story is told in her family. The author opened up my mind to see the foundations of the modern European welfare state by the relationship between the European and his government and military. Herrmann brings all of these little points out in his thoroughness and these are just a few that make the book a joy for me to read.
Herrmann’s ability to connect the actions of one to the actions of others is extremely important. This might appear to be common sense but I do not think it is given the credit it deserves in many books on the war. Herrmann consistently hammers away at how European politics were, I would say in my words, a game of dominoes or a game of marbles. One action in the halls of one nation’s government collided with another government and actions and reactions went down the line until the behavior of player D could be followed backwards to the behavior of player A although no one could have foreseen it forward. One conclusion Herrmann’s research draws me into is that while the American president knows he is answerable in some measure to the people the European leaders of that time, particularly kings and high commands, viewed the people as simply a resource to use. I know that is a simplistic generalization but until I am disabused of the notion it is one conclusion that presents itself.
Herrmann did such a great job of pointing out how all of this military buildup was being watched keenly by all sides. Having never really considered the influence of military observers’ opinions about a potential rival or ally’s maneuvers and competence I was fairly intrigued by how Herrmann presented that point. The French consternation at watching the Germans catch up to their military superiority had to be great. Herrmann makes this so obvious. In any event, I think this is one of his strongest points. He clearly shows how one European marble (my analogy) struck others which struck others which struck others in a way that was not controllable or even foreseeable although many knew that eventually a “great war” was coming. They just could not predict when with any success which is why when it happened so many people seemed to be taken by surprise much as you know that your brakes are failing and cannot afford to replace them but still are not prepared for it when you crash your car.
Finally, it is in the details and in their application that Herrmann really showed me the immensity of this problem of the militarization of Europe. While numbers of machine gun bullets and yearly tank production lists can get tedious Herrmann does not weigh his reader down with that kind of information. It is a book of text, a narrative, not charts, with a few maps and a couple of brief appendices. Herrmann provides the reader with details but does not try to overwhelm him with page after page of charts and graphs. He provides detail and then conclusions so that the detail shows as having a point beyond itself. For instance, after discussing the comparative number of divisions, reserves, field guns etc. on page 221 he goes on the next page to say that any advantages and prewar calculations became so much rubbish, ground to powder, so to speak, in the war of national resources to come. He made it clearer to me that while the ability to wage such a war and the scope of its mass murder were a result of the buildup before 1914 that those conditions were replaced by newer technology and the will of nations to grind their young men into ground beef for four incredibly bloody years.
In conclusion, while a book like Herrmann’s and its focus, does not by necessity explain all that needs to be explained about how The Great War was able to happen as far as economics and history such as a work like Carroll Quigley’s Tragedy and Hope, that is not its purpose. Herrmann provided me with a deeper understanding of the whys and wherefores of the conflict. He writes in a way that is fast-paced for my reading and allows facts and conclusions to soak into my thinking. He provides facts but doesn’t belabor them. I really like that. I like his conclusions that were so well-written and thought-provoking. For instance, he makes it so much more clear than other authors about how the small, professional army of Great Britain basically vanished early in the war and how the hubris of European leaders led the way into the war. I suppose that the main reason I like this book is that it provided me with a fresh look at the war from an angle I had not used and in a way that led me to many “aha!” moments. That is the kind of history book that really grabs me even though I might draw conclusions that Herrmann never intended. So, I really like this book in case that was not apparent. It is going to be a book I will come to time and time again.
March 31, 2023
I replied the other day to an online comment wondering about Britain's poor performance in WW2 by alluding to the deaths on the fields of Flanders. It's always important to understand why the Europeans of yore chose to turn out the lamps on their global importance and butcher themselves. Their decision erased millennia-old crowned houses and caused the deaths of millions as the European Great Powers ground themselves to dust in a war they had seen, in Neo-Darwinian style, as a desperate racial struggle.
Professor Herrmann in The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War writes that what tipped the scales was an atmosphere of intense competition among the land armies of European States amidst a series of diplomatic crises that established a sense of fatalism among the continent's statesmen.
