This slim volume provides a profound and accessible entry to understand some of Clausewitz's key approaches and novel suggestions. Sumida starts by assessing the evidence to suggest that the work we have now probably is a largely complete work, rather than being the early draft that some other writers have suggested. He then goes through a series of three-chapter assessment (the tripartite model surely being no accident, given Clausewitz's fascination by whta he called 'the trinity') - looking a theorists (Jomini, Corbett, and Liddell Hart), scholars (Aron, Paret, Gallie), antecedents, and key principles. Sumida's key point is that Clausewitz regarded war as something too complex for pure rational and mechanical models, as something where the the ability to command could be developed through a process of historical re-enactment (taking what is known of a historical situation, supplementing that with assumption based on expertise, and using this to get into the mind of the commander when having to make a decision), and as something where it is harder to attack a country than it is to defend it. Despite the significant and inherent complexity of the subject matter and concepts, Sumida presents his arguments in a manner that is clear and convincing. A vital work for any serious student of war.