In the decades between the wars, the British Empire reached its greatest extent, encompassing some 13 million square miles and 450 million individuals. though the seeds of the Empire's imminent decline had already been sown, Britain stood at the major force in global affairs because of the dismemberment of the old European powers in the war and the isolation of the ascendant non-European powers of the United States and the Soviet Union. With no further territorial ambitions of its own, the British Empire took on the role of a modern "superpower," seeking through the judicious use of military force and through diplomacy and economic power to preserve the fragile stability of the world.
Examining Britain's performance in its interwar role as a superpower, The British Empire as a Superpower, 1919-39 is an exhaustive account of the means by which imperial goals were translated into reality. Anthony Clayton traces the evolution of British imperial policy from the emphasis upon policing and internal security in the 1920s to the accelerating need for rearmament in the face of an ever-increasing likelihood that war would break out anew. Providing a sense of the day-to-day operation of the complex and far-flung imperial mechanism, Clayton carefully details Britain's use of all the resources at its command, including warships, aircraft, armies, police forces, irregular soldiers, and the China concession city volunteers.
Despite its military strength and vast territories, Great Britain was not finally successful in its role as a superpower. Global presence is not the equivalent of global power, and the Empire had neither the resources nor the unity to maintain world order. But, Clayton argues, British policy and the daily conduct of its administrators and military forces were far more praiseworthy than has often been understood. The Empire acted the inter-war years as a force for peace, and the imperial record, while not unblemished, was allied to the pursuit of freedom and human dignity.
Anthony Clayton was Senior Lecturer at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst from 1965 until 1994. One of Britain's leading military historians, he earned a Diploma in French from the University Paris in 1947, a Master of Arts in History from the University St. Andrews in 1951, and a Doctor of Philosophy in History from the University St. Andrews in 1970. He was made a Chevalier dans l'Ordre des Palmes Academiques in 1988 in recognition of his expertise in French military history.
The irony of the title, as you read the book, is in the fact that Britain was stuck functioning as a superpower, but without the economic or demographic underpinnings that make being a superpower possible. The USA already had most of what it needed to be an actual superpower, but no stomach for the costs of maintaining the international political and economic system. So despite the cost of WWI and the fact that the economic and technological leads which had propelled Britain to hegemon status in the early 19th century were gone, London soldiered on, hoping for the best but knowing it was atop a house of cards. That's why the British establishment embraced Appeasement: they knew that confrontation would reveal that the Emperor had no clothes, and what benefits which still accrued to London as a trading center and to Britain as an imperial power were doomed if another world war broke out. Britain could function as a pseudo-superpower so long as the bullets didn't start flying. Maintaining this situation was the sine qua non of British statecraft in the interwar years. This is something that Churchill, who didn't have a clue about economics, never understood.