What do you think?
Rate this book
Napoleon's Last Campaign in Germany 1813
The War of the Sixth Coalition
There are of course, many histories available on the Napoleonic era but the first distinction offered by this one must be the widely acknowledged regard with which its author, F. Loraine Petre is still held. Petre wrote several histories of the period and all are recognised as scholarship of the highest order and his contribution to the subject has rarely been surpassed in the years since their original publication. Napoleon's German campaign was decisive for the aspirations of the Emperor, France and the imperial allies that were resolved to bring him to ruin. All his hubris had brought about his greatest defeat as a consequence of the debacle that was the invasion of Russia and the retreat from Moscow. Most significantly, the avenging Russian army in concert with its finest ally, the bitter winter had deprived Napoleon, by the usages of war, disease and lethal cold, of virtually all the resources he had employed in his venture-a massive Grand Armee that could not be readily replaced for employment in future enterprises. Now with only a gallant army of 200, 000 men he had to fight against the odds in a contest which would prove too much for even his legendary personal military talents and further demonstrate the weaknesses of his lieutenants when in independent command. A series of battles would be fought in Germany at Saale, Lutzen, Bautzen, Dresden, Dennewitz and finally at Leipzig and Hanau where defeat would propel the French into a retreat which would set them on the road back to the Paris and abdication of the Emperor. These are the battles of the beginning of the end of the First Empire of the French recounted by one of its finest historians. Essential for every student of the period.
There are of course, many histories available on the Napoleonic era but the first distinction offered by this one must be the widely acknowledged regard with which its author, F. Loraine Petre is still held. Petre wrote several histories of the period and all are recognised as scholarship of the highest order and his contribution to the subject has rarely been surpassed in the years since their original publication. Napoleon's German campaign was decisive for the aspirations of the Emperor, France and the imperial allies that were resolved to bring him to ruin. All his hubris had brought about his greatest defeat as a consequence of the debacle that was the invasion of Russia and the retreat from Moscow. Most significantly, the avenging Russian army in concert with its finest ally, the bitter winter had deprived Napoleon, by the usages of war, disease and lethal cold, of virtually all the resources he had employed in his venture-a massive Grand Armee that could not be readily replaced for employment in future enterprises. Now with only a gallant army of 200, 000 men he had to fight against the odds in a contest which would prove too much for even his legendary personal military talents and further demonstrate the weaknesses of his lieutenants when in independent command. A series of battles would be fought in Germany at Saale, Lutzen, Bautzen, Dresden, Dennewitz and finally at Leipzig and Hanau where defeat would propel the French into a retreat which would set them on the road back to the Paris and abdication of the Emperor. These are the battles of the beginning of the end of the First Empire of the French recounted by one of its finest historians. Essential for every student of the period.
- GenresHistory
424 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1912
About the author
F. Loraine Petre
33 books3 followersFrancis Loraine Petre OBE (1852–1925) was a British civil servant in India and a military historian upon his retirement. He wrote a two-volume regimental history of the Norfolk Regiment, but is best known for his works on the Napoleonic Wars. The grandson of the 11th Baron Petre, he was educated at Oscott College and joined the Bar in 1880. He took the civil service exam and subsequently joined the Indian Civil Service. He retired as Commissioner of Allahabad in 1900.
Subsequently, he chose a literary career, pursuing interests in the history of the Napoleonic Wars. He wrote five books on the Wars, most of which are in use a century later. His studies of Napoleon's conquest of Prussia 1806–1807 (1901) and Napoleon's Campaign in Poland, 1806–1807 (1901) were among the first such books in the English language. He also wrote several regimental histories, a study of Simon Bolivar, and a descriptive study of Colombia. World War I interrupted his literary pursuits; he served in the Finance Branch of the Ministry of Munitions. In 1920, Petre was appointed Officer of the Order of the British Empire.
