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De iure belli ac pacis #1-3
The Rights of War and Peace: Including the Law of Nature and of Nations (Universal Classics Library, V. 1.)
The Rights of War and Peace establishes a system of international law based on the concept of natural law. Natural law, as Grotius describes it, is law that applies to all people, regardless of country or nationality. This law establishes concepts like "justifiable war" and "natural justice." Grotius discusses situations under which countries should go to war, and then further explains the proper way in which wars should be prosecuted. There are, he says, certain rules in warfare that must be observed, regardless of whether the parties involved have signed any specific agreement to do so. Philosophy and law students, as well as those with an interest in international politics, will be amazed at how modern many of Grotius's ideas seem and intrigued by this foray into international law that still has repercussions in the world today. HUGO GROTIUS (1583-1645) was born in the city of Delft in the Dutch Republic. Astoundingly intelligent, he entered the University of Leiden at age eleven and graduated at age fifteen. He was a philosopher and Christian apologist now remembered for his work in establishing a philosophical basis for international law.
423 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1625
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1015 people want to read
About the author
Hugo Grotius
552 books64 followersHugo Grotius [Hugo, Huigh or Hugeianus de Groot] was a towering figure in philosophy, political theory, law and associated fields during the seventeenth century and for hundreds of years afterwards. His work ranged over a wide array of topics, though he is best known to philosophers today for his contributions to the natural law theories of normativity which emerged in the later medieval and early modern periods.
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November 23, 2015
Regime Change, 1970's Style
I first encountered the 17th century philosopher Hugo Grotius in 1978, when I briefly studied the international law and political philosophy with respect to unilateral declarations of independence (UDI's) and what has since become known as "regime change".
There was a UDI on 11 November, 1965 in Rhodesia. Soon after, legal cases started to emerge in which there were jurisdictional issues about what government, what courts and what laws were applicable immediately after the declaration.
I was particularly interested in these issues, because exactly ten years later on 11 November, 1975 (towards the end of my first year at university in Canberra) Australia experienced its own version of an extra-parliamentary regime change, in which Malcolm Fraser replaced Gough Whitlam as Prime Minister, after his dismissal by the Governor-General, Sir John Kerr. (I had dinner with Gough and a number of other students in October, when he was quite bullish about his prospects of enduring the crisis.)
Many speculated (and still speculate) that there was some CIA involvement in the regime change. There was a precedent. Two years earlier in Chile, President Salvador Allende was ousted in a coup d'état staged with CIA support.
The CIA has subsequently been complicit in coups in Honduras and Venezuela, amongst many others.
De Facto Control
Coups have become part of contemporary Realpolitik.
Following any coup d'état, there is always a question with respect to the legitimacy of the new government.
Theoretically, there is a distinction between "de jure" and "de facto" control of a state.
Historically, the concept of de jure control reflected the reliance of the concept of sovereignty on the divine as the source of legitimate power and authority. If the new government doesn't derive its power from this source, it cannot be legitimate. The original government remains de jure.
However, as recent events such as these showed, de jure control means nothing in the absence of de facto control.
There inevitably comes a point when de facto control manifests itself as de jure control.
The old government can only pretend it's in control and still legitimate for so long.
Now, arguably, a coup d'état just needs to survive to become legitimate.
These arguments are influenced by the thinking of Grotius, who created a learned moral calculus of war and peace in 1625.
GROTIUS' MORAL CALCULUS OF WAR AND PEACE:
What is War?
Cicero styled war a contention by force.
What Constitutes the Justice of War?
Any thing is unjust, which is repugnant to the nature of society, established among rational creatures. Thus for instance, to deprive another of what belongs to him, merely for one’s own advantage, is repugnant to the law of nature.
Florentinus, the Lawyer, maintains that is impious for one man to form designs against another, as nature has established a degree of kindred amongst us. On this subject, Seneca remarks that, as all the members of the human body agree among themselves, because the preservation of each conduces to the welfare of the whole, so men should forbear from mutual injuries, as they were born for society, which cannot subsist unless all the parts of it are defended by mutual forbearance and good will.
Natural Right
Natural right is the dictate of right reason, shewing the moral turpitude, or moral necessity, of any act from its agreement or disagreement with a rational nature, and consequently that such an act is either forbidden or commanded by God, the author of nature.
Civil Right
The civil right is that which is derived from the civil power. The civil power is the sovereign power of the state.
The Law of Nations
But the law of nations is a more extensive right, deriving its authority from the consent of all, or at least of many nations.
War Between Sovereign Powers
No war is considered to be lawful, regular, and formal, except that which is begun and carried on by the sovereign power of each country.
Declarations of War
To make a war just, according to this meaning, it must not only be carried on by the sovereign authority on both sides, but it must also be duly and formally declared, and declared in such a manner, as to be known to each of the belligerent powers.
The Sovereign’s Subjects
A declaration of war, made against a sovereign, includes not only his own subjects, but all who are likely to become his associates, as thereby they make themselves accessories in the war.
Just Causes of War
The justifiable causes generally assigned for war are three, defence, indemnity, and punishment.
Means of War
Wars, for the attainment of their objects, it cannot be denied, must employ force and terror as their most proper agents.
Alternatives to War
There are three methods, by which independent nations may settle their disputed rights without coming to the decision of the sword.
The first method is that of conference.
The other method is that of compromise, which takes place between those, who have no common judge.
A third method of terminating disputes, without hostilities, was by lot.
Nearly related to the last named method is that of single combat, a practice recommended under the idea that by the risque of two lives a quarrel might be decided, which would otherwise have cost the blood of thousands.
Destruction and Rapine
War “will authorise mutual acts of destruction and rapine.”
Mutual Annoyance
The annoyance of an enemy, either in his person or property, is lawful.
This right extends not only to the power engaged in a just war, and who in her hostilities confines herself within the practice established by the law of nature, but each side without distinction has a right to employ the same means of annoyance.
Killing an Enemy
To kill a public enemy, or an enemy in war is no murder.
The persons of natural-born subjects, who owe permanent allegiance to a hostile power may, according to the law of nations, be attacked, or seized, wherever they are found.
Even women and children are frequently subject to the calamities and disasters of war.
There is nothing repugnant to the law of nature in spoiling the effects of an enemy, whom by the same law we are authorized to kill.
Nor does the law of nations, in itself, considered apart from other duties, which will be mentioned hereafter, make any exemption in favour of things deemed sacred.
Conquest of Lands
Lands are not understood to become a lawful possession and absolute conquest from the moment they are invaded. For although it is true, that an army takes immediate and violent possession of the country which it has invaded, yet that can only be considered as a temporary possession, unaccompanied with any of the rights and consequences alluded to in this work, till it has been ratified and secured by some durable means, by cession, or treaty.
Now land will be considered as completely conquered, when it is inclosed or secured by permanent fortifications, so that no other state or sovereign can have free access to it, without first making themselves masters of those fortifications.
Surrender
After a place has surrendered, and there is no danger to be apprehended from the prisoners, there is nothing to justify the further effusion of blood.
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
Article 2 (4)
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
Article 2 (7)
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state...
Article 39
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Article 51
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
SYRIA 2015
Grotius analysed war from the point of natural law, rational laws that didn't necessarily have to derive their authority from divine law.
Much of his analysis is relevant to issues that confront us today in Syria:
* on what basis can one state start a war against another?
* must a war be based on a just cause?
* what is a just cause?
* must there be a formal declaration of war?
* if there is effectively a civil war in the other nation, which party is in control and has sovereign power?
* can you attack an opposition or rebel group without compromising the sovereignty of the legitimate government?
* do you need the consent of the sovereign government to attack a rebel group on its territory?
* if the opposition or rebel group is in de facto control of a particular area within the territory, does it become a government or state in its own right?
* does this allow another state to attack that group without the consent of the legitimate government, even if that government wishes to regain control of that territory?
* how are these concepts of natural law affected by the United Nations Charter?
* does the resolution of the UN Security Council about ISIS expressly or implicitly condone military action?
* is the motive of ousting the Assad regime an act of war? Does it make the intervention an unjust war insofar as it concerns the Assad regime (as opposed to ISIL)?
Mourning Becomes the War, Mourning Becomes the Law
...so now, the West is at war. We're at war...
Well, of course we're at war, even if we haven't formally declared it yet (so that we must comply with the laws of warfare). We haven't stopped being at war since the beginning of the twentieth century (or was it the nineteenth century?)...
