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Race, Gender, and Science
Is Science Multicultural? Postcolonialisms, Feminisms, and Epistemologies
Is Science Multicultural? explores what the last three decades of European/American, feminist, and postcolonial science and technology studies can learn from each other. Sandra Harding introduces and discusses an array of postcolonial science studies, and their implications for "northern" science. All three science studies strains have developed in the context of post-World War II science and technology projects. They illustrate how technoscientific projects mean different things to different groups. The meaning attached by the culture of the West may not be shared or may be diametrically opposite in the cultures in other parts of the world. All, however, would agree that scientific projects―modern science included―are "local knowledge systems." The interests and discursive resources that the various science studies bring groups to their projects, and the ways that they organize the production of their kind of science studies, are distinctively culturally-local also. While their projects may be unintentionally converging, they also conflict in fundamental respects.
How is this inevitable cultural-situatedness of knowledge both an invaluable resource as well as a limitation on the advance of knowledge about nature? What are the distinctive resources that the feminist and postcolonial science theorists offer in thinking about the history of modern science; the diversity of "scientific" traditions in non-European as well as in European cultures; and the directions that might be taken by less androcentric and Eurocentric scientific projects? How might modern sciences' projects be linked more firmly to the prodemocratic yearnings that are so widely voiced in contemporary life? Carefully balancing poststructuralist and conventional epistemological resources, this study concludes by proposing new directions for thinking about objectivity, method, and reflexivity in light of the new understandings developed in the post-World War II world.
How is this inevitable cultural-situatedness of knowledge both an invaluable resource as well as a limitation on the advance of knowledge about nature? What are the distinctive resources that the feminist and postcolonial science theorists offer in thinking about the history of modern science; the diversity of "scientific" traditions in non-European as well as in European cultures; and the directions that might be taken by less androcentric and Eurocentric scientific projects? How might modern sciences' projects be linked more firmly to the prodemocratic yearnings that are so widely voiced in contemporary life? Carefully balancing poststructuralist and conventional epistemological resources, this study concludes by proposing new directions for thinking about objectivity, method, and reflexivity in light of the new understandings developed in the post-World War II world.
256 pages, Paperback
First published May 1, 1991
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About the author
Sandra G. Harding
57 books47 followersSandra G. Harding was an American philosopher of feminist and postcolonial theory, epistemology, research methodology, and philosophy of science. She directed the UCLA Center for the Study of Women from 1996 to 2000, and co-edited Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society from 2000 to 2005. Until her deceassed, she was a Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Education and Gender Studies at UCLA and a Distinguished Affiliate Professor of Philosophy at Michigan State University. In 2013 she was awarded the John Desmond Bernal Prize by the Society for the Social Studies of Science (4S).
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September 13, 2013
1 1/2 stars. There are so many things wrong with this work. I'll give a proper review when my laptop is fixed.
Okay, my laptop is fixed, so here we go. Before I begin, however, it's worth getting it out of the way that Harding once made the accusation that Principia Mathematica, Issac Newton's magnum opus, was a "rape manual." Apparently she later "regretted" making such a statement, but that's just an idea of where she's coming from.
Before I start the criticism, I'll just mention the few aspects of this work that I appreciate. First, it's important to integrate external and internal perspectives in the philosophy of science in explaining the success of modern science. That's very much true. It's also a fascinating question to understand the relationship and impact that European expansionism had on the "Scientific Revolution." Both of these are fine points. That's about where anything positive about this book ends, sadly.
Harding begins early with her definition of science, which she describes as any systematic "knowledge system." This definition is so vague as to be worthless, as it includes literally just about anything a culture happens to practice. These "knowledge systems" are ultimately "local," she maintains, in that they all use their own idiosyncratic methods. Yet, she fails to mention anything about the process of adequately comparing these various methods, and just why the methods of modern science are so obviously superior. Furthermore, the knowledge itself is certainly not "local," which takes most the strength out of this observation. Saying the knowledge is "represented" differently does no good, either, as it's a trivial point. For example, a German scientist may provide their results in German, and an English scientist may provide their results in English, and these would qualify as different "representations." But so what? If translations between representations are possible (and they are) then the "local" aspect is only superficial. Interestingly, the obvious question is left unaddressed, too. That is, if knowledge systems are, indeed, local, then how exactly is it possible for one knowledge system to extract knowledge from another knowledge system, and then integrate it into its own system? No discussion is provided.
Attached to this notion of "local" knowledge is, of course, epistemological relativism, which she vehemently denies her position entails. Her argument as to why her argument doesn't result in relativism? Oh, that's right--there's none given. It's simply stated as such.
Harding does discuss the apparent power of other knowledge systems, and she gives the example of acupuncture. This was developed, she states, without the aid of the methods of modern European science, and acupuncture has been proven successful in treating, say, pain. But she fails to mention that the only reason why we know it's successful--that it isn't just one giant placebo--is because it has been verified by the methods of modern European science!
Toward the second half of the work Harding begins to talk about standpoint theory and "feminist science." Now, let's just be clear: There's no such thing as "feminist science." There are only feminists doing science. Trying to understand varying perspectives, and then using those perspectives in deciding which questions need to be asked, or how to ask them, doesn't make "feminist science" or "Jewish science" or "American science." Trying to figure out how to ask the right questions is simply one aspect of science as a whole. For any given topic there is a fact of the matter, and that fact is not feminist or northern or rural or conservative. There are only theories that are more or less well supported by the evidence, regardless of the perspective one happens to take.
