What do you think?
Grouchy's Waterloo: The Battles of Ligny and Wavre
In this the third volume of his four-volume history exploring the French perspective of the Waterloo campaign, Andrew Field concentrates on an often neglected aspect of Napoleon’s final offensive – the French victory over the Prussians at Ligny, Marshal Grouchy’s pursuit of the Prussians and the battle at Wavre. The story of this side of the campaign is as full of controversy and interest as the battles of Quatre Bras and Waterloo which he has examined in such a penetrating and original way in his previous studies.
Napoleon in his memoirs accused Grouchy, like Marshal Ney, of a series of failures in command that led to the French defeat, and many subsequent historians have taken the same line. This is one of the long-standing controversies that Andrew Field explores in fascinating detail. Grouchy’s extensive description of his operations forms the backbone of the narrative, supplemented by other French sources and those of Prussian eyewitnesses.
Napoleon in his memoirs accused Grouchy, like Marshal Ney, of a series of failures in command that led to the French defeat, and many subsequent historians have taken the same line. This is one of the long-standing controversies that Andrew Field explores in fascinating detail. Grouchy’s extensive description of his operations forms the backbone of the narrative, supplemented by other French sources and those of Prussian eyewitnesses.
- GenresNonfiction
336 pages, Paperback
Published June 27, 2019
About the author
Andrew W. Field
10 books17 followersAndrew Field MBE is a former British army officer whose travels around the world have given him a unique opportunity to explore battlefields from ancient history to present times. He has always harboured a special fascination for the Napoleonic Wars. In particular he has reassessed Napoleon's campaigns in 1814 and 1815, and has carried out extensive research into Wellington's battles in the Peninsula. He has published articles on these topics and two notable books: Talavera: Wellington's First Victory in Spain and Waterloo: The French Perspective.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
March 12, 2019
I wish GR had 3.5 stars as a possibility for reviews. This would be an ideal book for that. The section on the battle of Ligny is good, but unfortunately Grouchy only really comes into his own during the 'pursuit' of the Prussians on the 17th and 18th of June. As a result, the first part of the book is Napoleon-oriented with Grouchy waiting on the sidelines, so to speak.
Since this is the third book in the series, much of the basic material is repeated to orient new readers although not to excess. Field wants the reader to understand what the French were thinking and doing in those critical June days so he liberally quotes from those who were there. The problem with that is that messages were delayed or were not helpful, which caused much confusion. This is especially true on the 18th when Grouchy's right wing found itself some distance from the main battlefield at Waterloo.
Probably the best part of the book is his summary in which the author goes over the various participants as well as what what they did right and wrong, It's rather ironic that Frenchmen died on the 18th/19th thinking that Napoleon had won. They could hear the battle, but could only assume the best until mid-morning.
I don't think this book is as good as the other two, partly because it needed more maps. And frankly, Grouchy's men, valiant though were in their efforts to carry out Napoleon's instructions, were part of a sideshow, a sideshow that could have turned the day around for the French. Instead, Grouchy (along with Ney) was blamed by many for the French defeat.
Since this is the third book in the series, much of the basic material is repeated to orient new readers although not to excess. Field wants the reader to understand what the French were thinking and doing in those critical June days so he liberally quotes from those who were there. The problem with that is that messages were delayed or were not helpful, which caused much confusion. This is especially true on the 18th when Grouchy's right wing found itself some distance from the main battlefield at Waterloo.
Probably the best part of the book is his summary in which the author goes over the various participants as well as what what they did right and wrong, It's rather ironic that Frenchmen died on the 18th/19th thinking that Napoleon had won. They could hear the battle, but could only assume the best until mid-morning.
I don't think this book is as good as the other two, partly because it needed more maps. And frankly, Grouchy's men, valiant though were in their efforts to carry out Napoleon's instructions, were part of a sideshow, a sideshow that could have turned the day around for the French. Instead, Grouchy (along with Ney) was blamed by many for the French defeat.
August 7, 2022
In this, the third of four books covering the Waterloo campaign from the French perspective, the focus is, as the title makes clear, on Grouchy, the newest and last of Napoleon's commanders to be raised to the exalted title of Marshal, and the skirmishes and two bigger battles he fought on Napoleon's right wing, during the Hundred Days campaign.
Inevitably there's also coverage of the other concurrent events, meaning some duplication of information with other titles in the series. But this is both inevitable, and indeed necessary, and for those sufficiently interested, more pleasure than chore.
In my recent review of Hussey's two-volume history of the Waterloo campaign I described Grouchy thus, 'until he learned of Napoleon's decisive defeat he was vacillating and cautious, most likely too in awe of his imperial master to act decisively on his own initiative. And yet once he knew France was militarily beaten, he suddenly rediscovered his leadership mojo'... And whilst I now have a much deeper, and more nuanced understanding of his actions in the campaign than I did then, thanks to this book, I think that judgement still stands.
This is a brilliant book, if, like me, you're obsessed by this colourful era, and, like me, your chief interest lies with the French. It's brilliant even if that's not the case. On my military history blog I dock half a star, but only because Field chooses to quote a lot of the official orders and similar correspondence in full, and these are sometimes a bit verbose, and between them include a lot of repetition. But here on GR I’ll go with five.
There is a reason for this verbosity, however, which has to do with the post Waterloo blame game, with Napoleon and his acolytes saying, a la Scooby-Doo, 'if it wasn't for those darned meddling kids (Grouchy and Ney), I'd have gotten away with it!' Quoting the correspondence in extenso might, one would’ve thought, help clarify whether orders were understood or not, and carried out properly or not, etc. That said, I’m not sure it does clarify much? Or if it clarifies anything it’s that the orders weren’t clear! The fog of war exists at many levels.
Ultimately Grouchy did fail Napoleon. And so did Ney. But then again, Napoleon was hoist by his own petard; he appointed them (and Soult was perhaps another unhappy choice for his particular role). And he played fast and loose with troop allocations throughout the campaign, which could amplify confusion and uncertainty.
The rickety chain of command, lack of clarity and promptitude in issuing orders, and the inherent style of Naploeon's leadership, which could cripple his subordinates ability to act well or decisively/independently - this clearly happened with Grouchy - all add up to a certain sense of inevitable failure. And that's before you even consider the bigger David vs Goliath picture, with a tired war-weary France facing a vastly superior international coalition.
All in all, another excellent chapter in Field's essential contribution to English language literature on this epoch-ending campaign, bringing much needed balance by looking at the French side of the story.
Inevitably there's also coverage of the other concurrent events, meaning some duplication of information with other titles in the series. But this is both inevitable, and indeed necessary, and for those sufficiently interested, more pleasure than chore.
In my recent review of Hussey's two-volume history of the Waterloo campaign I described Grouchy thus, 'until he learned of Napoleon's decisive defeat he was vacillating and cautious, most likely too in awe of his imperial master to act decisively on his own initiative. And yet once he knew France was militarily beaten, he suddenly rediscovered his leadership mojo'... And whilst I now have a much deeper, and more nuanced understanding of his actions in the campaign than I did then, thanks to this book, I think that judgement still stands.
This is a brilliant book, if, like me, you're obsessed by this colourful era, and, like me, your chief interest lies with the French. It's brilliant even if that's not the case. On my military history blog I dock half a star, but only because Field chooses to quote a lot of the official orders and similar correspondence in full, and these are sometimes a bit verbose, and between them include a lot of repetition. But here on GR I’ll go with five.
There is a reason for this verbosity, however, which has to do with the post Waterloo blame game, with Napoleon and his acolytes saying, a la Scooby-Doo, 'if it wasn't for those darned meddling kids (Grouchy and Ney), I'd have gotten away with it!' Quoting the correspondence in extenso might, one would’ve thought, help clarify whether orders were understood or not, and carried out properly or not, etc. That said, I’m not sure it does clarify much? Or if it clarifies anything it’s that the orders weren’t clear! The fog of war exists at many levels.
Ultimately Grouchy did fail Napoleon. And so did Ney. But then again, Napoleon was hoist by his own petard; he appointed them (and Soult was perhaps another unhappy choice for his particular role). And he played fast and loose with troop allocations throughout the campaign, which could amplify confusion and uncertainty.
The rickety chain of command, lack of clarity and promptitude in issuing orders, and the inherent style of Naploeon's leadership, which could cripple his subordinates ability to act well or decisively/independently - this clearly happened with Grouchy - all add up to a certain sense of inevitable failure. And that's before you even consider the bigger David vs Goliath picture, with a tired war-weary France facing a vastly superior international coalition.
All in all, another excellent chapter in Field's essential contribution to English language literature on this epoch-ending campaign, bringing much needed balance by looking at the French side of the story.
June 24, 2024
The Waterloo Campaign is rife with controversies, none more so than the role Marshal Grouchy may have played in Napoleon's defeat. This book offers an exhaustive examination of what transpired with the right wing of the French army from June 16-19 1815, looking closely at the actual orders sent by the major characters as well as first-hand accounts (albeit written, in many cases, years after the debacle). Field rightfully points out some of Grouchy's failings as a commander, but is careful to frame those within the context of the chain of command under an authoriatrian leader like Napoleon. He concludes that numerous persons played a part in this issue: Soult, Vandamme, Gerard, Pajol, but none more so than Napoleon himself. This is an excellent analysis of an oftern ignored feature of the Hundred Days.
October 24, 2019
Excellentl
Helps in understanding in detail with first hand accounts, the actions of Grouchy's command. Objective, and useful in coming to one's own opinions of the operations and decisions made in this wing of Napoleon's army.
Helps in understanding in detail with first hand accounts, the actions of Grouchy's command. Objective, and useful in coming to one's own opinions of the operations and decisions made in this wing of Napoleon's army.
August 22, 2019
This book is well researched and sheds light on some aspects of the campaign that are frequently overlooked from the perspective (French) that is often ignored. Field’s analysis and conclusion at the end are well presented, too. My biggest critique is that I would have liked a little more narrative explaining the events the events themselves; much of the book is made up of long block quotes, some of which could have been digested better by the author before being presented for the reader. Primary sources are a pivotal part of the process of writing history, but at points, it seems like Field could not decide between writing an historical narrative or presenting an anthology of primary source. Could stand for some more detailed maps, too. Nevertheless, it is well worth the read.
November 27, 2017
Very interesting interplay of the friction of war and commander's personalities.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews