The British General Election of 2001

Nuffield Election Studies #16

by David Edgeworth Butler, Dennis Kavanagh

Book by Butler, David, Kavanagh, Dennis

Genres: Politics, Nonfiction

372 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2002

About the author

Sir David Edgeworth Butler, CBE, FBA was an English political scientist who made a major contribution to the study of UK elections, particularly through the series of Nuffield Election Studies which has covered every UK general election since 1945. Butler was a commentator on the BBC's election night coverage from 1950 to 1979 and was a co-inventor of the swingometer. He later appeared as an electoral analyst on various television and radio programmes, including for ITV on the night of the 1997 general election, and Sky News election night coverage in 2001. He also appeared as a guest on the BBC's coverage of both the 2010 and 2015 general elections.

[with thanks to Wikipedia]

Reviews

[Peter Lutz · Rating 4 out of 5]

Tony Blair’s second term victory was even more dull than his first, with little drama throughout the entirety of the Parliament. His opposition–led by the plutocratic wet blanket William Hague–was often rudderless and unwilling to challenge the major policies of the government. The campaign itself had no moments of intrigue save John Prescott’s punch, and the final result was a makeup of seats nearly unchanged from 1997.

If you’re a veteran of the Nuffield series the structure is not changed from past editions, which makes assigning a star rating difficult. I settled for a 4/5 because Butler and Kavanagh are hamstrung by the nature of the stable electoral dynamics. Labour kept their advantage on salient social issues (health, education, economic affairs) and the Conservatives mostly disengaged from said topics. Fighting the election on crime and the Euro is viewed as a strategic blunder, but how would the Tories have fared if they claimed they had the credibility to manage the NHS, for example? Hague’s “core vote” gambit had a high ceiling and high floor; minute gains were not viewed as a success. Butler and Kavanagh believe Tony Blair had fundamentally shifted the political order and constricted the Overton window, and I’m inclined to agree. They are also careful to avoid writing off the Tories as they nearly did with Labour in 1992; eventually both ‘92 Labour and the Tories post-Hague had their day in the sun, but it didn’t happen without learning lessons. To cap the point: despite their four years out of government, the party was afflicted by the same rates of tactical voting as ‘97–voters were not entirely happy with Labour’s record, but they were miles more distrustful of the Conservative Party.

More voters than ever simply did not care about the election. Voting intention trends were remarkably immovable during Labour’s 4 years (excepting the fuel blockade in the fall of 2000). The trend of stability remained during the campaign period; not even the foot and mouth crisis could shake preferences. As previously stated no truly exciting development could envelop media coverage as “Jennifer’s ear” in ‘92 or even the Bell/Hamilton matchup in ‘97 could. Coupled with the lack of disagreement between Blair and Hague on how they’d govern Britain, turnout plummeted and third party votes rose modestly. Just 75% of seats were in the hands of the two major parties; a lower figure had not been seen in decades.

Lasly, it is worth speaking on the wonderful 2nd appendix that thoroughly investigates the electoral results and trends with statistics. The dynamics of 2023 can be evinced in the changes of 2001: Labour slipped slightly in the working-class heartland disillusioned by their abandoning of the political left flank, but limited any damage among the educated and middle classes. Perplexingly, the marginal Labour-defended seats actually shifted left on average, perhaps owing to the sheer organizational weakness and blundering of a once-mighty Tory electoral apparatus. While it may not have been argued explicitly at times, Labour was not in as sunny of a position as first believed. Their loss in the national vote share of about 2.5% would be enough to knock down more tenuous majorities. A comfy and downright undemocratic electoral bias boosted the party greatly, and a Tory party in shambles never had a chance of actually winning government. Trust in parties rose handsomely. Blair had his 2nd landslide, but with nowhere near the euphoria of 1997. If the opposition got their act together, and if external events befell his government, it could all come tumbling down.