The emergencies derived from the attempts by Austro-German leaders to extract diplomatic concessions from the Entente. The Berlin-Vienna axis were exploiting Russian military weakness after her defeat in the Russo-Japanese war. That policy's success was mixed, and their leadership soon devolved into a panic as they projected the balance of power swinging definitively against them. The cause of that envisioned swing was the restoration of Russian power and the concurrent increase in the military effectiveness of the irredentist Balkan States which emerged from the carcass of Ottoman Europe.
These conclusions are reached by analysing the military strengths of the European powers from 1904 to the eve of the Great War. A period that, all else aside, was a genuine technological paradigm shift in the history of warfare. One can't help but conclude that materiel determines the course of modern conflict and wonder how much room it leaves for the old standby of inspired generalship. The war went exactly how anyone reading about their final array would expect, even with the benefit of hindsight.
Light to read but dense with information. An excellent book!
Professor Herrmann in The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War writes that what tipped the scales was an atmosphere of intense competition among the land armies of European States amidst a series of diplomatic crises that established a sense of fatalism among the continent's statesmen.
The emergencies derived from the attempts by Austro-German leaders to extract diplomatic concessions from the Entente. The Berlin-Vienna axis were exploiting Russian military weakness after her defeat in the Russo-Japanese war. That policy's success was mixed, and their leadership soon devolved into a panic as they projected the balance of power swinging definitively against them. The cause of that envisioned swing was the restoration of Russian power and the concurrent increase in the military effectiveness of the irredentist Balkan States which emerged from the carcass of Ottoman Europe.
These conclusions are reached by analysing the military strengths of the European powers from 1904 to the eve of the Great War. A period that, all else aside, was a genuine technological paradigm shift in the history of warfare. One can't help but conclude that materiel determines the course of modern conflict and wonder how much room it leaves for the old standby of inspired generalship. The war went exactly how anyone reading about their final array would expect, even with the benefit of hindsight.
Light to read but dense with information. An excellent book!
November 23, 2013
Herrmann's Arming of Europe deals with the developments in weapons technology, tactics, army size and organization in the ten years leading up to World War One. Herrmann argues, convincingly, that it was the relative changes in the armies of Europe which provided one of the major triggers of the war. In 1905, the Russian army was not an effective war fighting force, having been so badly mauled during the Russo-Japanese War that it was recognized by all European powers that Russia could not intervene militarily in a crisis even if it wanted to. Germany and Austria-Hungary took advantage of this to force several situations in the Balkans to go their way, spurring Russia to begin a program of full-on military development, which in turn scared the Germans into the belief that they would have to fight Russia eventually and would have to do it sooner rather than later.
Herrmann also spends significant time on the tactical doctrines of the various powers, showing that leaders in all armies were indeed working to figure out the impact which machine guns and rapid firing artillery would have on the modern battlefield, though the conclusions they drew from the example of the Russo-Japanese War and the Boer War were mostly wrong.
The book will probably be of interest mainly to specialists, but I found it highly useful.
Herrmann also spends significant time on the tactical doctrines of the various powers, showing that leaders in all armies were indeed working to figure out the impact which machine guns and rapid firing artillery would have on the modern battlefield, though the conclusions they drew from the example of the Russo-Japanese War and the Boer War were mostly wrong.
The book will probably be of interest mainly to specialists, but I found it highly useful.
April 10, 2015
The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War by David G. Herrmann is a book that I was inclined to dislike from the outset, before even opening to the first pages. I am a self-proclaimed “cover snob” and the cover of this book does not make me want to pick it up to read it. Additionally, the title is uninspiring and actually makes me cringe. A discussion of the armaments leading up to the First World War does not sound like riveting material to someone who does not enjoy an undertaking about the intricacies of actual warfare. When choosing to read about war, I tend to lean more toward societal issues, outcomes, or personal accounts of wartime experiences. These seemingly cosmetic issues made this the book I was least looking forward to reading of all of the required selections for this past semester of my WWI class.
The one thing that I appreciated the most was the chronological progression of events leading up to the First World War. Herrmann covers European events from 1904 to 1914 which gives a sufficient and succinct overview of the time period. He breaks up his chapters into topical events, such as the First Moroccan Crisis and the Balkan Wars, while continuing to maintain his continuously forward progressing chronology. As a reader of history, when encountering a subject for the first time, I prefer to initially study it in its chronological order; a topical study I find more useful after I have a concrete understanding of the event itself. The chronology helps me to understand the progression of events that transpired and how each event contributed to the next. In presenting the decade proceeding the war, Herrmann helped to set the event of the war itself within the wider context of the increasingly militaristic atmosphere building in and around Europe.
I did find the material to be difficult to progress through and also rather dry. One thing that Herrmann is very adept at is providing a multitude of figures. He makes ample references to the numbers of howitzers, pieces of field artillery, and manpower headcounts that various belligerent nations had throughout the decade. While this information might be useful for relative comparisons of the participants, what it did was bog down the flow of the text and caused me to lose track of the real concepts being explored. There is an appendix at the back of the book which presents both peacetime and wartime troop strengths of the various nations. If this material is semi-important enough to be included as the only appendix material, is it necessary to rehash all of it again in the text? I do not think that this was the best way to utilize the page length or the appendices. Conversely, would it possibly have improved the flow of the text to include the tactical strengths of the nations as additional appendix material rather than presenting the raw numbers within the body of the work? I think so.
Overall, Herrmann adequately serves the objective that he set out to accomplish. He does show in depth how Europe increasingly armed itself in response to various events that transpired over the decade leading to the First World War. He also illustrates how seemingly minor events, such as the First Moroccan Crisis, in which nothing really transpired, served to amplify the path toward war. In these two goals, Herrmann succeeds. His style is where this book is flawed. It gets bogged down in specifics and numbers, which the average reader will likely not find any real purpose. While this information is indeed important, if presented in a way that supports the greater message of the book it would be more helpful. While The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War was not the terrible book I had in my mind from the outset, I can say that I certainly did not enjoy the experience of reading it.
This review was previously posted at The Maiden's Court blog.
The one thing that I appreciated the most was the chronological progression of events leading up to the First World War. Herrmann covers European events from 1904 to 1914 which gives a sufficient and succinct overview of the time period. He breaks up his chapters into topical events, such as the First Moroccan Crisis and the Balkan Wars, while continuing to maintain his continuously forward progressing chronology. As a reader of history, when encountering a subject for the first time, I prefer to initially study it in its chronological order; a topical study I find more useful after I have a concrete understanding of the event itself. The chronology helps me to understand the progression of events that transpired and how each event contributed to the next. In presenting the decade proceeding the war, Herrmann helped to set the event of the war itself within the wider context of the increasingly militaristic atmosphere building in and around Europe.
I did find the material to be difficult to progress through and also rather dry. One thing that Herrmann is very adept at is providing a multitude of figures. He makes ample references to the numbers of howitzers, pieces of field artillery, and manpower headcounts that various belligerent nations had throughout the decade. While this information might be useful for relative comparisons of the participants, what it did was bog down the flow of the text and caused me to lose track of the real concepts being explored. There is an appendix at the back of the book which presents both peacetime and wartime troop strengths of the various nations. If this material is semi-important enough to be included as the only appendix material, is it necessary to rehash all of it again in the text? I do not think that this was the best way to utilize the page length or the appendices. Conversely, would it possibly have improved the flow of the text to include the tactical strengths of the nations as additional appendix material rather than presenting the raw numbers within the body of the work? I think so.
Overall, Herrmann adequately serves the objective that he set out to accomplish. He does show in depth how Europe increasingly armed itself in response to various events that transpired over the decade leading to the First World War. He also illustrates how seemingly minor events, such as the First Moroccan Crisis, in which nothing really transpired, served to amplify the path toward war. In these two goals, Herrmann succeeds. His style is where this book is flawed. It gets bogged down in specifics and numbers, which the average reader will likely not find any real purpose. While this information is indeed important, if presented in a way that supports the greater message of the book it would be more helpful. While The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War was not the terrible book I had in my mind from the outset, I can say that I certainly did not enjoy the experience of reading it.
This review was previously posted at The Maiden's Court blog.
March 10, 2016
Excellent book explaining the mindset of Europeans prior to the start of WWI. His focus is the build-up of military and land armaments, rather than the naval race so often focused on.
December 11, 2018
If you’re looking for a book on crises in Europe leading up to WWI this is a good book but very detailed and historical in nature. Lots of information.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews