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The Thresher Disaster : The Most Tragic Dive in Submarine History
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- GenresHistory
372 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1975
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
October 28, 2022
This is a compelling account of the 1963 loss of the U.S. nuclear submarine Thresher in 8400 feet of water as it underwent a test dive to its operating limit, about 1000 feet. Author Bentley has carefully researched both the machine and the crew who manned her. All were lost along with 21 accompanying observers and technicians for a total loss of 129 men; a figure the author repeatedly reminds us is the greatest loss ever in an American submarine sinking. One member of the crew survived, an engineering officer whom the skipper had told to skip the test cruise so he could stay behind with his wife who had just had a serious blinding accident. The author includes a lengthy account by this officer, Raymond McCoole, of his experiences aboard the boat in the months preceding the ill-fated cruise.
Thresher, first of her class to be built, encompassed much technology that was state of the art. Unfortunately, there were many flaws to be worked out by testing in the harsh regime of the ocean.
Repeated problems resulted in the ship spending a large part of its life in for repairs or in drydock for major reworking. A number of small fires bedeviled the craft, some systems failed, there was reduced ability to access some problem sites because design features favored appearance over operations. But a critical shortcoming was the ability to quickly purge seawater from ballast tanks to enable surfacing in an emergency when operating at depth limits. This fault was the most likely cause of the tragic loss.
The elaborate search effort that commenced immediately after the loss of Thresher is well described by Bentley. The assemblage included Navy surface and submarine vessels, oceanographic ships from Lamont Geological Observatory and the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, and, once the remains were located, the bathyscaphe, Trieste. These undersea research elements were able to observe, photograph, and retrieve objects from the wreck site.
In addressing some of the non-mechanical causes leading to the loss, Bentley's book describes the numerous changes in personnel not only on the Thresher, but in the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard where Thresher was being worked on prior to her fatal test dive. In his epilogue, he focuses upon this circumstance which he finds critical, albeit a part of "The System," the navy's way of doing business. He writes, "of Thresher's twelve regular officers, six had never been to sea with her prior to her last trip." He writes further, "A survey of the 96 enlisted men who were lost with Thresher, however brings into focus an even sharper picture. Some 36, (over 30 per cent) had never sailed in her but had come aboard during the nine month overhaul. For 35 of these 36 men, Thresher was their first ever submarine assignment." Earlier, in his included narrative, Lieutenant Commander McCoole described the similar turnover in key staffers at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard where Thresher was being overhauled. Thresher's officers "had to deal with four different levels of people in the Portsmouth Navy Yard's chain of command." "Thresher's entire overhaul was in charge of the production officer. Then came the repair superintendent. Under him were the ship's superintendent and his assistant." McCoole noted that "In November 1962 they replaced the ship's assistant superintendent, and in December the chief superintendent. Trying to communicate with their replacements naturally set things back further." He noted another difficulty in resolving differences between ship officers and the Shipyard managers: "we were frequently outranked by people in the same service, and that was one sure way they could put a stop to any arguments or objections."
It is suppositional, of course, but perhaps the most consequential transfer that occurred is that of the Thresher's original skipper, Commander Dean Axene. In command since christening , he was familiar with Thresher's quirks, was meticulous in following up and righting the problems he encountered, and had warned about the weakness of the deballasting system. While the boat was undergoing that final overhaul, he was ordered transferred to a new position. He protested, appealed, and continued to object to the transfer, but finally acceded. His replacement, Lt. Commander John Harvey, was well qualified, but lacked intimate familiarity with the Thresher and its history. Could delay of that command have made a difference that prevented the loss of the Thresher? We will never know.
The Navy quickly launched a Court of Inquiry after the loss, but the most probing investigation was that begun on June 26, 1963 by Congress's Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Bentley dissects the latter at length. It consisted of Senators and Representatives asking pointed questions and Admirals and Navy Secretaries of Assistant Secretaries trying to provide the most self protective answers. One can find this is part of the continuing legislative process today via clips on YouTube, or the full detail, slow grinding mill offered on CSPAN. Vague answers, or "We have," or "We are," or "We will look at that. Or, "Thank you for the suggestion" to a statement presented as a directive. Bentley comments on the Navy's lack of blame falling on those in privileged positions during these hearings, offering some pointed observations.
Bentley finds a hero among the Navy witnesses: Rear Admiral Hyman Rickover. Rickover is shown as a relentless perfectionist who will take on any opponent that stands in the way of that perfection. Rickover is shown to have ensured that every weld on piping within his nuclear reactors was tested to show it was done correctly. He questioned the "silver brazing" employed on the seawater piping used on non-nuclear systems, something he would not allow in the reactor. Bentley shows that there were cases of failures by the Shipyard to conduct and provide those test results.
In all, a sad, but informative read. It is well written, credible, and contains a simple message of recognizing the importance of individual responsibility. This book is well worth reading by military buffs and general readers.
Thresher, first of her class to be built, encompassed much technology that was state of the art. Unfortunately, there were many flaws to be worked out by testing in the harsh regime of the ocean.
Repeated problems resulted in the ship spending a large part of its life in for repairs or in drydock for major reworking. A number of small fires bedeviled the craft, some systems failed, there was reduced ability to access some problem sites because design features favored appearance over operations. But a critical shortcoming was the ability to quickly purge seawater from ballast tanks to enable surfacing in an emergency when operating at depth limits. This fault was the most likely cause of the tragic loss.
The elaborate search effort that commenced immediately after the loss of Thresher is well described by Bentley. The assemblage included Navy surface and submarine vessels, oceanographic ships from Lamont Geological Observatory and the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, and, once the remains were located, the bathyscaphe, Trieste. These undersea research elements were able to observe, photograph, and retrieve objects from the wreck site.
In addressing some of the non-mechanical causes leading to the loss, Bentley's book describes the numerous changes in personnel not only on the Thresher, but in the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard where Thresher was being worked on prior to her fatal test dive. In his epilogue, he focuses upon this circumstance which he finds critical, albeit a part of "The System," the navy's way of doing business. He writes, "of Thresher's twelve regular officers, six had never been to sea with her prior to her last trip." He writes further, "A survey of the 96 enlisted men who were lost with Thresher, however brings into focus an even sharper picture. Some 36, (over 30 per cent) had never sailed in her but had come aboard during the nine month overhaul. For 35 of these 36 men, Thresher was their first ever submarine assignment." Earlier, in his included narrative, Lieutenant Commander McCoole described the similar turnover in key staffers at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard where Thresher was being overhauled. Thresher's officers "had to deal with four different levels of people in the Portsmouth Navy Yard's chain of command." "Thresher's entire overhaul was in charge of the production officer. Then came the repair superintendent. Under him were the ship's superintendent and his assistant." McCoole noted that "In November 1962 they replaced the ship's assistant superintendent, and in December the chief superintendent. Trying to communicate with their replacements naturally set things back further." He noted another difficulty in resolving differences between ship officers and the Shipyard managers: "we were frequently outranked by people in the same service, and that was one sure way they could put a stop to any arguments or objections."
It is suppositional, of course, but perhaps the most consequential transfer that occurred is that of the Thresher's original skipper, Commander Dean Axene. In command since christening , he was familiar with Thresher's quirks, was meticulous in following up and righting the problems he encountered, and had warned about the weakness of the deballasting system. While the boat was undergoing that final overhaul, he was ordered transferred to a new position. He protested, appealed, and continued to object to the transfer, but finally acceded. His replacement, Lt. Commander John Harvey, was well qualified, but lacked intimate familiarity with the Thresher and its history. Could delay of that command have made a difference that prevented the loss of the Thresher? We will never know.
The Navy quickly launched a Court of Inquiry after the loss, but the most probing investigation was that begun on June 26, 1963 by Congress's Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Bentley dissects the latter at length. It consisted of Senators and Representatives asking pointed questions and Admirals and Navy Secretaries of Assistant Secretaries trying to provide the most self protective answers. One can find this is part of the continuing legislative process today via clips on YouTube, or the full detail, slow grinding mill offered on CSPAN. Vague answers, or "We have," or "We are," or "We will look at that. Or, "Thank you for the suggestion" to a statement presented as a directive. Bentley comments on the Navy's lack of blame falling on those in privileged positions during these hearings, offering some pointed observations.
Bentley finds a hero among the Navy witnesses: Rear Admiral Hyman Rickover. Rickover is shown as a relentless perfectionist who will take on any opponent that stands in the way of that perfection. Rickover is shown to have ensured that every weld on piping within his nuclear reactors was tested to show it was done correctly. He questioned the "silver brazing" employed on the seawater piping used on non-nuclear systems, something he would not allow in the reactor. Bentley shows that there were cases of failures by the Shipyard to conduct and provide those test results.
In all, a sad, but informative read. It is well written, credible, and contains a simple message of recognizing the importance of individual responsibility. This book is well worth reading by military buffs and general readers.
April 4, 2018
Submarines are at the heights of hysteria and secrecy for governments and armies alike. Yet Bentley (is this his real name?) not only knows the details, but is knowledgeable enough to pinpoint "the most tragic" of them all. And through the spirit world a second rate writer can put words in the mouths of dead people with no care. People he never knew they existed already have personalities and move in this macabre puppet show.
April 15, 2023
A very dry and technical account of what happened. Too much bureaucracy for me and frustration that the Navy were so obsessed with their image and protecting it rather than improving safety in submarine construction. Which is a huge waste of money anyway. Urgh men.
May 8, 2024
Great book!
April 4, 2016
I didn't actually read all of this - too much technical and legal and bureaucratic language. But ... I read enough, including stuff about Rickover, a no b.s. guy if there ever was one, to get the main picture. Very sad that so many had to die for the Navy to get its act together. My parents moved to Kittery, Maine(the actual location of the Portsmouth yard) in 1967 and their house was right across the back channel of the Piscataqua from the base. I recall being on the base itself only once, shortly after my separation from the Navy in 1969. I'm gonna give it to an active Navy(not a submariner) friend of mine.
July 5, 2016
For a non-fiction book, this was SO easy to get through. Especially after seeing almost no ratings and reviews for it on Goodreads.
The disaster that the book is focused on is SUPER intense to read, but aside from the meaty "action" it's a tragedy, so I feel dirty using the word action here) bits, the story is entertaining through because of the commentary on the disaster. I learned a surprising amount about submarine technology, and none of it was terribly boring (even though that sounds boring). The author gets very emotional about the incident, and I really liked the way it shone through. He uses his emotion to create a searing critique, and it makes nonfiction very readable.
The disaster that the book is focused on is SUPER intense to read, but aside from the meaty "action" it's a tragedy, so I feel dirty using the word action here) bits, the story is entertaining through because of the commentary on the disaster. I learned a surprising amount about submarine technology, and none of it was terribly boring (even though that sounds boring). The author gets very emotional about the incident, and I really liked the way it shone through. He uses his emotion to create a searing critique, and it makes nonfiction very readable.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews