Postmodernism has always been a slippery concept for me to get hold of. At one point, I had a simple equation where postmodernism equals relativism. Reading Hans Bertens’ intriguing The Idea of the Postmodern: A History provided both a wide-angle lens and a zoom feature to the movement, but also demonstrated in vivid fashion why I always felt inadequate when approaching the concept.
Part of my problem is that I often associated the movement with critics and observers, like Susan Sontag, who never actually used the word. Indeed, I was surprised to see that there were only 21 references to the word in major U.S. newspapers during 1960, blossoming to 116 in 1984, and reaching 247 by 1987 (p. 11). I have always been used to hearing the word used primarily as an adjective as in “postmodern world,” but Bertens asserts from early on that it is not the world that is postmodern, it is the perspective (p. 9).
Bertens summarizes early positions such as those of Charles Olson and the Black Mountain Poets who primarily identified postmodernism with French “new literary criticism” and Heidiggerean anti-Englightenment positions because they believed that current western thought was over-intellectualized (pp. 19-20). Hence, there was a deconstructionist slant to the early critics, even though many postmodernists don’t believe that deconstructionists went quite far enough. As Ibn Hassad argued, the postmodern disorder and attack on form in the arts and literature was an attempt to recover human innocence (p. 24).
So, I quickly came to discover that whether in art, literature, philosophy, politics, or sociology, postmodernism’s primary center was a distrust of anything unifying except diversity in order to both destroy any perceived hegemonies associated with these fields and provide opportunity for a fresh, innocent start for humanity. Yet, this very ideal, so attractive to me in terms of art, literary analysis, and the consideration of truth (I know postmodernists would argue against my usage here.) becomes very problematic when it reaches the point of culture-building, society-building, world-building, or even finding anchor points for one’s own life. One can only celebrate the chaos for so long before becoming weary and I believe I can demonstrate that for postmodernism using the material from Bertens’ book. But if you don’t like my approach, I apologize in advance. I’m using the personal perspective because I read the book for personal reasons.
Part of my criticism of the overall perspective is congruent with Daniel Bell’s famous attack on postmodernism as being both narcissistic and hedonistic (p. 30). This is probably necessary when the aesthetics of postmodernism can be described as both anti-psychological and anti-myth (p. 68). The problem with destroying and denying the metanarrative, the centralizing truth or essence of life, is that it opens the gate to pure subjectivism and makes consensus and cooperation exceedingly difficult if not impossible. This is highlighted in the chapter on postmodernism and politics where Bertens observes that the breakdown of the idea of representation allows a more diverse and open approach to shape nearly anything, but the destruction of legitimation undermines the entire idea of a cohesive macro-politic (p. 180). And it is reiterated in the chapter on postmodernism and sociology when Bertens cites Mike Featherstone (popularly known for his works on consumer culture) as stating that the hedonism of the postmodernists is a “calculating hedonism” which provides for a “controlled de-control” and, as a result, becomes the prerogative of a particular class that is well-educated, affluent, and urban (although a watered-down version may be available to the general population, p. 206).
That is my warning about postmodernism as a perspective for social change. I believe it is doomed to failure. The rejection of myth in favor of objectness (p. 31) has been assumed in order to free individuals for more of an immediate experience of the world. In this perspective, Bertens cites Alan Wilde as observing that postmodern writers don’t seek to understand the world as much as accept it (p. 73). There is a certain refreshing quality to that perspective, but carried forward to its extreme extrapolation, it can engender a stilted equilibrium and defeatism.
Bertens reveals some of this when he speaks of the political implications. In seeing, as did the art critics of the ‘80s, representation as a coded perspective on those who held power, there came to be a use of Foucauld's ideas about representation to move toward Marxist ideology (pp. 79-80). The irony of this, of course, is that with w/ postmodern critics venerating and idealizing minority or 3rd World representation as part of their emphasis on diversity and anti-western power structures is that it may not lead to the progressive political expression they expect, it may lead to a regressive, dominating right wing regime (p. 98).
So, what then do I see as positive in the perspective? I think postmodernism has value because, unless extrapolated to its most extreme positions, it works against the complacency of the empirical-theoretical world as well as that of the mystical-spiritual world. By resisting the idea of knowable Truth, postmodernism reminds humanity that everyone may be blind men touching different aspects of the elephant. No one can grasp all of the Truth enough to become satisfied. One must keep exploring, experimenting and examining on the basis of logic and experience in order to get a fuller knowledge of what might be Truth. This is important to me because I am a Theist. I believe that there is Truth, but I don’t believe humanity is capable of grasping all of it. Authentic postmodernists won’t buy that, but it means that I can appreciate some of their ideas. But when they say that the real (my emphasis) can only be presented as it is not, since it is a priori not representable (pp. 88, 208), they are speaking my language—even if they don’t realize it. If they are going to posit something “real,” there can be “Truth,” even if it isn’t totally representable.
Second, I was attracted to Jurgen Habermas’ valiant (and probably futile, but worth attempting) effort to recognize that capitalism combined with dominance of the empirical-theoretical viewpoint in modern society has created means-end manipulation as opposed to integrated values (pp. 112, 115). So, he created his idea of “communicative rationality” to advocate using the very structure of language as a procedural rationality to arrive at a communication that “…does not serve other interests than those of perfecting itself, of creating absolutely unimpeded communication.” (p. 112) By using this procedural rationality to adjudicate competing truth claims, Habermas believes it possible to create a philosophy of intersubjectivity resulting in communication and consensus (p. 112). As I noted at the beginning of this paragraph, I’m not sure that can be done, but it is a noble experiment worth testing.
Third, I appreciate two extremely insightful sentences in Bertens’ concluding chapter. They read, “Knowing that universals inevitably violate the rights of the particular, we yet want a universal rule to protect the particular from the possibly universalizing aspirations of other particulars. In practice, we oscillate between universalist and particularist positions, in a dialectic, which, in the last twenty-five years, has not been unsuccessful in the field of concrete practical politics—at least where I live—but that theoretically cannot be resolved.” (pp. 232-233)
Hans Bertens’ The Idea of the Postmodern: A History is extremely useful in terms of understanding the various permutations and ramifications of the postmodernist movement(s). I feel like anyone who reads it will gain a better hold on the slippery subject, but like the subject itself, it will still remain slippery.