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The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth
The Schlieffen Plan was the name given after World War I to the theory behind the German invasion of France and Belgium on 4 August 1914. In 1905-1906 Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen, the Chief of the Imperial Army German General Staff from 1891-1906, had devised a deployment plan for a war-winning offensive, in a one-front war against the French Third Republic. After the war, the German official historians of the Reichsarchiv and other writers, described the plan as a blueprint for victory.
Post-war writing by senior German officers and the Reichsarchiv historians managed to establish a commonly accepted narrative that it was Schlieffen’s successor Helmuth von Moltke the Younger’s failure to follow the blueprint, rather than German strategic miscalculation, that resulted in four years of attrition warfare.
In 1953, renowned historian Prof. Gerhard Ritter Schlieffen’s unearthed Schlieffen’s papers during a visit to the United States, and he published his findings in the book Der Schlieffenplan: Kritik eines Mythos, presented here in its 1958 English translation, The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth. It proved to be an important historical publication, as it set in motion a period of revision, when the details of the supposed Schlieffen Plan were subjected to scrutiny and contextualisation.
In Der Schlieffen Plan, Prof. Ritter presents the full text of Schlieffen’s military testament, and the relevant parts of other memoranda which shed light on the evolution of the Plan. They are preceded by Professor Ritter’s masterly exposition of their content and significance, while his accompanying notes add to the illuminating effect.
“FOR two generations the Schlieffen Plan has been a magic phrase, embodying one of the chief mysteries and ‘might have beens’ of modern times. The mystery is cleared up and the great ‘If’ analysed in Gerhard Ritter’s book—a striking contribution to twentieth-century history.”—B. H. Liddell Hart
Post-war writing by senior German officers and the Reichsarchiv historians managed to establish a commonly accepted narrative that it was Schlieffen’s successor Helmuth von Moltke the Younger’s failure to follow the blueprint, rather than German strategic miscalculation, that resulted in four years of attrition warfare.
In 1953, renowned historian Prof. Gerhard Ritter Schlieffen’s unearthed Schlieffen’s papers during a visit to the United States, and he published his findings in the book Der Schlieffenplan: Kritik eines Mythos, presented here in its 1958 English translation, The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth. It proved to be an important historical publication, as it set in motion a period of revision, when the details of the supposed Schlieffen Plan were subjected to scrutiny and contextualisation.
In Der Schlieffen Plan, Prof. Ritter presents the full text of Schlieffen’s military testament, and the relevant parts of other memoranda which shed light on the evolution of the Plan. They are preceded by Professor Ritter’s masterly exposition of their content and significance, while his accompanying notes add to the illuminating effect.
“FOR two generations the Schlieffen Plan has been a magic phrase, embodying one of the chief mysteries and ‘might have beens’ of modern times. The mystery is cleared up and the great ‘If’ analysed in Gerhard Ritter’s book—a striking contribution to twentieth-century history.”—B. H. Liddell Hart
- GenresHistory
288 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 1958
8 people are currently reading
35 people want to read
About the author
Gerhard Ritter
82 books4 followersGerhard Ritter nacque in Turingia,nel 1888.Professore universitario a partire dal 1924,durante gli ultimi anni della seconda guerra mondiale entrò in contatto con i gruppi di opposizione al regime,e fu imprigionato dalla Gestapo.Ripreso l'insegnamento universitario,morì a Friburgo il 1 luglio 1967.
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Displaying 1 of 1 review
September 26, 2025
High quality book, probably best as a text for a master’s degree level of study. While the topic is obvious a great historical document/focus area, the author’s expertise is obvious throughout the text. A must read for the military historian. Key excerpts below.
- But Schlieffen failed to take due account of a great difference between the conditions of Napoleonic times and his own - the advent of the railway. While his troops would have to March on their own feet around the circumference of the circle, the French would be able to switch troops by rail across the cord of the circle. P6. PJK: In other words, discussion of interior/exterior lines.
- There was an annual general staff ride through the eastern frontier districts just as in the West. And during the winter, war games allowed the constant invention of new military situations and the testing of new solutions. P33. PJK: amazing staff discipline to professionalize strategic planning. Time and resource intensive, but critical for future success.
- As the memoranda of April 1892 already indicates, Schlieffen’s main aim was to fight the decisive battle in the West “as quickly as possible”, so as to be free, after total victory, to defeat Russia. P38.
- One can see how he doubted the feasibility of a lengthy defense in prepared positions and how much he preferred to take the offensive. “To win, we must endeavor to be the stronger of the two at the point of impact. Our only hope of this lies in making our own choice of operations, not and waiting passively for whatever the enemy chooses for us.” P38.
- Clearly the success of a great enterprise depended on the speed and surprise of the German advance through Belgium. The enormous pressure of time is indefensible feature of the whole Schlieffen plan. P57.
- The great Schlieffen Plan was never a sound formula for victory. It was a daring, indeed an over-daring, gamble whose success depended on many luck accidents. A formula for victory needs a surplus of reasonable chances of success if it is to inspire confidence- a surplus which tends quickly to be used up by “frictions” in the day-to-day conduct of war. P66. PJK: So much truth in these sentences. I love that victory needs a surplus of chances of success. Frictions are also a reality in any military mission, training or combat.
------------ Quote from the actual document ---------------
- France must be regarded as a great fortress. Of the outer enceinte the sector Belfort-Verdun is almost impregnable…. P144. PJK: assessment of enemy strongpoints, and thus where not to attack.
- But Schlieffen failed to take due account of a great difference between the conditions of Napoleonic times and his own - the advent of the railway. While his troops would have to March on their own feet around the circumference of the circle, the French would be able to switch troops by rail across the cord of the circle. P6. PJK: In other words, discussion of interior/exterior lines.
- There was an annual general staff ride through the eastern frontier districts just as in the West. And during the winter, war games allowed the constant invention of new military situations and the testing of new solutions. P33. PJK: amazing staff discipline to professionalize strategic planning. Time and resource intensive, but critical for future success.
- As the memoranda of April 1892 already indicates, Schlieffen’s main aim was to fight the decisive battle in the West “as quickly as possible”, so as to be free, after total victory, to defeat Russia. P38.
- One can see how he doubted the feasibility of a lengthy defense in prepared positions and how much he preferred to take the offensive. “To win, we must endeavor to be the stronger of the two at the point of impact. Our only hope of this lies in making our own choice of operations, not and waiting passively for whatever the enemy chooses for us.” P38.
- Clearly the success of a great enterprise depended on the speed and surprise of the German advance through Belgium. The enormous pressure of time is indefensible feature of the whole Schlieffen plan. P57.
- The great Schlieffen Plan was never a sound formula for victory. It was a daring, indeed an over-daring, gamble whose success depended on many luck accidents. A formula for victory needs a surplus of reasonable chances of success if it is to inspire confidence- a surplus which tends quickly to be used up by “frictions” in the day-to-day conduct of war. P66. PJK: So much truth in these sentences. I love that victory needs a surplus of chances of success. Frictions are also a reality in any military mission, training or combat.
------------ Quote from the actual document ---------------
- France must be regarded as a great fortress. Of the outer enceinte the sector Belfort-Verdun is almost impregnable…. P144. PJK: assessment of enemy strongpoints, and thus where not to attack.
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