One of the problems is that recently we've got used to fighting wars with technology: planes, drones, no men on the ground, except perhaps proxy combatants...
We're used to fighting the Other, but more importantly, we've got used to fighting the Other Elsewhere.
During the First and Second World Wars, we experienced war on our own territory, in our own streets, in our own neighbourhoods, close to our own homes.
The Other still experiences this Elsewhere, only the Other has decided to bring our war on its territory to our neighbourhood.
The moment war emerged from the trenches and from being fought by professional combatants, the real victims of a decision to declare war have been the innocents, the civilians.
Whether or not these innocents sympathise with the combatants, they don't deserve death or injury or destruction or involvement, not on their territory, nor on ours. They don't deserve to be collateral damage.
We should grieve for the innocent victims of war, wherever they suffer, whoever they sympathise with.
We have forgotten what it means to suffer on our own territory, what it means to be shot and killed by a ricocheting bullet while at a desk in our own home.
The Other who suffers Elsewhere has decided it is time to bring the experience of war, the experience of suffering to our neighbourhood.
This is what war has become, this is what war is like. We can't hide, as if innocent, behind technology and proxy combatants and mere training and supply of armaments to opposition or rebel groups.
We can't continue to manufacture and supply the weapons of war and feign innocence.
If we are at war, we are guilty of being at war.
We have to acknowledge that, if we participate in a war, anywhere, that war will be brought home to us, onto our territory, adjacent to our terraces, outside our cafes and bars, close to our homes, no matter how secure our borders.
This is the way wars will be fought in the 21st century. Not on computers alone.
People suffer, values are implicitly attacked. Ours as well as theirs.
For whom do we grieve? Only our innocents? Or their innocents as well?
How little do we ask why this war is being fought at all.
We are no more civilised than where and how and why we fight our wars.
SOUNDTRACK:
[For Those who Danced Too Briefly
to the Music of Time]
Jackson Browne - "For A Dancer"
Lyrics:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=78AVc...
Live:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IU1rZ...
I first encountered the 17th century philosopher Hugo Grotius in 1978, when I briefly studied the international law and political philosophy with respect to unilateral declarations of independence (UDI's) and what has since become known as "regime change".
There was a UDI on 11 November, 1965 in Rhodesia. Soon after, legal cases started to emerge in which there were jurisdictional issues about what government, what courts and what laws were applicable immediately after the declaration.
I was particularly interested in these issues, because exactly ten years later on 11 November, 1975 (towards the end of my first year at university in Canberra) Australia experienced its own version of an extra-parliamentary regime change, in which Malcolm Fraser replaced Gough Whitlam as Prime Minister, after his dismissal by the Governor-General, Sir John Kerr. (I had dinner with Gough and a number of other students in October, when he was quite bullish about his prospects of enduring the crisis.)
Many speculated (and still speculate) that there was some CIA involvement in the regime change. There was a precedent. Two years earlier in Chile, President Salvador Allende was ousted in a coup d'état staged with CIA support.
The CIA has subsequently been complicit in coups in Honduras and Venezuela, amongst many others.
De Facto Control
Coups have become part of contemporary Realpolitik.
Following any coup d'état, there is always a question with respect to the legitimacy of the new government.
Theoretically, there is a distinction between "de jure" and "de facto" control of a state.
Historically, the concept of de jure control reflected the reliance of the concept of sovereignty on the divine as the source of legitimate power and authority. If the new government doesn't derive its power from this source, it cannot be legitimate. The original government remains de jure.
However, as recent events such as these showed, de jure control means nothing in the absence of de facto control.
There inevitably comes a point when de facto control manifests itself as de jure control.
The old government can only pretend it's in control and still legitimate for so long.
Now, arguably, a coup d'état just needs to survive to become legitimate.
These arguments are influenced by the thinking of Grotius, who created a learned moral calculus of war and peace in 1625.
GROTIUS' MORAL CALCULUS OF WAR AND PEACE:
What is War?
Cicero styled war a contention by force.
What Constitutes the Justice of War?
Any thing is unjust, which is repugnant to the nature of society, established among rational creatures. Thus for instance, to deprive another of what belongs to him, merely for one’s own advantage, is repugnant to the law of nature.
Florentinus, the Lawyer, maintains that is impious for one man to form designs against another, as nature has established a degree of kindred amongst us. On this subject, Seneca remarks that, as all the members of the human body agree among themselves, because the preservation of each conduces to the welfare of the whole, so men should forbear from mutual injuries, as they were born for society, which cannot subsist unless all the parts of it are defended by mutual forbearance and good will.
Natural Right
Natural right is the dictate of right reason, shewing the moral turpitude, or moral necessity, of any act from its agreement or disagreement with a rational nature, and consequently that such an act is either forbidden or commanded by God, the author of nature.
Civil Right
The civil right is that which is derived from the civil power. The civil power is the sovereign power of the state.
The Law of Nations
But the law of nations is a more extensive right, deriving its authority from the consent of all, or at least of many nations.
War Between Sovereign Powers
No war is considered to be lawful, regular, and formal, except that which is begun and carried on by the sovereign power of each country.
Declarations of War
To make a war just, according to this meaning, it must not only be carried on by the sovereign authority on both sides, but it must also be duly and formally declared, and declared in such a manner, as to be known to each of the belligerent powers.
The Sovereign’s Subjects
A declaration of war, made against a sovereign, includes not only his own subjects, but all who are likely to become his associates, as thereby they make themselves accessories in the war.
Just Causes of War
The justifiable causes generally assigned for war are three, defence, indemnity, and punishment.
Means of War
Wars, for the attainment of their objects, it cannot be denied, must employ force and terror as their most proper agents.
Alternatives to War
There are three methods, by which independent nations may settle their disputed rights without coming to the decision of the sword.
The first method is that of conference.
The other method is that of compromise, which takes place between those, who have no common judge.
A third method of terminating disputes, without hostilities, was by lot.
Nearly related to the last named method is that of single combat, a practice recommended under the idea that by the risque of two lives a quarrel might be decided, which would otherwise have cost the blood of thousands.
Destruction and Rapine
War “will authorise mutual acts of destruction and rapine.”
Mutual Annoyance
The annoyance of an enemy, either in his person or property, is lawful.
This right extends not only to the power engaged in a just war, and who in her hostilities confines herself within the practice established by the law of nature, but each side without distinction has a right to employ the same means of annoyance.
Killing an Enemy
To kill a public enemy, or an enemy in war is no murder.
The persons of natural-born subjects, who owe permanent allegiance to a hostile power may, according to the law of nations, be attacked, or seized, wherever they are found.
Even women and children are frequently subject to the calamities and disasters of war.
There is nothing repugnant to the law of nature in spoiling the effects of an enemy, whom by the same law we are authorized to kill.
Nor does the law of nations, in itself, considered apart from other duties, which will be mentioned hereafter, make any exemption in favour of things deemed sacred.
Conquest of Lands
Lands are not understood to become a lawful possession and absolute conquest from the moment they are invaded. For although it is true, that an army takes immediate and violent possession of the country which it has invaded, yet that can only be considered as a temporary possession, unaccompanied with any of the rights and consequences alluded to in this work, till it has been ratified and secured by some durable means, by cession, or treaty.
Now land will be considered as completely conquered, when it is inclosed or secured by permanent fortifications, so that no other state or sovereign can have free access to it, without first making themselves masters of those fortifications.
Surrender
After a place has surrendered, and there is no danger to be apprehended from the prisoners, there is nothing to justify the further effusion of blood.
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
Article 2 (4)
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
Article 2 (7)
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state...
Article 39
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Article 51
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
SYRIA 2015
Grotius analysed war from the point of natural law, rational laws that didn't necessarily have to derive their authority from divine law.
Much of his analysis is relevant to issues that confront us today in Syria:
* on what basis can one state start a war against another?
* must a war be based on a just cause?
* what is a just cause?
* must there be a formal declaration of war?
* if there is effectively a civil war in the other nation, which party is in control and has sovereign power?
* can you attack an opposition or rebel group without compromising the sovereignty of the legitimate government?
* do you need the consent of the sovereign government to attack a rebel group on its territory?
* if the opposition or rebel group is in de facto control of a particular area within the territory, does it become a government or state in its own right?
* does this allow another state to attack that group without the consent of the legitimate government, even if that government wishes to regain control of that territory?
* how are these concepts of natural law affected by the United Nations Charter?
* does the resolution of the UN Security Council about ISIS expressly or implicitly condone military action?
* is the motive of ousting the Assad regime an act of war? Does it make the intervention an unjust war insofar as it concerns the Assad regime (as opposed to ISIL)?
Mourning Becomes the War, Mourning Becomes the Law
...so now, the West is at war. We're at war...
Well, of course we're at war, even if we haven't formally declared it yet (so that we must comply with the laws of warfare). We haven't stopped being at war since the beginning of the twentieth century (or was it the nineteenth century?)...
One of the problems is that recently we've got used to fighting wars with technology: planes, drones, no men on the ground, except perhaps proxy combatants...
We're used to fighting the Other, but more importantly, we've got used to fighting the Other Elsewhere.
During the First and Second World Wars, we experienced war on our own territory, in our own streets, in our own neighbourhoods, close to our own homes.
The Other still experiences this Elsewhere, only the Other has decided to bring our war on its territory to our neighbourhood.
The moment war emerged from the trenches and from being fought by professional combatants, the real victims of a decision to declare war have been the innocents, the civilians.
Whether or not these innocents sympathise with the combatants, they don't deserve death or injury or destruction or involvement, not on their territory, nor on ours. They don't deserve to be collateral damage.
We should grieve for the innocent victims of war, wherever they suffer, whoever they sympathise with.
We have forgotten what it means to suffer on our own territory, what it means to be shot and killed by a ricocheting bullet while at a desk in our own home.
The Other who suffers Elsewhere has decided it is time to bring the experience of war, the experience of suffering to our neighbourhood.
This is what war has become, this is what war is like. We can't hide, as if innocent, behind technology and proxy combatants and mere training and supply of armaments to opposition or rebel groups.
We can't continue to manufacture and supply the weapons of war and feign innocence.
If we are at war, we are guilty of being at war.
We have to acknowledge that, if we participate in a war, anywhere, that war will be brought home to us, onto our territory, adjacent to our terraces, outside our cafes and bars, close to our homes, no matter how secure our borders.
This is the way wars will be fought in the 21st century. Not on computers alone.
People suffer, values are implicitly attacked. Ours as well as theirs.
For whom do we grieve? Only our innocents? Or their innocents as well?
How little do we ask why this war is being fought at all.
We are no more civilised than where and how and why we fight our wars.
SOUNDTRACK:
[For Those who Danced Too Briefly
to the Music of Time]
Jackson Browne - "For A Dancer"
Lyrics:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=78AVc...
Live:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IU1rZ...
May 16, 2013
De Jure Belli ac Pacis means On the Justice of War and Peace in Greek. This is a kinda weird book, as far as books go, but pretty worthwhile in the end. The plot starts out real slow at first, and the characters are distant and hard to relate to. You really have to get used to Grotius' style, which is a little outdated because he was a Roman, and he references tons of Roman and other examples to bolster his arguments, sometimes even like 20 pages of examples, and by the end, you're like, OK I get it dude, Jesus said it was ok to have wars, or whatever. This book is really long, but I feel like in olden times, people maybe just wrote longer books, and you have to be patient about that because they say a lot of good stuff when you give them a chance.
Grotius' main point is that there is a natural law in the world which governs even how countries have wars with each other, even though while they're having the war, it seems like they might not be governed by any laws at all, so many people have argued that there is no such law. But this natural law is not based on God or anything subjective or controversial like that (although God is cool with it). It's based on two things: the universally observable human impulse to defend himselves when he is under attack, and the equally universal fact that humans are sociable and want to live together. The first part justifies why war is justified in the first place, because we have a right to defend ourselves when we're attacked. But the second is really cool, because it limits the extent to which we can do the first part, so that we can't just do whatever we want in self-defense, like Mr. Tom Hobbes says thousands of years later, but we can only defend ourself to the degree that our defense promotes sociability, or maintains our society as a whole. That still means we can do a lot of badass stuff in war though.
I'm not sure if I buy Grotius ultimately, because it's really hard to make countries follow laws when they are in wars and there is no way to hold them to the laws, or they feel existential about a particular war and conclude that they have to do whatever it takes to win it or be totally crushed, like what happened to the land of Carthage in Grotius' time. But for the most part, I feel like Grotius is really good to read when you get tired of some of the edgier authors in this genre like Bodin and Hobbes, because he has a more moderate idea about what a country's self-interest is, and thinks that laws about contract and property can be extrapolated from within a country to govern relations among countries. Especially for people who care about international law and human rights nowadays, it's really important for them to justify that without relying on different subjective religions, and if you think that Grotius' justifications are not that good, you need to think about whether you have any better ones.
Grotius' main point is that there is a natural law in the world which governs even how countries have wars with each other, even though while they're having the war, it seems like they might not be governed by any laws at all, so many people have argued that there is no such law. But this natural law is not based on God or anything subjective or controversial like that (although God is cool with it). It's based on two things: the universally observable human impulse to defend himselves when he is under attack, and the equally universal fact that humans are sociable and want to live together. The first part justifies why war is justified in the first place, because we have a right to defend ourselves when we're attacked. But the second is really cool, because it limits the extent to which we can do the first part, so that we can't just do whatever we want in self-defense, like Mr. Tom Hobbes says thousands of years later, but we can only defend ourself to the degree that our defense promotes sociability, or maintains our society as a whole. That still means we can do a lot of badass stuff in war though.
I'm not sure if I buy Grotius ultimately, because it's really hard to make countries follow laws when they are in wars and there is no way to hold them to the laws, or they feel existential about a particular war and conclude that they have to do whatever it takes to win it or be totally crushed, like what happened to the land of Carthage in Grotius' time. But for the most part, I feel like Grotius is really good to read when you get tired of some of the edgier authors in this genre like Bodin and Hobbes, because he has a more moderate idea about what a country's self-interest is, and thinks that laws about contract and property can be extrapolated from within a country to govern relations among countries. Especially for people who care about international law and human rights nowadays, it's really important for them to justify that without relying on different subjective religions, and if you think that Grotius' justifications are not that good, you need to think about whether you have any better ones.
March 4, 2023
Шикарная книга, наконец-то я её прочитал. Лучше поздно чем никогда. Я бы, правда, заметил, что она скорее должна была называться "Право: мир и война", поскольку от 2/3 до 3/4 её всё же посвящено миру. Тут сразу видна чистая эмпиризм Гуго де Грота: если убрать из книги все цитаты античных и современных автору писателей, то книга, вероятно просядет на 9/10. Впрочем сам объём использованной литературы поражает, практически весь корпус античных писателей, многочисленные богословские труды, римское право и комментарии к нему, труды древних и современных автору историков. И это в мире где ещё не было поиска по тексту. Очень редко автор ссылается на современную ему практику. И очень часто его мысль скрыта за многочисленными цитатами. Решается титаническая задача: как найти право, когда никакого права нет? Внутри государства право есть, но что делать вне государства или когда само государство оказывается не-правовой ситуации, что есть война. Где есть право между государствами? Ответить на этот вопрос было тяжело, что древним писателям, что во времена Гроция, когда Европа содрогалась от 30-летней войны. Да и можно ли сейчас сказать, что все эти вопросы отошли в историю? Тем не менее, что раньше, что сейчас многие полагают, что есть какое-то естественное право, которое существует помимо государственных законов, и когда законы молчат - можно найти право и справедливость. Не сказать чтобы мы сильно продвинулись в этом вопросе , но я считаю, что исследования естественного права ius naturale это сейчас самая важная и перспективная доктрина правовой теории и её будущим исследователям важно иметь под рукой эту книгу Грота.
Жаль, что на русский пока не переведены другие книги Гроция и надеюсь на их появление (впрочем, что-то есть на английском). Вообще работы юристов 16-18 века интересный и малоисследованный у нас материал.
Жаль, что на русский пока не переведены другие книги Гроция и надеюсь на их появление (впрочем, что-то есть на английском). Вообще работы юристов 16-18 века интересный и малоисследованный у нас материал.
July 18, 2025
I was extremely surprised by how reasonable this all was. Writing at a time when the transatlantic slaver trade and empire building were at an increase, I expected this to prop all that up. Sure, there were plenty of things that weren’t outright condemned, like the killing of prisoners in war (though leniency was advocated), and I hated the oft consequentialist ethic - but the guy argued for things like the necessity of accepting refugees and the inexcusability of enslaving people because their race is better at a job or they’re inferior. And also advocating against certain ideas like one person can be punished for another (and in other works advocated for a certain theory of the atonement against PSA). I thought the work was very enlightened overall and it helped me to see that the barbarity of the imperial age wasn’t due to moral ignorance at all.
Also, I loved that he used ancient Greeks, Romans , and the early church to show that he wasn’t just making ideas up out of nowhere.
Also, I loved that he used ancient Greeks, Romans , and the early church to show that he wasn’t just making ideas up out of nowhere.
October 3, 2020
I have heard many things about Hugo Grotius and this book. So I have read it. But I did not find much value in it as an atheist, libertarian, liberal, anti-state, anti-church, anti-authority thinker. This was a liberal book in those times, but now it is just a neverending defense of the state, of the right to go to war, which for a social liberal thinker it is repulsive.
March 4, 2021
Uluslararası hukuku başlatan kitap. Grotius, barışçıl biri sayılmasa da savaşın zararlarının da farkında. Savaşı önleyecek kuramlar geliştirmek yerine savaşın taraflarının uyması gereken uluslararası hukukun temellerini atıyor. Alanında yazılan ilk kitap. Vicdani reddi savunmasının yanında savaşı kaybeden halkın öldürülebileceğini söylemesi gibi bugünden bakıldığında aykırı düşünceleri de var.
September 19, 2015
I'm sure it was a decent analysis for its time (first published in 1625), but beauty fades with age. Useful for understanding historical origins and for understanding legal thinking of the time period. I found the interplay of law and religion more than a little disturbing and annoying. Plus there are anachronistic statements like this:
*"[on promises/contracts]The first requisite is the use of reason; consequently, the promises of madmen, idiots, and children are null and void. The case of minors is different, for although they are not supposed to have thoroughly sound judgement, any more than women, yet that is not a permanent defect, nor sufficient of itself to invalidate their acts." Book 2 ch. XI:5
Well, I suppose at least for minors, that's a good thing. Shame that women will never outgrow it. And never mind the defenses of slavery.
But then there are gems like these:
"War-making is not one of the honest crafts. Rather it is a thing so horrible that nothing but absolute necessity or true affection can make it honorable." Book 2, XXV:9
"Nor should even a permanent dwelling place be refused to foreigners driven from their own homes, who are seeking a refuge. But this should be on condition that they submit to the established government and to whatever other regulations are necessary to prevent tumults." Book 2, II:16 (This seemed too on point as the Syrian refugee crisis is currently enjoying much media coverage.)
I can't recommend it to anyone who isn't a legal scholar or who does not have a keen interest in legal history.
* Quotes from 1949 Black edition (translated by Louise R. Loomis)
*"[on promises/contracts]The first requisite is the use of reason; consequently, the promises of madmen, idiots, and children are null and void. The case of minors is different, for although they are not supposed to have thoroughly sound judgement, any more than women, yet that is not a permanent defect, nor sufficient of itself to invalidate their acts." Book 2 ch. XI:5
Well, I suppose at least for minors, that's a good thing. Shame that women will never outgrow it. And never mind the defenses of slavery.
But then there are gems like these:
"War-making is not one of the honest crafts. Rather it is a thing so horrible that nothing but absolute necessity or true affection can make it honorable." Book 2, XXV:9
"Nor should even a permanent dwelling place be refused to foreigners driven from their own homes, who are seeking a refuge. But this should be on condition that they submit to the established government and to whatever other regulations are necessary to prevent tumults." Book 2, II:16 (This seemed too on point as the Syrian refugee crisis is currently enjoying much media coverage.)
I can't recommend it to anyone who isn't a legal scholar or who does not have a keen interest in legal history.
* Quotes from 1949 Black edition (translated by Louise R. Loomis)
July 30, 2007
This is a painful read, but there's worthwhile information in there. I don't know. I'm very ambivalent toward it. Pick the parts you read and it'll be enjoyable.
March 17, 2015
Skimmed a PDF.
Read
August 22, 2018My opinion law around writing the best boook.
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