Subsequently, he chose a literary career, pursuing interests in the history of the Napoleonic Wars. He wrote five books on the Wars, most of which are in use a century later. His studies of Napoleon's conquest of Prussia 1806–1807 (1901) and Napoleon's Campaign in Poland, 1806–1807 (1901) were among the first such books in the English language. He also wrote several regimental histories, a study of Simon Bolivar, and a descriptive study of Colombia. World War I interrupted his literary pursuits; he served in the Finance Branch of the Ministry of Munitions. In 1920, Petre was appointed Officer of the Order of the British Empire.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
October 19, 2018
Petre goes into detail about the major 1813 battles of the campaign such as Lutzen, Bautzen, Dresden, and Leipzig. He also talks about about battles such as Dennewitz and Hanau in some detail, but in between battles he usually makes some reference that the book 'doesn't go into that' or 'there's no need to go into that.' I suppose he doesn't want to go into a lot of political background, but it does make the reader wonder what was left out. Unfortunately, there are no maps to help the reader understand what is going on either.
His analysis of the allies is generally not too favorable. They relied heavily on superior numbers because their commanders were frequently poor in their concepts, and sometimes could not be counted on when needed. Even when they won, they were still 'awed' by Napoleon's reputation, and so did not go for the kill. They mostly seemed just to want him out of Germany.
As for Napoleon, Petre is an obvious admirer, but concedes that the 'Emperor' made decisions that 'General' Bonaparte would not have countenanced, such as trying to hold Dresden and other towns. Napoleon needed some decisive victories in 1813, which might have affected the thinking of his opponents, who were scarcely united in their resolve to finish him off. Thus, the fighting and dying continued into 1814.
His analysis of the allies is generally not too favorable. They relied heavily on superior numbers because their commanders were frequently poor in their concepts, and sometimes could not be counted on when needed. Even when they won, they were still 'awed' by Napoleon's reputation, and so did not go for the kill. They mostly seemed just to want him out of Germany.
As for Napoleon, Petre is an obvious admirer, but concedes that the 'Emperor' made decisions that 'General' Bonaparte would not have countenanced, such as trying to hold Dresden and other towns. Napoleon needed some decisive victories in 1813, which might have affected the thinking of his opponents, who were scarcely united in their resolve to finish him off. Thus, the fighting and dying continued into 1814.
March 31, 2022
This book was first published in 1912 but I read a 1977 reprint. The Author’s Preface notes the Napoleonic Wars as an evolution, the time of change from war as involving only the clash of armies to something which involved whole nations instead.
The book follows the course of the campaign of 1813 from Napoloeon’s initial invasion to its culmination at Liepzig, the largest engagement of the Napoleonic Wars, with a brief description of the minor battle at Hanau in its aftermath. The essence of the tale is that the Russian adventure in 1812 had severely weakened Napoleon (not least in a deficit of cavalry in comparison with before, but also with many new recruits to be assimilated into his armies) if not his personal reputation as a master of war. His aura was still such that during it the Allies formed a pact not to engage separately the army of which the Emperor was directly in charge unless and until they had united and had a large superiority in numbers. This stricture did not apply to his Marshals who according to Petrie were very well-versed in tactical matters but a failure to train them in strategical considerations meant they were lacking at crucial junctures.
The decline in Napoleon’s abilities from his glory years is illustrated by contrasting his switherings in this campaign with his decisiveness at Jena seven years earlier. There was a fatal conflict of Napoleon’s priorities as Emperor, and dominator of Germany, compared with his military objectives. Here he tended to try to protect the land he held, specifically the city of Dresden, over his previous focus on destroying his enemies’ armies in the field. Petrie also quotes the man himself as saying experience in war does not count for much, that he thought himself as insightful in his youthful campaigns in Italy as he ever was later. His early battles were of course smaller affairs over which he could exercise a large degree of control. Notwithstanding the fact that armies in 1813 were much more densely concentrated than in later times, by the time of Liepzig this sort of close oversight was perhaps beyond any one person.
