A History Of The Peninsular War: August 1813 to April 14, 1814; the Capture Of St. Sebastian, Wellington's Invasion of France, Battles of the Nivelle, The Nive, Orthez and Toulouse
Between August 1813 and the end of hostilities in April 1814, Napoleon's forces were finally expelled from the Iberian Peninsula. Wellington's army invaded southern France, only halting its operations when news was received of Napoleon's abdication. The events covered in this volume include the British siege and capture of St Sebastian; the final campaigning in eastern Spain; Wellington's invasion of France; and the last actions of the war in the Battle of Toulouse and the French sortie from Bayonne. A chapter on the place of the Peninsular War in history concludes Oman's monumental work.
Sir Charles William Chadwick Oman was a British military historian of the early 20th century. His reconstructions of medieval battles from the fragmentary and distorted accounts left by chroniclers were pioneering. His style is an invigorating mixture of historical accuracy and emotional highlights, and it makes his narratives, though founded on deep research, often read as smoothly as fiction, especially in his History of the Peninsular War. Occasionally, his interpretations have been challenged, especially his widely copied thesis that British troops defeated their Napoleonic opponents by firepower alone. Paddy Griffith, among modern historians, claims the British infantry's discipline and willingness to attack were equally important.
He was born in India, the son of a British planter, and was educated at Oxford University, where he studied under William Stubbs. In 1881 he was elected to a Prize Fellowship at All Souls College, where he would remain for the rest of his career.
He was elected the Chichele Professor of modern history at Oxford in 1905, in succession to Montagu Burrows. He was also elected to the FBA that year, serving as President of the Royal Historical and Numismatic societies, and of the Royal Archaeological Institute.
His academic career was interrupted by the First World War, during which he was employed by the government Press Bureau and Foreign Office.
Oman was a Conservative member of Parliament for the University of Oxford constituency from 1919 to 1935, and was knighted in 1920.
He became an honorary fellow of New College in 1936 and received the honorary degrees of DCL (Oxford, 1926) and LL.D (Edinburgh, 1911 and Cambridge, 1927). He died at Oxford.
Two of his children became authors. Son Charles wrote several volumes on British silverware and similar housewares. Daughter Carola was notable for her biographies, especially that of Nelson.
I've said it for every volume of the seven - this is the greatest work of history ever, period. It has depth and breadth of purpose and execution like no other work; and little likelihood anyone today would nor could follow this template. Unfortunately for Oman perhaps, the story tails off to a whimper rather than to a dramatic climax, but such is history and nothing can be done about it (unless one of those more modern historians who don't fear to make up a story when there is none to be told).
Toulouse is such an anti climax and probably one of Wellington's worst battles. However although this is no part of Oman's tale it may well be illustrative of the evolution of Wellington's military approach. From India through to Oporto there is the dash and daring. Talavera through to Torres Vedras is the cautious wait and see. Then Salamanca to the Vittoria the grand strategic envelopment, but yet limitations of subordinates fail to bring about complete destruction of the enemy (Ulm like). Thus Wellington (although it is very much Oman's case that questions of grand strategy and politics governed Wellington's action) - begins a series of offensives with strictly limited objectives, which constantly give Soult time to recover and fight again. What would the Wellington of India have made of 1814? Surely the multiple opportunities to annihilate Soult would have cleared the southern front of one lot of potential enemies forever, regardless of whether Napoleon himself might have been freed to return with vengeance?! Yet even when Wellington makes a weak attempt to to finish it after Orthez he pulls his punches and lets Soult slip away to Toulouse.
Nevertheless to stories of the Bidassoa, the Nivelle and the Nive rivers are masterful battles, told masterfully. The skill with which Wellington manages these assaults should be text books for all modern warfare. Wellington is the master, but yet there another story - the utter superiority of the British infantry so that even when there is a misstep - say St Sebastian, sheer doggedness prevails. Oman has something to say about tactical superiority and of course Wellington's handling of this potent instrument (never better demonstrated than in the contrast between Wellington's success at Busacco compared with Soults failure on Mont Rave at Toulouse), but says less of the moral superiority. It ought to have been enough to bring utter despair to any French general when no matter what they do, they can't win - even Schwarzenberg like it wouldn't have worked to avoid Wellington and attack where-ever he wasn't.
Yet of course that Barbarian horde, led by rapid adventurers bent only on their personal aggrandizement which the revolution bequeathed to France could not think. Nevertheless it remained a dangerous monster until the very end. There are many more stories to be told of the Peninsular war and the people, but this truly is the consummate History of that conflict - and Oman's knows the difference.
If like me a private interested individual, this whole work by this author is a must read. It is very detailed but compelling range of words, sometimes too many details BUT unable to leave it before the final page.