Notes on Central America: Particularly the States of Honduras and Salvador

by Ephraim G. Squier

This is a reproduction of a book published before 1923. This book may have occasional imperfections such as missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. that were either part of the original artifact, or were introduced by the scanning process. We believe this work is culturally important, and despite the imperfections, have elected to bring it back into print as part of our continuing commitment to the preservation of printed works worldwide. We appreciate your understanding of the imperfections in the preservation process, and hope you enjoy this valuable book.

Genres: History

397 pages, Hardcover

First published June 1, 1985

Reviews

[Justin Tapp · Rating 3 out of 5]

Notes on Central America: Particularly the States of Honduras and San Salvador (1855): Their Geography, Topography, Climate, Population, Resources, Production, etc. etc. and the Proposed Honduras Interoceanic Railway by Ephraim George Squier

This is part of my collection of reviews of travel memoirs about Honduras written in English prior to 1927. Books written by U.S. and European travelers had a good market for about a century and plenty are past copyright. The books about Honduras are remarkable for expressing optimism about Honduras' potential for foreign investment due the richness of soil and natural resources, the favorable (weather) climate, and its lack of development and technology.

E.G. Squier's various books on Central America were widely circulated and heavily cited by other authors. My follow-up research on this particular book led me to a little-known and deeply interesting backstory involving Honduras and the United States. Besides being a Chargé d'Affairs to the Republic of Central America, Squier should be known in Central American history for his work in efforts to survey and gather scarce statistics on a young Central America in turmoil, his "discovery" of various ancient ruins in Honduras (which drew the attention of Western archaeologists and led to their preservation), and his quixotic attempt to build a trans-oceanic railroad in Honduras. Each of these endeavors is documented in this book. He is also credited in other books as being helpful in Honduras' efforts to reclaim Roatan and the coast of Mosquitia from British colonizers from prior to the signing of the Clayton-Bulwar treaty of 1851 to negotiations in London in 1856-1857 that eventually proved successful.

While I found this book extremely valuable for historic information on Honduras and details about its regions, this book is unwieldy as it ranges from being a presentation of scientific data and literature about Central America as well as a platform for his opinions on race and an investment brochure for his company. The book paints Honduras as a largely peaceful and "salubrious" untapped paradise with limitless potential for investment. While Squier believed it, the true backstory and omitted details from this book and Squier's promotion of the transoceanic railroad were published in a 1966 article by Prof. Charles L. Stansifer in the Hispanic American Historical review (available free at Duke University Press' website). Stansifer did extensive research of preserved correspondence between Squier, his companions, and Honduran politicans, along with records of his Honduras Interoceanic Railway Company, and records found in London. Squier's belief -- grounded in scientific measurement -- of Honduras being the best option for a transoceanic railway against competing ideas in Panama and Nicaragua led him down a rabbit hole that would consume the next decades of his life and to some uncomfortable areas of political intrigue.

By 1852, Squier had become of the advantages of a transoceanic railroad from Puerto de Caballos (modern day Puerto Cortés) to the Bay of Fonseca relative to other possibilities in the region (Panama's was already built and profitable). Squier encouraged some of his friends to invest in exploring the possibility, and the book begins with their 1853 arrival in the country to begin the work of surveying and data collection. Stansifer documents that a former Secretary of the Treasury and other expansionists were among the original investors of this venture.

The book-- a "hurried memoir," begins with Squier and company's arrival in February, 1853 where the party fanned out in "reconnaissance" from Leon, Nicaragua to La Unión, El Salvador, taking temperature and barometric readings, gathering what they could find in local records about population and resource wealth, and surveying the landscape to both improve on existing maps and survey the potential railroad. (Stansifer documents that Squier boarded the steamer from New York under an assumed name in an attempt to keep their mission secret.)

Squier usefully writes at length of the weakness of the varied histories and maps of the region he has acquired from the 1500s to the 1850s. This particular aspect of the book reminded me the fact that treaties are drawn over maps, and their accuracy matters greatly. Maps were clearly drawn by people who had never visited the territory or -- in the case of the British-- embellished in certain areas for political purposes. Indeed, the final boundary between Nicaragua and Honduras wouldn't be settled until the lands were much better surveyed in the 1950s. The British were producing maps that showed Belize "including more than four times the amount of territory legitimately pertaining to it," in order to support their claims to recent colonies in Honduras and Nicaragua. These matters largely wouldn't be settled until the 1860s:

"A few strokes of the colorist's brush have been sufficient to indicate British sovereignty over two thirds of the Department of Vera Paz in Guatemala, to convert the islands belonging to Honduras, in the bay of the same name, into British dependencies, and to carry Mosquito jurisdiction over more than half of the respective states of Honduras and Nicaragua."

The vast majority of available maps were missing major towns, landmarks, had placed rivers or cities in incorrect locations, etc. Squier's reconnaissance team set out to create accurate maps-- and several pages of this book are written instructions on drawing the specific maps for Honduras-- in order to better explain the investment opportunities and aid in its development.

Beyond maps, Squier sets out to document the temperatures of the regions in order to show the moderate climate being conducive to living. He includes detailed descriptions of the wildlife, fauna, and natural resources. He collects population estimates from the few sources that are available, and makes his own estimates to fill in the blanks. (Noting that the native tribes cannot possibly be estimated as many live in uncivilized areas.)

Stansifer's research shows that Squier wasn't just interested in scouting the land for scientific purposes. Stansifer documents that "Squier believed that Honduras, not to say all of Central America and Mexico, would inevitably fall into the hands of the United States." As such, Squier "wanted 'as much land as possible'" as it would be highly valuable for resale to the wave of new foreign immigrants. Squier himself writes that "not only is the value of Central America, in every point of view, beginning to be appreciated, but the enterprise of our people is setting in that direction in a full and increasing current."

Perhaps the most interesting part of the book for me was Squier's coming across ruins near the city of Comayagua, having come across a large ancient settlement that he relates to his previous archaeological work in the Mississippi Valley. He describes these thoroughly and later submitted the same information in article to a science journal which attracted great attention to these under-appreciated ruins in Central America. There is also the unexplained phenomenon of the Fuente de Sangre near Virtud, which Googling confirms still exists and gets little attention. If these things existed in the United States, they'd be tourism attractions.

Squier seems rather a complicated individual. Devoted to science, once he latches on to an idea or supposition then he is determined to see it through-- the railroad must be viable because science says so. Races must not mix because "anthropological science" shows us that it's harmful. He does not ever seem to question his priors or look for arguments to the contrary. One complication is that he seems to revere the native civilizations that built the complex cities and fortifications that he discovers and wants to research further while at the same time describes the native tribes -- descendants of these civilizations -- as being "savages, whom three hundred years of contact with civilization have failed to improve." The "Mosquito" indians of northeastern Honduras were considered to be mixed descendants of natives and former African slaves; Squier describes them as "mongrel savages." He elaborates further that "The Indian does not possess, still less the South Sea Islander, and least of all the negro, the capacity to comprehend the principles which enter into the higher order of civil and political organizations."

The criticism is not uniform or consistent throughout the book, however. Squier gives heavy criticism to the behavior of both the historic Spanish and modern British colonizers as a people. But Squier also makes clear his dislike of the negro race and his concern over the mixing of races, showing a sentiment about race common in the 1800s. Citing "anthropological science," Squier writes that "it has come to be understood that their physical, moral, and intellectual traits are radical and permanent, and there can be no admixture of widely-separated families, or of superior with inferior races, which can be harmonious, or otherwise disastrous in its consequences." The problems of poor governance in Central America are a result of the mixing of Spanish and natives: "In Central and South America, and Mexico, we find a people not only demoralized from the unrestrained association of different races, but also the superior stocks becoming gradually absorbed in the lower, and their institutions disappearing under the relative barbarism."

Squier's solution is more white immigration and multiplication. He credits the United States' advancement to greatness over Spanish American republics to the "refusal of the dominant Teutonic stock to debase its blood." In his mind, the native American tribes were dying out and this was "the will of God!" It is a bit of a wild digression in the beginning of a book that is ultimately intended to attract investment to these countries.

The last section of the book describes the plans of constructing the railroad and the charter obtained by the Honduran government. Squier argues forcefully that the route is more practicable with fewer hazards than one through Panama or Honduras. Panama's railway had been costly in terms of money and lives in building it through swampland. Squier maintains that the railway through Honduras would cost merely $7 million, an amount far less per mile than Panama's railroad. He also estimates that revenue would be $2 million per year once the railway neared completion. Besides the obvious advantages to Honduras for the increased connections, immigration, and commerce Squier estimates it would save 490,000 days a year to the population traveling from New York to California (shaving a week off mail correspondence as well).

Stansifer's research shows how remarkable it is that Squier could write these words and continue to defend them for the next several years as the project faced one inevitable hurdle after another. The difficulties that the Honduran government was experiencing at the time, but are documented for history in his correspondence, were left out of this memoir.

As documented in Squier's book, in June, the representatives of Honduras signed a charter with Squier that gave the Honduras Inter-Oceanic Railway Company all the lands and materials necessary for construction, which was to be completed in a ridiculously ambitious eight years. International passengers were to receive free transit on the railway, with no passport checks. All settlers would receive the same rights as Honduran citizens and would be exempt from military service or taxes for 10 years. The company would receive 1,000 square miles in Yoro and purchase additional land at 12.5 cents an acre. Further, Honduras would give 50-75 acres to each foreign laborer who would immigrate to Honduras and declare intention to become a citizen. It also gave Squier's Honduras Steamship and Navigation Company privileges to ports and rivers. The company would bear the cost of constructing the railroad.

Omitted from the book is the tale of how Squier spent much of his time on the 1853 trip negotiating with the Honduran government. President José Trinidad Cabañas was Squier's friend and a liberal leader eager to attract foreign investment but also get American support for his struggle against the Guatemalan dictator Manuel Carrera. Cabañas was actively battling Carrera's forces which had invaded Honduras at the time of the 1853 reconnaissance trip. Cabañas' ministers relayed that the president sought "to procure the admission of Honduras into the American Union," and Squier hedged his response but pledged his "cooperation." Cabañas clearly saw the railroad project as potentially bringing immigrants, money, and arms and would not work to tratify the charter unless Squier's company aided the immediate fight against Guatemala. Squier promised him a $20,000 loan to purchase arms in the United States.

Stansifer illustrates from the group's correspondence that the company anticipated the possibility of annexation from the outset of the trip. Squier agreed to pay the expenses of a Honduran minister to the United States who would travel and present terms of treaty for incorporation of Honduras. (The U.S. appointed an official minister to all of Central America, including Honduras, but he never visited the country.) Squier returned to New York in 1854 to raise capital, ship the arms, send additional cash "for the legislators," who ratified the charter in April, 1854.

Several setbacks occurred. Cabañas' appointed Minister of Honduras to the United States (José Barrundia) died unexpectedly before he begin negotiations. The deal became publicly controversial as it was criticized by conservatives in Guatemala and Honduras as a front for an invasion of Americans to threaten Honduran sovereignty, as well as Guatemala's economic power. Economic conditions worsened and fewer investors saw the need for a railway to compete with Panama's. The company also had no stomach to engage in launching a full-scale "filibuster" of private Americans taking arms to Honduras to fight for Cabañas and secure the country by arms. In 1856, Cabañas was ousted from the presidency by force by conservative General Santos Guardiola with aid from Guatemala. Guardiola publicly condemned Squier. William Walker's successful filibustering and capture of Nicaragua lessened the esteem of Americans, now seen as aggressors, in Central America.

Ironically, Squier turned primarily to Great Britain for financing after he'd been heavily critical of their attempts to colonize swaths of Honduras. Squier was thus on hand in London to work on the Dallas-Clarendon convention with the United States in which Great Britain agreed to abandon the Bay Islands and its colony in Mosquitia. Britain never ratified the treaty, so Squier mediated a bilateral one between Britain and Honduras with the same effect, but would not finally be ratified until 1861.

The Honduras Interoceanic Railway Company sold its charter to British investors, with Squier remaining on the board of the now-British company. Investment was slow as subsequent studies of the plan showed it to be uneconomical; much more costly than Squier had estimated. Cholera, which Squier had written didn't exist in Central America, broke out in 1857. By 1858, Squier wrote that he was "pretty much tired to death with this abominable railway and long to have it out of my way." The U.S. Civil War later interrupted any American investment and the project was discarded. In 1869, the United States' own transcontinental railway was completed and the idea of Honduras' railroad became obsolete.

Sadly, the Hondurans took it upon themselves to build the railroad and secured a large international debt that would burden Honduras well into the 20th century. Only the 57 mile section from Puerto Cortés to San Pedro Sula would be built-- resulting in San Pedro Sula becoming one of the largest commercial centers in Honduras, but with little benefit to the rest of the nation. My wife, who is Honduran, tells me of the psychological effect of the unfulfilled dream of this railroad over the decades. Until U.S. Millenium Challenge funds later constructed an interstate that traversed roughly the same route 150 years later, the promise was never realized. Ironically, I note an article in Chinese state media this week quoting a Honduran legislature speaking favorably of a new desire by the People's Republic of China to build the trans-oceanic railroad. Squier's impossible dream thus lives on.

Nevertheless, as Stansifer remarks from his 1960 vantagepoint, Squier was ultimately seen in Honduras as a friend. Wikipedia and other sources on the internet today note little of the intrigue and his efforts to arm Cabañas and see Honduras annexed to the United States, nor the racism in his writings on the country.

The book is incredibly well-sourced with a rich bibliography of works, some of which are now surely lost. I give it 3 stars for its historical importance, but you have to read Professor Stansifer's research a century later to get the complete story.