It amused me when at one point Petrie says, “These extensive expeditions of considerable bodies of cavalry in the French rear are a peculiarity of this campaign which is the only instance of their employment on a large scale in a European War. Similar raids played a considerable part in the American Civil War of fifty years ago. In this case, as in 1813, the raids were generally carried out in a country the inhabitants of which were often sympathisers with the raiders, to whom they supplied food, forage, and information. Moreover, there were few or none of the modern facilities for sending information to the other side. It seems more than doubtful what success such raids could hope for in these days of telegraphs in Europe. (My emphasis.) Petrie notes a like raid by Petrushenko in the then recent Russo-Japanese War which, “can hardly be deemed a great success, and it was only possible to carry it out at all owing to the route being taken through an area devoid of telegraphs.” The thought of such wires being cut in the furtherance of such activities does not seem to have occurred to him. And didn’t the Boers in the also recent South African War in effect also use tactics like this? Of course the presence of technologies such as the telegraph, telephone, and radio did not negate the opportunity for operations behind the lines in later wars.
The language of the text can be a little precious. Petrie uses unnecessary formulations such as “We left Oudinot, at 11 am,” “We now return to Ney,” etc, and there is the usual alphanumeric soup of divisions and Roman-numeralled corps. The four sheets of maps (seventeen diagrams in total) are more or less useless as they require folding out but are affixed to pages towards the end of the book, nowhere near the parts of the text they are meant to illuminate. Their appearance is also too cluttered.
The book follows the course of the campaign of 1813 from Napoloeon’s initial invasion to its culmination at Liepzig, the largest engagement of the Napoleonic Wars, with a brief description of the minor battle at Hanau in its aftermath. The essence of the tale is that the Russian adventure in 1812 had severely weakened Napoleon (not least in a deficit of cavalry in comparison with before, but also with many new recruits to be assimilated into his armies) if not his personal reputation as a master of war. His aura was still such that during it the Allies formed a pact not to engage separately the army of which the Emperor was directly in charge unless and until they had united and had a large superiority in numbers. This stricture did not apply to his Marshals who according to Petrie were very well-versed in tactical matters but a failure to train them in strategical considerations meant they were lacking at crucial junctures.
The decline in Napoleon’s abilities from his glory years is illustrated by contrasting his switherings in this campaign with his decisiveness at Jena seven years earlier. There was a fatal conflict of Napoleon’s priorities as Emperor, and dominator of Germany, compared with his military objectives. Here he tended to try to protect the land he held, specifically the city of Dresden, over his previous focus on destroying his enemies’ armies in the field. Petrie also quotes the man himself as saying experience in war does not count for much, that he thought himself as insightful in his youthful campaigns in Italy as he ever was later. His early battles were of course smaller affairs over which he could exercise a large degree of control. Notwithstanding the fact that armies in 1813 were much more densely concentrated than in later times, by the time of Liepzig this sort of close oversight was perhaps beyond any one person.
It amused me when at one point Petrie says, “These extensive expeditions of considerable bodies of cavalry in the French rear are a peculiarity of this campaign which is the only instance of their employment on a large scale in a European War. Similar raids played a considerable part in the American Civil War of fifty years ago. In this case, as in 1813, the raids were generally carried out in a country the inhabitants of which were often sympathisers with the raiders, to whom they supplied food, forage, and information. Moreover, there were few or none of the modern facilities for sending information to the other side. It seems more than doubtful what success such raids could hope for in these days of telegraphs in Europe. (My emphasis.) Petrie notes a like raid by Petrushenko in the then recent Russo-Japanese War which, “can hardly be deemed a great success, and it was only possible to carry it out at all owing to the route being taken through an area devoid of telegraphs.” The thought of such wires being cut in the furtherance of such activities does not seem to have occurred to him. And didn’t the Boers in the also recent South African War in effect also use tactics like this? Of course the presence of technologies such as the telegraph, telephone, and radio did not negate the opportunity for operations behind the lines in later wars.
The language of the text can be a little precious. Petrie uses unnecessary formulations such as “We left Oudinot, at 11 am,” “We now return to Ney,” etc, and there is the usual alphanumeric soup of divisions and Roman-numeralled corps. The four sheets of maps (seventeen diagrams in total) are more or less useless as they require folding out but are affixed to pages towards the end of the book, nowhere near the parts of the text they are meant to illuminate. Their appearance is also too cluttered.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews