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How to Defend Australia
A brilliant and important book about Australia’s future. Can Australia defend itself in the Asian century? How seriously ought we take the risk of war? Do we want to remain a middle power? What kind of strategy, and what Australian Defence Force, do we need? In this groundbreaking book, Hugh White considers these questions and more. With exceptional clarity and frankness, he makes the case for a reconceived defence of Australia. Along the way he offers intriguing insights into history, technology and the Australian way of war. Hugh White is the country’s most provocative, revelatory and yet realistic commentator on Australia’s strategic and defence orientation. In an age of power politics and armed rivalry in Asia, it is time for fresh thinking. In this controversial and persuasive contribution, White sets new terms for one of the most crucial conversations Australia needs to have.
343 pages, Kindle Edition
Published July 2, 2019
163 people are currently reading
341 people want to read
About the author
Hugh White
14 books14 followersLibrarian Note: There is more than one author in the Goodreads database with this name.
Hugh White (born 1953) is a Professor of Strategic Studies at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre of the Australian National University in Canberra, Australia, long time defence and intelligence analyst, and author who has published works on military strategy and international relations. He was Deputy Secretary for Strategy and Intelligence in the Australian Department of Defence from 1995 until 2000 and was the inaugural Director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). (Source: Wikipedia)
Hugh White (born 1953) is a Professor of Strategic Studies at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre of the Australian National University in Canberra, Australia, long time defence and intelligence analyst, and author who has published works on military strategy and international relations. He was Deputy Secretary for Strategy and Intelligence in the Australian Department of Defence from 1995 until 2000 and was the inaugural Director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). (Source: Wikipedia)
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Displaying 1 - 28 of 28 reviews
October 8, 2019
I would recommend this book to anyone wanting to understand Australian defence policy and the challenges it currently faces.
I worked for Hugh White, nearly 20 years ago now, when he was the deputy secretary responsible for strategy in the Australian Department of Defence. Thus many of the arguments were familiar to me, but with an important twist – what if Australia cannot rely on the United States as the ultimate guarantor or its security when confronted with a much more powerful China.
White’s answer I that we need to spend much more on defence to provide an independent capability to resist China, in particular building our maritime denial capabilities (manifested in a large submarine capability). Anything less would fail to provide meaningful security, and may even reduce it.
The rise of China as a major power was not totally a surprise. It was identified as far back as the 1994 Defence White Paper – at a time Australia’s exports to China were still less than those to (still British) Hong Kong or Taiwan. But dealing with China was left as a problem for the United States, too distant from Australia to really be a worry. This approach seemed perfectly rational at the time. My observation is that even two decades ago was that a war with China was going to be too hard. Should Australia end up in a war with China, it would be as an ally of the United States – and a minor partner at that.
Nor is the thought that the United States might flirt with isolationism all that new. For most of the time that the US has existed it has sought to distance itself from the world’s problems, arriving late for both the world wars. While the Cold War drew the US into the role of protector of the free world, it has also demonstrated that there is a limit to which it was prepared to support its erstwhile allies. The Republic of China 1949, Cuba (Bay of Pigs) 1961, South Vietnam 1975, Lebanon 1983, Somalia 1991 and the Syrian Kurds 2019 stand as examples. For Australia, much of our strategy has been to build the depth of our relationship so that we would not be easily abandoned – and to present any adversary at least the very real risk that the United States might intervene on Australia’s side.
White’s argument starts with proposition that Australian defence spending has to be based on defending Australia without having to rely on the combat forces of any other nation. This proposition seems powerfully intuitive, but neglects the fact that most Australian military commitments have been to promote security more broadly. From the 1970s through to recent years, Hugh White points out the direct threat was Indonesia; essentially (rather implausibly) a rerun of Konfrontasi (1963-66) but directed Southwards. White argues that a Chinese threat is now a more credible yardstick for developing the self-reliant defence of Australia.
While White steps through his arguments carefully, at the end they remain unconvincing. Why should we consider a Chinese attack on Australia as sufficiently likely that we need to significantly increase defence spending? In 1942, the Japanese Army thought invasion of Australia was infeasible – and geography would put the same constraints on China. A large submarine fleet is useful if your opponent is a maritime power, but is not much use otherwise. It seems likely that Australia will be drawn into conflicts in the Pacific islands or the Middle East (much as it has in the past), even if these conflicts do not threaten Australian sovereignty – and submarines here are largely irrelevant.
Ultimately, strategic planning involves assessing and prioritising risks. For a middle power, it is not possible to address every threat. There needs to be a choice based on the significance, likelihood and capacity to respond to various threats. White’s book will at least provoke some thinking on these issues.
I worked for Hugh White, nearly 20 years ago now, when he was the deputy secretary responsible for strategy in the Australian Department of Defence. Thus many of the arguments were familiar to me, but with an important twist – what if Australia cannot rely on the United States as the ultimate guarantor or its security when confronted with a much more powerful China.
White’s answer I that we need to spend much more on defence to provide an independent capability to resist China, in particular building our maritime denial capabilities (manifested in a large submarine capability). Anything less would fail to provide meaningful security, and may even reduce it.
The rise of China as a major power was not totally a surprise. It was identified as far back as the 1994 Defence White Paper – at a time Australia’s exports to China were still less than those to (still British) Hong Kong or Taiwan. But dealing with China was left as a problem for the United States, too distant from Australia to really be a worry. This approach seemed perfectly rational at the time. My observation is that even two decades ago was that a war with China was going to be too hard. Should Australia end up in a war with China, it would be as an ally of the United States – and a minor partner at that.
Nor is the thought that the United States might flirt with isolationism all that new. For most of the time that the US has existed it has sought to distance itself from the world’s problems, arriving late for both the world wars. While the Cold War drew the US into the role of protector of the free world, it has also demonstrated that there is a limit to which it was prepared to support its erstwhile allies. The Republic of China 1949, Cuba (Bay of Pigs) 1961, South Vietnam 1975, Lebanon 1983, Somalia 1991 and the Syrian Kurds 2019 stand as examples. For Australia, much of our strategy has been to build the depth of our relationship so that we would not be easily abandoned – and to present any adversary at least the very real risk that the United States might intervene on Australia’s side.
White’s argument starts with proposition that Australian defence spending has to be based on defending Australia without having to rely on the combat forces of any other nation. This proposition seems powerfully intuitive, but neglects the fact that most Australian military commitments have been to promote security more broadly. From the 1970s through to recent years, Hugh White points out the direct threat was Indonesia; essentially (rather implausibly) a rerun of Konfrontasi (1963-66) but directed Southwards. White argues that a Chinese threat is now a more credible yardstick for developing the self-reliant defence of Australia.
While White steps through his arguments carefully, at the end they remain unconvincing. Why should we consider a Chinese attack on Australia as sufficiently likely that we need to significantly increase defence spending? In 1942, the Japanese Army thought invasion of Australia was infeasible – and geography would put the same constraints on China. A large submarine fleet is useful if your opponent is a maritime power, but is not much use otherwise. It seems likely that Australia will be drawn into conflicts in the Pacific islands or the Middle East (much as it has in the past), even if these conflicts do not threaten Australian sovereignty – and submarines here are largely irrelevant.
Ultimately, strategic planning involves assessing and prioritising risks. For a middle power, it is not possible to address every threat. There needs to be a choice based on the significance, likelihood and capacity to respond to various threats. White’s book will at least provoke some thinking on these issues.
December 24, 2024
Got some weird looks in the staffroom when I was reading this on lunch break
Want to read
July 7, 2019..
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{Not a Review}
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My notes:
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Seen in Paul Monk's review https://www.theaustralian.com.au/arts...
Paul Monk was the head of the 'China desk' at the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO). So he probably knows what he's talking about and think's Hugh White is full of it (which we knew anyway and I agree). Seems the DIO has churned out some half-decent analysts afterall ;-p
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..
.
{Not a Review}
..
.
..
My notes:
======++++++======
Seen in Paul Monk's review https://www.theaustralian.com.au/arts...
Paul Monk was the head of the 'China desk' at the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO). So he probably knows what he's talking about and think's Hugh White is full of it (which we knew anyway and I agree). Seems the DIO has churned out some half-decent analysts afterall ;-p
March 30, 2020
I think White is just a tongue in cheek reference to the text. The author only lacks the bed sheets to make a full Klan member.
February 3, 2024
National Defence
Outstanding book on national defense.
An inspiration for other Five Eyes Countries.
Amazing book on foreign policy and national defense.
Highly recommended book to learn more about how to defend against foreign influence, totalitarian regimes, intellectual property theft, espionage, and trade sanctions.
4.8/5
Outstanding book on national defense.
An inspiration for other Five Eyes Countries.
Amazing book on foreign policy and national defense.
Highly recommended book to learn more about how to defend against foreign influence, totalitarian regimes, intellectual property theft, espionage, and trade sanctions.
4.8/5
August 16, 2021
Excellent book and both very timely and very essential. As I've been personally and professionally involved with Australia and Australians since the 1970s I have many reasons to care about its "health" as an Indio-Pacific country, particularly one having to deal with an increasingly encroaching and aggressive China. When Trump abandoned one of our greatest and most loyal historic allies and said to myself "Oh shit" at the same time as many in Australia were. Why? Many reasons, but the major one might have been the fact that the PLAN has been edging further and further into and inside Australian waterways while the PLA has launched successful cyberattacks against both Australia and New Zealand's parliaments. Add to that the fact that while both countries, but in this case the topic is Australia, have fought bravely and well beside US troops in conflicts other more "prominent" and bigger allies didn't bother (Vietnam anyone?) as well as possibly one of the greatest concerns -- the near-total lack of an Australian navy -- essential for maritime defense against the PLAN -- BECAUSE of their historic treaties/defense agreements with the US in which, among other things, since they really couldn't fund a large-scale (or medium) navy, nor likely defend what's basically a huge country/continent against a potentially dangerous and aggressive regional hegemony, they would both allow the US virtual free reign and would participate in the Five Eyes program -- something vital to the US in that region -- and not invest their federal budget in building a navy they A) couldn't afford and B) for a long time wasn't considered to be needed in exchange for America's promise that Australia would always be protected by the US nuclear stockpile only to find Trump literally going out of his way to insult the Australian prime minister in his first day in office and ultimately telling Australia "Screw you, you're on your own" while also advising other allies and protectorates, specifically South Korea and Japan, something similar while advising them to invest in a navy and even to consider pulling out of the NPT and going rogue nuke! AND to the shock of many, some influential Australians over the past five years publicly advocated exactly that, which is/was unthinkable since the US has led the way in essentially forcing all other countries (with the then-Soviet Union as sort of an ironic partner) that weren't already what would be considered "legally" nuclear (Britain, France and China, besides the US and Soviets) to sign the NPT which guaranteed each country would not ever build nuclear weapons ion exchange for unlimited aid in building and using nuclear power for energy by the US and the Soviets. Out of all of the global countries, if I recall without looking it up, virtually every country in the world with the exception of 3-4 (Israel, India, Pakistan and I keep thinking there was a fourth but I can't recall which it would have been, and it wasn't North Korea) who were harshly criticized and have been termed "illegal" in Pakistan and India building nuclear stockpiles while virtually everyone believes Israel has too -- there's tons of evidence to indicate that -- but Israel has steadfastly refused to ever comment or state yes or no when asked if they have nukes, so they are included in the list of "illegal" nuclear countries -- every other country in the world, all under intense pressure from both creators of the NPT, but especially the US, signed and through the present all (I believe) have publicly maintained their promises -- except North Korea, which pulled out of the NPT nearly 20 years ago and "went rogue" and have become a nuclear weapon nation. (Many don't know South Africa had secretly become one and even tested a nuke at a specific ocean location -- many believe with Israeli participation -- but for some reason, decided to ditch their nuclear weapons program and remain part of the NPT and of course everyone knows Iran is determined to become a nuclear country.). The point is, countries that did not sign, pulled out or otherwise have "illegally" become a nuclear weaponized country are typically viewed as pariahs and take heavy criticism. Thus the fact that some leading Australians were so freaked out about America abandoning Australia and yanking its "nuclear umbrella" with them while advising two other regional allies to build their own damn nukes (illegally) was and is unthinkable, especially for major US allies. Indeed, my colleague Sheila Smith of the Council on Foreign Relations, published an excellent book two years ago called "Japan Rearmed" in which, among issues discussed, is a fascinating description and analysis of the Article 9 dilemma Japan has always face since WW 2. Part of their constitution that we drafted, it forbids Japan from building a military of any size or strength to EVER become strong enough to be an aggressor and limits what and how much Japan CAN build -- with the promise that the US would always protect it. So like Australia, when Trump told them to go screw themselves and build their own (illegal) damn nukes, that threw their leaders into a tizzy because the entire country has always taken that part of the constitution very seriously due to what transpired in WW 2 (war guilt issues, much like was the case in Germany), and like Australia, they do not have a military equipped to defend itself against an extremely hostile China whose PLAA harasses them daily at an unbelievable rate. (The issue of aircraft carriers has become a hot topic regionally over the past half decade. The US has the most at 11, which is a decrease from a former 15, but all are old as hell, some are not remotely serviceable and even though over 50% of our budget goes to defense, it's not for aircraft carriers -- the Space Force is getting a lot of funding, as is the USAF. We effectively have at most a half dozen working carriers and they're largely obsolete when compared to what China is doing. First, few countries have any and those that do only have one or two. England has gotten great fanfare with its new carrier, currently leading a strike group in the SCS. China has had an old Russian POS, but when it decided it wanted to become a regional hegemony, it developed and funded a plan to starting building its own nuclear-powered carriers, the first of which was put into the ocean not long ago while another is either close to being finished or is. Thus, China currently has three, I believe, with the plan to have five by 2025. Essentially to compete with and beat the USN. And other regional countries? South Korea recently put its first one out to sea and Japan is building a couple of small mini-carriers. I think India may have one too. Australia? Essentially the only (mid)power in the region without any aircraft carriers. And for some reason, without the ability (or determination?) to build any. So Australia has become increasingly stressed out about this, to the point where they've been discussing buying two of the Japanese mini-carriers while converting a couple of their navy's ships into ones that can accommodate a few aircraft.)
I guess the point is, this book is not only relevant but critical to the present and future survability of Australia and it asks some very hard, very tough questions that will frankly embarrass some of Australia's leaders, but they needed to be brought up and Hugh White did so. For anyone who gives a crap about regional stability or about Australia's literal ability to defend itself AND possibly grow its military to the point where it can "compete" with its regional allies in S Korea and Japan for military capabilities -- all important while China continues on its 100 year plan to dominate if not control ... what ... the region? The world? Supplant a fading US while becoming the world's most dominant hegemony? The actions now finally being taken by the US, England, France and Germany, combined with defense agreements among regional states that have been bullied if not attacked already by China -- the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, India, etc. -- and the possibility more states may join forces to confront the CCP, PLAN, PLAA, etc., while it is still realistically possible to do so gives reason for hope to many regional states as well as, frankly, many global states and is necessary to not only defend Australia, but all of the Indio-Pacific if not the world itself. As I started to say, for anyone who gives a crap (and many if not most should), this is an essential book and certainly recommended.
I guess the point is, this book is not only relevant but critical to the present and future survability of Australia and it asks some very hard, very tough questions that will frankly embarrass some of Australia's leaders, but they needed to be brought up and Hugh White did so. For anyone who gives a crap about regional stability or about Australia's literal ability to defend itself AND possibly grow its military to the point where it can "compete" with its regional allies in S Korea and Japan for military capabilities -- all important while China continues on its 100 year plan to dominate if not control ... what ... the region? The world? Supplant a fading US while becoming the world's most dominant hegemony? The actions now finally being taken by the US, England, France and Germany, combined with defense agreements among regional states that have been bullied if not attacked already by China -- the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, India, etc. -- and the possibility more states may join forces to confront the CCP, PLAN, PLAA, etc., while it is still realistically possible to do so gives reason for hope to many regional states as well as, frankly, many global states and is necessary to not only defend Australia, but all of the Indio-Pacific if not the world itself. As I started to say, for anyone who gives a crap (and many if not most should), this is an essential book and certainly recommended.
November 9, 2019
Provides a very good history and insight into current defence policy.
June 16, 2024
American power is on the wane in Asia. China’s appetite for influence will increase along with its power, and it has shown itself willing to risk confrontation where America has not, making America look weak and China look strong. It is no longer clear that America accepts the risk of war with China to remain dominant in Asia. What do we want our armed forces to be able to do, if they must operate without America's help from now on? Hugh White seeks to answer this fundamental question in How to Defend Australia.
Traditionally, our armed forces have supported Australia’s “great and powerful friends” in their own (mis)adventures, even where our adversaries in these conflicts never posed a direct, credible threat to Australia (Imperial Japan in 1942 is the exception). Part 1 examines the threats we might face in coming decades and Part 2 identifies the strategic objectives we should pursue to mitigate them: (1) defending our continent, (2) preventing an adversary from establishing a base on our periphery, (3) forestalling aggression against friendly neighbours in maritime Southeast Asia, and (4) contributing meaningfully to a wider military coalition in a great-power war. Part 3 details the way in which Australia’s military must be dramatically restructured in order to meet these objectives (including massive naval expansion and a larger and more skilled expeditionary army to stabilise our closest neighbours). Finally, Part 4 discusses the immense costs imposed by White’s proposed changes, and how we might effectively lower them.
How To Defend Australia is a much-needed meditation on Australian grand strategy, and if White isn’t the godfather of the discipline, he is certainly its patient midwife. He acknowledges the low probability of a full-scale invasion of the Australian mainland, but we will not be the only state pursuing its strategic objectives in the Pacific and Southeast Asia: we may eventually confront an adversary powerful enough to counter us by applying pressure directly to our homeland. It is this last point that engenders the most controversial part of the book – White encourages the reader to consider, however distasteful, the reasons Australia might build nuclear weapons to offset the risk of nuclear blackmail by an adversary during a major conventional conflict. The book is neither alarmist nor complacent, and overall, White offers confronting answers to difficult questions with the clarity of an experienced analyst.
There is room for disagreement, or at least expanded discussion. Australia should influence issues with strong security dimensions, even without America -- space law, climate risk and AI governance, to name a few – but White prematurely dismisses “developments beyond the wider Asian region” as a potential fifth strategic interest. Hardware specialists may also roll their eyes at the exact equipment White recommends, although his underlying argument comfortably withstands these heckles from the peanut gallery. How To Defend Australia is a must-read, and could well inspire similarly sober analyses of Australia’s foreign, trade and development policies.
What, after all, do we want Australia to be able to do?
Traditionally, our armed forces have supported Australia’s “great and powerful friends” in their own (mis)adventures, even where our adversaries in these conflicts never posed a direct, credible threat to Australia (Imperial Japan in 1942 is the exception). Part 1 examines the threats we might face in coming decades and Part 2 identifies the strategic objectives we should pursue to mitigate them: (1) defending our continent, (2) preventing an adversary from establishing a base on our periphery, (3) forestalling aggression against friendly neighbours in maritime Southeast Asia, and (4) contributing meaningfully to a wider military coalition in a great-power war. Part 3 details the way in which Australia’s military must be dramatically restructured in order to meet these objectives (including massive naval expansion and a larger and more skilled expeditionary army to stabilise our closest neighbours). Finally, Part 4 discusses the immense costs imposed by White’s proposed changes, and how we might effectively lower them.
How To Defend Australia is a much-needed meditation on Australian grand strategy, and if White isn’t the godfather of the discipline, he is certainly its patient midwife. He acknowledges the low probability of a full-scale invasion of the Australian mainland, but we will not be the only state pursuing its strategic objectives in the Pacific and Southeast Asia: we may eventually confront an adversary powerful enough to counter us by applying pressure directly to our homeland. It is this last point that engenders the most controversial part of the book – White encourages the reader to consider, however distasteful, the reasons Australia might build nuclear weapons to offset the risk of nuclear blackmail by an adversary during a major conventional conflict. The book is neither alarmist nor complacent, and overall, White offers confronting answers to difficult questions with the clarity of an experienced analyst.
There is room for disagreement, or at least expanded discussion. Australia should influence issues with strong security dimensions, even without America -- space law, climate risk and AI governance, to name a few – but White prematurely dismisses “developments beyond the wider Asian region” as a potential fifth strategic interest. Hardware specialists may also roll their eyes at the exact equipment White recommends, although his underlying argument comfortably withstands these heckles from the peanut gallery. How To Defend Australia is a must-read, and could well inspire similarly sober analyses of Australia’s foreign, trade and development policies.
What, after all, do we want Australia to be able to do?
October 17, 2019
Most people would agree that after decades of US hegemony, the rise of Asia has made the world a more uncertain place and increased our strategic risks (the risk of a threat to Australia).
My first time reading about issues to deal with Australia's defence - most people would agree that some semblance of a defence force is necessary for a nation like ours (somewhere between no defence force at all and conscription of every living and breathing organism). White seeks to find out where the optimum balance between risk and capability exists - by define why we would need a defence force in the first place? what we would reasonably be expected to do? and how could we shape a defence force to carry out these tasks?
White argues that Australia has concentric layered strategic objectives starting from 1. being able to defend the continent 2. being able to maintain stability in our surrounding archipelagos to prevent the chance that anyone could establish bases from which to launch an attack on Australia 3. perhaps being able to support a coalition to counterbalance any emerging aggressive threats in South East Asia or 4. in the wider Asian region.
Also, White asserts that the current investments made by both Liberal and Labour parties in the past decade or so have kept analysis of these interests in mind. Australia should be making more investment into a maritime denial strategy - since we are an island nation and there is an asymmetry in the effectiveness of maritime control (having a navy that keeps a whole ocean safe) vs. maritime denial (having the means to stop enemies from establishing maritime control) i.e. it is easier to take down enemy ships rather than establishing maritime control with our own ships which would be vulnerable to the enemy's denial strategies.
White builds his argument from there.
Lots of additional notes/references that seem to promise a juicy read.
My first time reading about issues to deal with Australia's defence - most people would agree that some semblance of a defence force is necessary for a nation like ours (somewhere between no defence force at all and conscription of every living and breathing organism). White seeks to find out where the optimum balance between risk and capability exists - by define why we would need a defence force in the first place? what we would reasonably be expected to do? and how could we shape a defence force to carry out these tasks?
White argues that Australia has concentric layered strategic objectives starting from 1. being able to defend the continent 2. being able to maintain stability in our surrounding archipelagos to prevent the chance that anyone could establish bases from which to launch an attack on Australia 3. perhaps being able to support a coalition to counterbalance any emerging aggressive threats in South East Asia or 4. in the wider Asian region.
Also, White asserts that the current investments made by both Liberal and Labour parties in the past decade or so have kept analysis of these interests in mind. Australia should be making more investment into a maritime denial strategy - since we are an island nation and there is an asymmetry in the effectiveness of maritime control (having a navy that keeps a whole ocean safe) vs. maritime denial (having the means to stop enemies from establishing maritime control) i.e. it is easier to take down enemy ships rather than establishing maritime control with our own ships which would be vulnerable to the enemy's denial strategies.
White builds his argument from there.
Lots of additional notes/references that seem to promise a juicy read.
November 4, 2021
Hugh White posits that Australia’s armed forces are no longer fit-for-purpose due to the waning influence of the United States in the Asia Pacific. By hinting that we will be alone in the regions (at least militarily), he proposes a reconfigured army, navy, and air force that is primarily set up to deny territorial gain within the Asia Pacific and defend our strategic assets on the mainland. His thesis suggests that this will require significant spend and a once-in-a-century reimagining of what our armed forces should be set up to do.
White is clearly an accomplished communicator as this piece is easy to understand if you have no military background. He sets out his argument in a logical way and breaks down the book into key themes which helps focus the reader.
Considering the complexities covered in this book, it would have been really useful if he presented some of his arguments and data as tables and diagrams. This would certainly help when using the book as a reference after the first pass. That being said, it remains an approachable take on the future of Australia’s military presence.
White is clearly an accomplished communicator as this piece is easy to understand if you have no military background. He sets out his argument in a logical way and breaks down the book into key themes which helps focus the reader.
Considering the complexities covered in this book, it would have been really useful if he presented some of his arguments and data as tables and diagrams. This would certainly help when using the book as a reference after the first pass. That being said, it remains an approachable take on the future of Australia’s military presence.
August 28, 2020
White provides clarity on how Australia's current defence policy came about and where it's going wrong. While also charting a course for us to follow if we choose to become a middle power nation capable of independent defence in the future.
He shows how on our current path we'll likely remain stuck between a small power and middle power status, spending vast sums for little reward. And how as a nation we must decide if we're happy to become a small power (and there's no shame in that - many countries choose to be and save billions in spending), or if we're willing to spend, and more importantly design our defence strategy accordingly, to become a middle power.
I highly recommend this book to anybody wishing to become more informed with Australia's defence policies and choices.
He shows how on our current path we'll likely remain stuck between a small power and middle power status, spending vast sums for little reward. And how as a nation we must decide if we're happy to become a small power (and there's no shame in that - many countries choose to be and save billions in spending), or if we're willing to spend, and more importantly design our defence strategy accordingly, to become a middle power.
I highly recommend this book to anybody wishing to become more informed with Australia's defence policies and choices.
May 7, 2025
Excellent analysis of the defence dilemmas facing Australia now that the American alliance is failing, or at least we can't rely on it as much as we used to. It's a little dated now, being published in 2019, but the principles are still very relevannt.
We waste a lot of money buying hardware that's not relevant because we don't consider what sort of war we are likely to fight and what mix of weapons would be the most cost-effective to fight that sort of war. Too often we try to achieve a balanced force that could take on any situation from peacekeeping to a full scale invasion but we don't have the resources to do everything effectively. We need to prioritise.
Very well written and clearly and logically argued. A pleasure to read.
We waste a lot of money buying hardware that's not relevant because we don't consider what sort of war we are likely to fight and what mix of weapons would be the most cost-effective to fight that sort of war. Too often we try to achieve a balanced force that could take on any situation from peacekeeping to a full scale invasion but we don't have the resources to do everything effectively. We need to prioritise.
Very well written and clearly and logically argued. A pleasure to read.
October 25, 2020
White explains the advantages of strategic independence and why maritime denial is the key. The author explains why to achieves this we will need to spend both more and more efficiently in defence. Geography is certainly on our side but our demographics, when compared with the expected trajectories of our neighbours, are not that flash. The prose is very clear and can be easily followed by the lay reader. Strategic policy is indeed a fascinating and immediate discipline and White manages to make it very engaging. Four stars.
December 11, 2022
𝗦𝗵𝗼𝗿𝘁 𝗮𝗻𝘀𝘄𝗲𝗿: we can't, really.
Great book, if very grim. The concept of an isolated and relatively weak Australia is something we need to seriously consider and prioritise at the polling booth.
Paying $830 million for diesel submarines that will never arrive can't go unpunished when we may soon (or already do) have an enemy that currently commands 10 times our GDP and 70 times our population - and that is just one of the possible threats.
Great book, if very grim. The concept of an isolated and relatively weak Australia is something we need to seriously consider and prioritise at the polling booth.
Paying $830 million for diesel submarines that will never arrive can't go unpunished when we may soon (or already do) have an enemy that currently commands 10 times our GDP and 70 times our population - and that is just one of the possible threats.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
September 29, 2021
This book is essentially to Australia's defence policy what Gyngell's 'Fear of Abandonment' is to its foreign policy: readable, informative and methodical. It differs from Gyngell's work in how it looks more to the future than it does the past. In this regard, especially given recent developments, I found it particularly interesting.
May 20, 2023
basically humbled me on defence i thought i knew about war and conflict but its a lot more complex than it seems we have to rely less on america becuase its interests changr and it might not play a tole in our reigion so we have to be able to defend ourselves also its just good manners is china actually that bad
April 26, 2020
Not a bad book
Could do with more mathematics, graphs and information to back up more statements otherwise good questioning of a lot of rationale within the military establishment
Agree with the logic of a lot of his conclusions
Could do with more mathematics, graphs and information to back up more statements otherwise good questioning of a lot of rationale within the military establishment
Agree with the logic of a lot of his conclusions
November 7, 2019
A compelling, thought provoking publication, that I think should be required reading for all literate persons to form a qualitative debate on what is a very important question posed by the author.
April 19, 2020
Great book that really changed my thinking and understanding about where Australia sits in regards to its neighbours and the rest of the world in regards to defence
July 6, 2020
A very easy to read and detailed analysis of Australia's potential defense needs. It's an interesting and sobering read.
December 11, 2020
Overall, the author provides well grounded arguments on Australia's defence policy and dilemmas. The book is rather repetitive but it reinforces the core arguments.
February 14, 2021
Practical insight into Australian defence in the Asia-Pacific region, recommended
August 24, 2021
This was a great read. All about our current defense forces, and what we need to do to fend for ourselves possibly without the U.S.
April 25, 2023
An interesting read. What he talks about 5 years ago is actually happening now.
February 11, 2024
Good book, rare voice of reason up until the nuclear issue.
July 17, 2025
Solid. Doesn't pull punches and accessible for those not working in these circles.
August 6, 2020
Summary (SPOILER ALERT) 8/10 Worth the read!
1. Can we defend Australia from China on our own? - No.
2. Is there a risk of attack now? - No, but the threat is growing rapidly.
3. Is Australia a big power? - No, we are medium at best, slipping into small if we don't up our game.
4. Is the US our best alliance? - No, unreliable (look at Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan).
5. Do we need other alliances in the region? - Yes, and quickly.
6. What is the best way to defend Australia? - Sea/Air: Submarines and Aircraft. (Sadly, we purchased badly with our new bespoke submarines & the US will not sell us F-22 Raptors, so we have semi-optimal weapons - thanks US.)
7. Why not army? - Not effective, battle needs to be won at sea/air before hitting our shores.
8. Why don't we have aircraft carriers? - Not strategic, too expensive to run/maintain and can be sunk quickly; huge risk.
9. Nuclear weapons? - He said unsure. (l say no, makes us a target and not environmentally optimal.)
10. Is there going to be a big power shift in the APAC region? - HELL YES!
11. Does Australia need to spend money on military? - Yes.
1. Can we defend Australia from China on our own? - No.
2. Is there a risk of attack now? - No, but the threat is growing rapidly.
3. Is Australia a big power? - No, we are medium at best, slipping into small if we don't up our game.
4. Is the US our best alliance? - No, unreliable (look at Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan).
5. Do we need other alliances in the region? - Yes, and quickly.
6. What is the best way to defend Australia? - Sea/Air: Submarines and Aircraft. (Sadly, we purchased badly with our new bespoke submarines & the US will not sell us F-22 Raptors, so we have semi-optimal weapons - thanks US.)
7. Why not army? - Not effective, battle needs to be won at sea/air before hitting our shores.
8. Why don't we have aircraft carriers? - Not strategic, too expensive to run/maintain and can be sunk quickly; huge risk.
9. Nuclear weapons? - He said unsure. (l say no, makes us a target and not environmentally optimal.)
10. Is there going to be a big power shift in the APAC region? - HELL YES!
11. Does Australia need to spend money on military? - Yes.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
January 25, 2020
Hugh White's 'How to Defend Australia' provides clarity and insight into the key debates surrounding (or that should surround) Australia's defence policy. The structure of White's argument walks the reader through key questions that link the four parts of his overarching thesis, which I took to be that Australia needs to seriously reconsider what it needs to be able to defend itself from, and as a result, must re-design the force that is currently being procured (and fast).
Part geopolitics, part Realpolitik and grounded in an astute understanding of Australian politics and policy processes this book is a must-read for anyone who wants to understand the overarching questions that shape Defence policy in Australia and the key considerations discussed behind-closed-doors in Canberra. Further, the introduction to the language of defence policy is both clear and enlightening.
Although I am not necessarily convinced by all of White's arguments, I applaud this book as the most clearly articulated synthesis and synopsis of the key debates that underpin Australia's strategic outlook. A must-read for junior officers in the ADF.
Part geopolitics, part Realpolitik and grounded in an astute understanding of Australian politics and policy processes this book is a must-read for anyone who wants to understand the overarching questions that shape Defence policy in Australia and the key considerations discussed behind-closed-doors in Canberra. Further, the introduction to the language of defence policy is both clear and enlightening.
Although I am not necessarily convinced by all of White's arguments, I applaud this book as the most clearly articulated synthesis and synopsis of the key debates that underpin Australia's strategic outlook. A must-read for junior officers in the ADF.
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