Standpoint theory doesn't seem to alter traditional epistemology too much, anyway. As Harding describes it, the position is limited to the context of discovery, leaving the context of justification (the domain of traditional philosophy of science) untouched.
The different experiences of different groups of people, moreover, do not create different "sciences." Men and woman may differ in their experience of certain drugs, but science describes from the third-person perspective. There are no "male" psychopharmacologies or "female" psychopharmacologies. There are only people trying to understand the effect of drugs as objectively as possible. If there were, indeed, different sciences, then the number of sciences would be practically infinite, as people can be divided into any number of groups we choose.
I could say more, but only one last thing. Harding also mentions science and value neutrality, which she, of course, is against. Clearly science uses epistemic values, and values can guide the research we choose, but the knowledge science produces is (granted, in ideal cases) value free. We can look at prime examples in physics, chemistry, physiology, etc. for knowledge that lacks all but epistemic value (it can certainly be employed for practical value, though). Harding's case is simple but wrong: Value neutrality is itself a value, so science is not value free. Well, yeah, but everyone freely admits that science uses epistemic values, and value neutrality is itself an epistemic value, so there's no conflict here. The debate centers around the effect and role of non-epistemic values in knowledge and method.
Avoid this work.
Okay, my laptop is fixed, so here we go. Before I begin, however, it's worth getting it out of the way that Harding once made the accusation that Principia Mathematica, Issac Newton's magnum opus, was a "rape manual." Apparently she later "regretted" making such a statement, but that's just an idea of where she's coming from.
Before I start the criticism, I'll just mention the few aspects of this work that I appreciate. First, it's important to integrate external and internal perspectives in the philosophy of science in explaining the success of modern science. That's very much true. It's also a fascinating question to understand the relationship and impact that European expansionism had on the "Scientific Revolution." Both of these are fine points. That's about where anything positive about this book ends, sadly.
Harding begins early with her definition of science, which she describes as any systematic "knowledge system." This definition is so vague as to be worthless, as it includes literally just about anything a culture happens to practice. These "knowledge systems" are ultimately "local," she maintains, in that they all use their own idiosyncratic methods. Yet, she fails to mention anything about the process of adequately comparing these various methods, and just why the methods of modern science are so obviously superior. Furthermore, the knowledge itself is certainly not "local," which takes most the strength out of this observation. Saying the knowledge is "represented" differently does no good, either, as it's a trivial point. For example, a German scientist may provide their results in German, and an English scientist may provide their results in English, and these would qualify as different "representations." But so what? If translations between representations are possible (and they are) then the "local" aspect is only superficial. Interestingly, the obvious question is left unaddressed, too. That is, if knowledge systems are, indeed, local, then how exactly is it possible for one knowledge system to extract knowledge from another knowledge system, and then integrate it into its own system? No discussion is provided.
Attached to this notion of "local" knowledge is, of course, epistemological relativism, which she vehemently denies her position entails. Her argument as to why her argument doesn't result in relativism? Oh, that's right--there's none given. It's simply stated as such.
Harding does discuss the apparent power of other knowledge systems, and she gives the example of acupuncture. This was developed, she states, without the aid of the methods of modern European science, and acupuncture has been proven successful in treating, say, pain. But she fails to mention that the only reason why we know it's successful--that it isn't just one giant placebo--is because it has been verified by the methods of modern European science!
Toward the second half of the work Harding begins to talk about standpoint theory and "feminist science." Now, let's just be clear: There's no such thing as "feminist science." There are only feminists doing science. Trying to understand varying perspectives, and then using those perspectives in deciding which questions need to be asked, or how to ask them, doesn't make "feminist science" or "Jewish science" or "American science." Trying to figure out how to ask the right questions is simply one aspect of science as a whole. For any given topic there is a fact of the matter, and that fact is not feminist or northern or rural or conservative. There are only theories that are more or less well supported by the evidence, regardless of the perspective one happens to take.
Standpoint theory doesn't seem to alter traditional epistemology too much, anyway. As Harding describes it, the position is limited to the context of discovery, leaving the context of justification (the domain of traditional philosophy of science) untouched.
The different experiences of different groups of people, moreover, do not create different "sciences." Men and woman may differ in their experience of certain drugs, but science describes from the third-person perspective. There are no "male" psychopharmacologies or "female" psychopharmacologies. There are only people trying to understand the effect of drugs as objectively as possible. If there were, indeed, different sciences, then the number of sciences would be practically infinite, as people can be divided into any number of groups we choose.
I could say more, but only one last thing. Harding also mentions science and value neutrality, which she, of course, is against. Clearly science uses epistemic values, and values can guide the research we choose, but the knowledge science produces is (granted, in ideal cases) value free. We can look at prime examples in physics, chemistry, physiology, etc. for knowledge that lacks all but epistemic value (it can certainly be employed for practical value, though). Harding's case is simple but wrong: Value neutrality is itself a value, so science is not value free. Well, yeah, but everyone freely admits that science uses epistemic values, and value neutrality is itself an epistemic value, so there's no conflict here. The debate centers around the effect and role of non-epistemic values in knowledge and method.
Avoid this work.
December 1, 2012
Admittedly, I did not read this entire book. I would love to do so, but there simply isn't time. What I have read, the chapters about science and feminist epistemologies, was very good. It's not something everyone will pick up, and not something to pick up just because (though I would), since it is dense and theoretical, but I would recommend if if you are interested in feminism and science.
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